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Foreword 
The nation is still in the midst of an unprecedented upward trend in 
prosperity and economic growth. It has already attained a level of 
national and per capita income which would have seemed unattainable 
only three decades ago. But the end is not yet iri sight and American 
society has deHned substantiative future goals accordingly. These 
are goals in general which suggest opportunity for all individuals and 
groups to share equitably in participation and gain from this advance. 
If they are to be attained I these goals also require an appraisal of the 
nation 1 s policies in repect th their contribution to or restraint on attainment 
over the next decade. 
Agricultural policies are important ones of the set to be examined. 
The agricultural industry has contributed greatly to the economic 
advance and income of the nation. Not only has agriculture freed 
resources to be used on other fronts of economic growth but it supplies 
food to consumers at the lowest real price over the entire world. But even 
with these attainments 1 a major portion of the nation 1 s poverty still 
resides within agriculture. Farm communities have fewer facilities for 
and attainment in education and vocational training than the urban society. 
Large public outlays are still' used to restrain supply in an attempt to 
assure an equitable share in the national economic growth to which the 
commercial farm sector contributes. 
Our farm policies are largely geared to the conditions and needs 
of the three previous decades. Perhaps some are inconsistent with 
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our broader national and international goals for the decades ahead. The 
Fifth· Annual Farm Policy Review Conference was organized accordingly. 
The papers contain an appraisal . of the performance of current farm policies 
in respect to lessening poverty, to an equitable distribution of the gains 
from economic growth, to prospects and performance in international 
markets , to further advances and sturctural adjustments of the farm 
industry, and to attainment in education and public knowledge. They 
also suggest instruments and means which would allow farm policies 
to be better meshed with the nation•s broader social and economic 
goals in the period ahead. 
The Fifth Annual Farm Policy Review Conference was held in 
Washington, D. C. at the request of members of Congress and program 
administrators. It was attended by many individuals representing 
these groups and by those representing farm organizations and uni-
versities or other research, educational, and service institutions. 
These conferences have served greatly to stimulate direct communication 
between government representatives, university scientists and farm leaders. 
It is hoped that this process can continue. 
Earl 0. Heady 
Executive Director 
Center for Agricultural and1 
Economic Development 
Iowa State University 
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COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE'S RESPONSE TO NATIONAL FARM POLICIES 
by K. L. Robinson! 
It is appropriate to begin with a review of the present position of com-
mercial farmers and the impact which recent government programs have had 
on those farms which account for a large proportion of all farm products sold. 
According to recent USDA figures, there are approximately 3. 5 million farms. 
But less than half of these farms produce the bulk of farm products which 
move through commercial channels of trade. The top 27 percent of all farms 
(those with sales in excess of $10, 000 annually) now account for nearly 80 
percent of the total value of farm products sold (Table 1)" Almost a million 
farms fall in this category. Another 600,000 farms have annual sales which 
fall between $5, 000 and $10, 000 annually. Most of these also can be 
classified as commercial farms, but their numbers are dwindling, and most 
farms in this category face severe adjustment problems, Finally, there are 
nearly two million farms with reported sales of $5J 000 or less, but they 
account for less than 10 percent of all farm products sold. On most of 
these farms, income from nonfarm sources is far more important than in-
come from the sale of farm products. The.ir prosperity is already influenced 
much more by developments outside of agriculture than by the level of farm 
prices or by agricultural support programs 0 
It is, of course, extremely difficult and frequently misleading to attempt 
to generalize about farmers today because of the wide diversity that exists 
in farm sizes and incomes. Despite unfavorable prices for most farm pro-
ducts, high costs and frequently a shortage of skilled and reliable labor, 
some farmers are doing remarkably welL Others are building up debts and 
are falling farther behind each year. 
Typical labor incomes on dairy farms in the Northeast, for example, 
have been around $3,000 in recent yearso Average incomes for the majority 
of farmers certainly are low in relation to those of employed workers in 
nonfarm occupations. But the average figures tell only part of the story. 
Among a group of 18 above-average dairy farms in New York, all family 
owned and operated with no more than one or two hired men per farm, the 
range in labor incomes (after allowing for a 5 percent return on capital) 
in 19 63 was from less than $3, 000 for four of the farms to more than $10,000 
for six of the farms. One farmer earned a labor income of more than $2 5, 000. 
1 Professor of agricultural economics, Cornell University. 
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Table 1 Number of Farms and Proportion of Sales 
by Sales Classes, 1963 
Farms with 
sales of: 
$10,000andup 
$ .S, r:no to $10,000 
$ 2 • 50 0 to $ 5 , 0 0 0 
Less than $ 2, 500 
Number of 
Farms 
(million) 
1.0 
• G 
, 5 
1.5 
Percent of 
All Farms 
27 
17 
13 
43 
100 
Source: USDA, Farm Income Situation, November 1964. 
(percent) 
Percent of 
Total Sales 
78 
13 
5 
4 
100 
Similar extremes can be found among any group of commercial farmers at 
present. Those farmers with superior management ability and the capital to 
make improvements are doing remarkably well. 
At least a part of the present wide range in incomes is associated with 
farm siz;es. Farmers v;itl qro:3s sales of less than $5,000 annually obviously 
fL1d :t cxire.TJely diffi.cult to pa:r· production expenses and have enough left 
,:c r~,n),rtaln a reasonajJJe level of living unless they can earn income from 
off--farm vvork. Even those farrns •,vHL sales of $5, 000 to $10, 000 nave 
Hrr1ited potent lal ean• ii'~ capacity. Tt js generally acknowledged that a 
farmer needs to sell farm products valued at $10, 000 or more each year to 
farm successfully today. Farmers themselves have recognized this. The 
number of farms with sales in excess of $10,000 annually has, in fact, 
been rising in recent years, while the number of farms with sales of less 
than this amount has been declinmg, especially those with sales of less 
than $5,000 annually. 
Every year since 1935, the total number of farms has been less than in 
the preceding year. Jn the decade of the 1940's the average rate of decline 
fell between 1 and 2 percent per year o During the past decade, including 
the past five years, the rate of decline has averaged about 3 percent per 
year. Thus, the decline in farm numbers is clearly a bi-partisan phenom-
eriOIL The exodus from agriculture has continued in every administration 
and under every Secretary of Agriculture that has held office during the past 
30 years. 
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Effects of Recent Federal Farm Programs on Commercial Agriculture 
We have at present an extremely diverse and complex assortment of 
commodity programs. These programs provide price supports at widely 
varying levels for some commodities but not others. Those commodities 
which are supported now account for roughly one half the total cash re-
ceipts of farmers. Livestock and most livestock products (other than 
milk and dairy products), fruits and vegetables are not supported al-
though the prices of many of these non-supported commodities are in-
fluenced indirectly by support programs on other commodities and, in a 
few cases, by marketing orders. Present support programs are buttressed 
by a wide range of activities designed to reduce supplies or to increase 
consumption, either at horne or abroad. These include compulsory acreage 
allotments for some crops but not others, the school lunch, school milk and 
food stamp programs, export subsidies, sales of surplus commodities for 
foreign currencies and gifts for relief. More recent! y, large- scale land 
retirement programs have been added. It is obviously very difficult to sep-
arate out the effects of these programs from all the other factors which have 
influenced farm output, prices and incomes over the past decade. Never-
theless, I think it is important to try to do this if one is to provide informa-
tion on which to base rational policy decisions. 
Farm programs probably have influenced prices and incomes much more 
during the past decade than during the depression years of the 1930's and 
certainly more than during the decade of the 1940's. During the first 15 
years of government price-support and acreage control programs, that is 
from about 1933 to 1948, recovery from the depression, drought in the rnid-
1930' s and World War II had far more influence on agriculture than did farm 
programs. The agricultural adjustment programs adopted in the 1930's 
unquestionably influenced the production of individual commodities such 
as cotton and tobacco, but they had only a very modest effect on total 
farm output. Average farm prices were increased as a result of the stor-
age and loan program when commodities moved into storage in the late 
1930's, but they were later depressed when the accumulated storage 
stocks were liquidated. Thus, the net effect was to moderate the price 
fluctuations rather than to raise by a substantial margin the average level 
of farm prices. 
Government programs also helped to cushion the decline in prices 
which occurred in the late 1940's. But again, the effect of the support 
programs during late 1940's and early 1950's was mainly to moderate 
price fluctuations rather than to add significantly to average farm incomes. 
Storage holdings acquired in the late 1940's were reduced during the 
Korean emergency. 
Government policies began to have a much greater impact on agriculture 
during the decade following the Korean War (beginning about 19 53). In the 
late 1950's and early 1960's, net farm incomes probably were increased by 
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a minimum of 20 percent and perhaps as much as 50 percent by government 
price-support, acreage diversion and surplus disposal programs. 2 The 
greater impact of government programs during the past decade than during 
earlier periods is due principally to the fact that substantial quantities of 
farm products were held off the market and stored or diverted to non-
commercial outlets, mainly abroad. In addition, beginning in the late 
1950's and continuing in the early 1960' sJ total farm output, and not just 
the production of individual commodities, was held down by land retirement 
programs. Substantial export subsidies and transfers of income via direct 
payments, as under the feed grain, cotton, sugar and wool programs, also 
have contributed to maintaining or raising farm incomes during recent years. 
Increases in cash costs relative to gross receipts in recent years have 
made net farm incomes more vulnerable to changes in farm prices than was 
true 20 or 30 years ago. At present, a decline of 10 percent in gross re-
ceipts is likely to be accompanied by a reduction of between 30 and 35 
percent in net farm income, and an even greater percentage decline in the 
net cash income available to buy new equipment or to repay debts. Thus, 
price declines are more serious now than a decade or two ago because of 
the higher leverage or multiplier effect such changes are likely to have 
on net farm incomes. 
Despite support programs, the average level of farm prices in the 
United States has been relatively low in recent years when measured 
against either world prices or histori.cal price relationships in this country. 
Our prices for feed grains, soybeans, poultry and eggs are among the 
lowest in the world. The prices which our farmers receive for wheat, cotton, 
rice and tobacco, although above those prevailing in the lowest-price 
countries, are well below those which are maintained in many countries. 
The index of average farm prices in the United States in 1963-64 was 4 
percent below the level prevailing a decade earlier, while the index of 
prices paid was 12 percent higher. During each of the past three years, 
the parity ration, that is the average relationship between prices received 
and paid by farmers (with the 1910-14 relationship equal to 100) has fallen 
below 80. The only other period since World War I that the ratio has re-
mained this low for as long as three years was during the early 1930" So 
The current ratio is substantially below that which prevailed during the 
agricultural depression of the 1920's. 
2For a review of these estimates see 11 Farm Program Benefits and Costs 
in Recent Years, 11 a study prepared for the Senate Committee on Agri-
culture and Forestry by Walter W. Wilcox of the Legislative Reference 
Service and published as a Committee Print, 88th Congress, Second 
Session, October 1964. 
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Had farm price-support/ storage, acreage diversion and export subsidy 
programs not been in effect during the past decade, there is no question 
but that farm prices would have declined even further. Various statistical 
methods have been used in an attempt to estimate how much prices might 
have fallen in the absence of government programs. All are subject to limi-
tations/ particularly with respect to the effect lower prices might have had 
on subsequent supplies, but they offer convincing evidence of the critical 
role which support programs have played during the recent years in main-
taining farm prices substantially above the levels that would have prevailed 
under free-market conditions. The effects obviously have been much greater 
on some commodities, such as wheat, cotton, tobacco and rice than on other 
commodities such as fruits, vegetables, eggs and poultry. Indirectly, sup-
ports and storage or diversion programs have significantly influenced live-
stock product prices, particularly the prices of beef and pork. Had surplus 
grain stocks not been held off the market, prices would have been forced 
down to a level at which it would have been profitable to convert the addi-
tional grain into beef/ pork and poultry. This/ in turn, would have de-
pressed the average prices of all livestock products. 
Producers of supported commodities undoubtedly have received a large 
share of the benefits of federal farm programs, but the producers of such 
non-supported commodities as pork and beef also have gained, at least in 
the short run. Benefits have been allocated among producers roughly in 
proportion to sales. Thus 1 the top 25 to 30 percent of all farmers (those 
with sales in excess of $10,000 annually) have probably obtained about 
80 per cent of the benefits. 
Those leaving agriculture also have benefited indirectly from support 
programs because of the effect such programs have had on farm values. 
Over the past three years, prices of farm land have risen at the average 
rate of about 5 per cent per year. The recent inflation in land prices has 
been due in part to intense competition among farmers who want to en-
large their farms. But at least a significant part of the gain has been due 
to government programs. Certainly land values would have risen less if 
such programs had not been in effect. While higher land values have pro-
vided a form of capital gains to farmers who have sold out, it must be 
recognized that these higher prices also have raised entry costs and 
thereby created a higher cost structure for those purchasing farms. 
Farm price-support and supply adjustment programs clearly have 
helped to maintain or raise the average level of farm prices, incomes and 
land values during the past decade. The effect of such programs on out-
put and efficiency is much more difficult to determine. Some of the pro-
grams which have been in effect during the past 10 years have had a 
retarding effect on output and efficiency 1 while others have stimulated 
the adoption of new technology and thus have contributed to increases 
in yields. My own judgement/ based on fragmentary and admittedly not 
very satisfactory data/ is that our farm programs had a net positive effect 
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on output during much of the 1950's, but that they have had a retarding 
effect on output during the past three to five years. During the most 
recent period, the withdrawal of land from production under various 
types of government programs probably has been sufficient to offset a 
major part of the yield-increasing stimulus of price and income-support 
programs. This was not true during most of the 1950's. Except in 1957-
58, total farm output was not materially influenced by government programs. 
During the past four years, however, the area planted to crops has been 
reduced by 40 to 50 million acres which is equivalent to a 13 percent re-
duction in land inputs. As a result of this large-scale withdrawal of land, 
production has been held below where it would otherwise have been. 
Among the major agricultural nations of the world, the United States 
is unique in having adopted programs designed to limit production. Mainly 
because of these programs, per capita supplies of agricultural products in 
the United States have averaged very little higher during the past three 
years than in the early 1950 1 s.- (table 2). In contrast, per capita supplies 
of farm products are now much larger than a decade ago in most other in-
dustrial nations, and especially in Japan, Australia and Western Europe. 
Total agricultural output rose even in Eastern Europe, the USSR and Latin 
America more than jn the United States between 19 52 -·4 and 19 62 ·-4. 
Changes in the use of farm inputs during the past decade are in line 
with those that probably would have occurred in the absence of govern-· 
ment programs. Farmers are now using a third less labor than a decade 
ago, 10 to 15 per cent less land, about the same quantity of machinery, 
and much more fertilizer, chemicals and purchased feed (Table 3). It is 
unlikely that the exodus from agriculture could have been speeded up 
much more without causing serious problems for rural communities. In 
the absence of price-support programs, slightly larger numbers of people 
mtght have left agriculture, but there is little evidence to suggest that 
such programs have been a significant factor in the decision to leave or 
to rema.in in agriculture. Income differentials have been so wide, par-
ticularly for those operating small farms,. that there has been ample in-
centive to move whenever jobs were available. The rate of exodus from 
agriculture has undoubtedly been influenced much more by nonfarm em-
ployment opportunities than by farm programs. 
In the absence of government programs u the amount of income avail-
able to finance improvements undoubtedly would have been reduced. This 
in turn would have made creditors less willing to finance the purchase of 
additional machinery and perhaps other inputs as well. The question of 
fertilizer purchases is the most critical, since inputs of fertilizer have 
probably contributed more to increasmg output in recent years than any 
other factor. Over the past l 0 years, the total quantity of plant nutrients 
applied, (nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium combined) has increased 
more than 75 percent. If one accepts the rule of thumb which has been sug-
gested by some agronomists that a ton of applied plant nutrients will add the 
Table 2 
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Percent Changes in Total and Per Capita Farm Output, 
Selected Areas and Countries, 1952-54 to 1962-64 
Perc·ent chang:e 
Country or Area Total Per capita 
Japan 51 
Australia 41 
Eastern Europe and USSR 34 
Latin America 34 
Western Europe 25 
U. S. A. 19 
Source: World Agricultural Situation, ERS, USDA, 1965 
Table 3 Changes in Major Farm Inputs 
· 1953-54 to 1963-64 
36 
15 
18 
1 
15 
1 
Farm Inputs 
Percent change, 1953-54 to 
1963-64* 
Farm labor (man-hours) - 36 
Cropland planted - 13 
Machinery + 2 
Feed, seed and livestock purchased +54 
Fertilizer + 76 
* Partly estimated. 
Source: USDA, Chang:es in Farm Production and Efficiency, Statistical 
Bulletin No. 233, Revised July 1964. 
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equivalent of 10 tons of grain, then as much as 80 per cent of the increase 
in total grain production which has occurred during the past decade can be 
attributed to increased use of fertilizer. Even if farm product prices had 
been lower, it is doubtful if the use of fertilizer would have been greatly 
curtailed. Marginal returns from increased use of fertilizer at recent 
prices have been as high as three dollars for each dollar spent. 
Regional shifts in production undoubtedly have been inhibited by acre-
age allotment programs tied to historical bases. In the absence of allot-
ment programs, production of cotton undoubtedly would have declined in 
the Southeast and increased in the Southwest. A somewhat larger propor-
tion of the wheat crop also would have been produced in those areas where 
costs are low and alternatives limited such as the Great Plains and the 
Pacific Northwest and a smaller proportion in the eastern states. The con-
solidation of farms would have been encouraged, and, on the average, 
greater efficiency in the use of both labor and machinery would have been 
achieved. Farms have grown in size despite these programs, but consoli-
dation probably would have occurred at an even more rapid pace in the 
absence of such programs o At the same time, one must recognize that 
increases in labor efficiency have been achieved in part because farmers 
have had the income (and hence the capital) to buy additional land, 
machinery, improved seeds, fertilizer, irrigation equipment, etc. 
In summary,, the effects of farm programs on commercial farmers and 
their present position is about as follows: 
1. Despite government support programs, farm prices are now rela-
tively low by historical standards, but they are probably at least 
l 0 per cent higher than they would be in the absence of govern-
ment programs. 
2. A significant minority of farmers have demonstrated that they can 
operate profitably under pre sent adverse price relationships o 
They have been able to do this by enlarging their farm, using 
higher yielding crop pra.ctices and bu.ying additional machineryo 
3. The income spread within agriculture is probably widening. 
Farmers with superior management ability have increased their 
incomes relative to those who have been unwilling or unable to 
adopt new production practices. 
4. Large numbers of small-scale farms still remain in agriculture 
despite the rapid adjustments that have occurred in recent years. 
Only a small fraction of those operating such farms (i.e., farms 
with current sales of $5, 000 or less) will ever be able to earn a 
satisfactory income solely from agriculture. 
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5. Farm programs have not seriously impeded resource adjustments 
in agriculture. The quantity of labor and land employed in agri-
culture has continued to decline, and the use of capital, and 
especially fertilizer, has increased. These are changes· which prob-
ably would have occurred in the absence of government programs, 
although probably at somewhat different rates. 
6. Farm incomes and land values are now higher than they would have 
been in the absence of government programs. At least a part of 
these gains have been capitalized into land values, thereby adding 
to capital requirements for new entrants into agriculture. 
7. Some of the agricultural programs which have been in effect during 
recent years have led to increases in yields and efficiency, while 
others have had a retarding effect. I find it difficult to make a 
positive statement about whether gains have exceeded losses or 
the reverse. The changes in resource use that have been induced 
by price-support and related programs are probably small relative 
to those resulting from technological developments and market 
forces. The major factors contributing to increased output during 
the past decade have been improved varieties and cultural prac-
ticeS which have been developed in large part With public finds 1 
and cheap fertilizer, improved chemicals and farm machinery, 
which have been produced mainly by private industry. 
Magnitude of the Present Surplus Problem 
Experience during recent years strongly suggests that more farm pro-
ducts are likely to be produced by farmers during the next few years at 
prices averaging between 75 and 80 percent of parity (if production is un-
controlled) than consumers, either at horne or abroad, might purchase at 
these prices. The amount by which prices would have to be reduced in 
order to achieve equilibrium between commercial demand and supply ob-
viously cannot be forecast with any degree of precision, partly because 
the effects of future technological developments are unknown. Most 
economists who have made an attempt to forecast future demand and sup-
ply conditions have come to the conclusion that, even under the unfavor-
able price relationships that have prevailed in recent years, the surplus 
problem is likely to persist, at least during the next five to ten years. 
If yields continue to rise at rates which approximate those that have pre-
vailed in the recent past, we will be able to meet anticipated domestic 
and export demands 10 or 15 years hence with no more land in production 
that has been planted to crops in recent years, arid less land than was 
farmed in the 1950 1 s. 3 
3see Earl 0. Heady, 11 Potential Shifts in Commercial Agriculture Rela-
tive to Technological Change; Policies for Long-Run Solution to Surplus 
Problems, .. this volume. 
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The size of the surplus is obviously dependent on prices. To main-
tain the present level of pricesu it probably will be necessary over the 
next five to ten years, either to purchase farm products equivalent in 
value to between 5 and 8 per cent of annual production if output is not 
restricted, or to make corresponding adjustments in production. This is 
merely an informed guess, and for this reason should not be considered 
as a precise forecast. A period of adverse weather or a new international 
crisis might temporarily eliminate the surplus problem. Nevertheless, it 
would appear prudent for the United States to be prepared to deal with a 
continuing adjustment problem in agriculture over the next decade of about 
the same dimensions as in the recent past. 4 This suggests that we should 
be prepared to consider something more than one or two-year "emergency" 
programs, 
Alternative Courses of Action 
American agriculture has achieved a tolerable degree of adjustment with 
the assistance of the federal government during the past few years. Physi-
cal surpluses of most commodities have been reduced. Except for cotton 
and tobacco, average annual disappearance of every major farm commodity 
has equalled or exceeded production during the past three years. Our ex-
perience has demonstrated that the surplus problem is by no means insoluble. 
Nevertheless, I think it fair to say that no one is entirely satisfied with the 
present combination of farm programs. Many farmers are dissatisfied with 
the incomes they now receive; others complain about the controls and the 
bureaucracy necessary to implement the programs which have been adopted; 
nonfarm residents object to the costs associated with supporting agriculture; 
our competitors abroad complain about our export policies; and economists 
frequently assert that too little attention has been given to policies which 
will facilitate long--run resource adjustments. ·while criticisms abound 0 
one must not lose sight of the fact that the present combination of programs 
does represent an acceptable compromise, There is probably less opposi-
tion among commercial farmers to present programs, complicated though 
they are, than to most of the alternatives that have been proposed. 
In view of the support that exists for the current mixture of programs, 
it is probably unrealistic to think in terms of eliminating all supports or of 
relying on a single proposal such as comprehensive supply controls to 
achieve a balance between consumption and production. The important 
policy issue at present is to decide what combination of programs appears 
to be reasonable. My assignment is not to attempt to prescribe the opti-
mum mix of programs (even if I were capable of doing so to the satisfaction 
4The magnitude of the surplus problem in the late 1950's, according 
to recent estimates prepared by Tyner and Tweeten ranged between 5 
and 11 percent. The gap averaged over 7 per cent between 19 60 and 
1962. Fred H. Tyner and Luther G. Tweeten, "Excess Capacity in 
U. S. Agriculture," Agricultural Economics Research, Vol. XVL No. 
1, January 1964, pp, 23-31. 
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of all interested groups), but merely to suggest possible modifications of 
present programs or changes in emphasis that might be considered, and 
to point out some of the consequences of such changes. 
Since government costs are a focal point of opposition to present pro-
grams, I shall begin by listing the alternatives in ascending order of costs. 
They are as follows: 
1 . Lower support prices 
2. Limit production or sales through the use of effective, 
compulsory controls 
3. Programs involving multiple pricing 
4. Voluntary land retirement 
5. Purchase, store and dispose of surplus commodities 
6. Make direct payments to increase total returns to producers 
above the amounts that might be obtained from the sale 
of farm products 
The problems associated with each of these alternatives will be discussed 
in tum. 
Lower Supports 
The direct and indirect costs of agricultural support programs now 
account for more than one half the total agricultural budget. Eventually, 
savings of perhaps $3 billion in government costs might be achieved if all 
support programs were eliminated, but the short-run effects on the budget 
of reducing support prices would be much less since a significant part of 
present costs are associated with storing, handling and disposing of sur-
plus commodities that have been accumulated in prior years. 
The conflict over high vs. low supports which dominated farm policy 
discussions in the 1950's has diminished in intensity during recent years. 
Secretary Benson achieved at least a partial victory in his efforts to use 
the price mechanism to reduce agricultural surpluses and cut government 
costs. Few people are now advocating a return to high supports unless 
they are accompanied by effective supply controls. The major issue at 
pre sent is whether support prices should be lowered still further. 
Most economists concede that lower support prices would tend to slow 
down the rate at which farm production might increase in the future by re-
ducing incomes and hence the amount of capital available for investment. 
Moderate price reductions, however, could not be expected to bring about 
an immediate decrease in farm production or a significant increase in 
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consumption. Prices would have to be reduced very substantially to have an 
immediate effect on production. The costs to society of eliminating sur-
pluses through price reductions alone would indeed be very great. Creditors, 
merchants in rural areas, and local schools would be among those adversely 
affected as well as farmers. Lower support prices for some commodities, 
however, would help to reduce costs associated with export subsidies and, 
through their influence on land valuesJ would make it less expensive to re-
tire cropland under a voluntary land retirement program. Over a period of 
years, lower support prices also might help restore or improve the compet-
itive position of such commodities as cotton and tobacco. 
Compulsory Controls 
The least-cost method of eliminating agricultural surpluses, if one 
assumes that dropping supports is not a feasible alternative, is to make 
production controls or sales quotas effective without compensating producers 
for resources withheld from productiono To be effective, present minimum 
acreage restrictions would have to be abolished, and further cuts in allot-
ments would have to be made in order to offset the effects of higher yields. 
Some method also would have to be adopted to prevent the acres withdrawn 
from allotment crops from being planted to non-allotment crops. Alternatively, 
sales quotas might be employed, HoweverJ thus far both Congress and pro-
ducers have been reluctant to accept this alternative. Unless controls were 
comprehensive and included most commodities, resources formerly used to 
produce commodities subject to control would be diverted to other commodi-
ties, thereby creating new surplus problems. Potential gains in efficiency 
also would be sacrificed unless some provision were made to transfer sales 
quotas between producers. Many farm operators have far more to gain from 
increasing output and reducing costs than from moderate increases in prices. 
The individual farmer looks at these programs from the standpoint of the 
effect they might have on his farm business, not the aggregate effects. 
This .is why it is difficult to get producer acceptance for such programs 
even though one can argue convincingly that total returns to farmers could 
be increased if sales of farm products were restricted. 
Multiple Pricing 
For some commodities, it is possible to raise or maintain returns to 
producers above the level that would prevail under free-market conditions by 
charging buyers different prices for the same product, depending on use. For 
a number of years, this principle has been used to improve returns to pro-
ducers operating under federal marketing orders. A high proportion of the 
fluid milk sold in urban areas is now priced in this manner. All costs of 
marketing order programs are assessed against producers or handlers. 
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More recently the principles of multiple pricing have been applied to 
wheat. Under the present wheat certificate program, the average market 
price of wheat is maintained at a relatively low level. Those who agree 
to restrict their acreage are given certificates for a part of their crop which 
can be converted into cash. The payments made to participating farmers are 
financed largely by the sale of certificates to wheat processors or exporters. 
Thus, government costs are relatively low. Any farmer who wants to increase 
wheat production is free to do so, although he receives lower average returns 
per bushel of wheat than those farmers who elect to participate in the program 
and agree to restrict production. 
In practice, multiple price programs probably can be applied succussfully 
to only a few of our present surplus commodities such as wheat, milk and 
possibly rice. Government costs can be reduced and returns to producers 
maintained or increased only if the higher prices charged buyers for a part of 
the total volume, or the cost of certificates, can be passed on to consumers 
without greatly influencing sales. It is also essential to have a secondary 
outlet, such as the export of feed market for wheat, which can absorb the 
quantities not sold in the primary or high-priced market. 
Voluntary Land Retirement Programs 
Recent experience suggests that we can continue to avoid any serious 
build-up of farm surpluses (assuming the present level of support prices is 
maintained) if we are willing to spend between one and two billion dollars per 
year to induce farmers to keep land idle. In general, it is cheaper to pay 
farmers not to plant crops than to purchase, store and try to dispose of sur-
plus commodities once they are produced. A land retirement program can 
probably be operated at about one half the cost or less of a purchase, stor-
age and disposal program, provided the program is operated efficiently. 
The present voluntary feed grain program is expensive mainly because it 
has been directed towards retiring part of the acreage on each participating 
farm. To get farmers to cut back their acreage, it is necessary to compensate 
them, not only for the idle land, but also for their labor, management and 
capital on which they would have earned a return if the additional acreage had 
been planted. Marginal returns from planting additional acreage are usually 
very high. For this reason, compensation rates must be high if farmers are 
to be induced to participate. The costs of retiring land under the present 
feed grain program have exceeded 50 percent of the gross value of production 
per acre. 
Government costs could be reduced to as low as 20 to 30 percent of the 
gross value of output per acre if the program were concentrated in certain 
areas, and whole farms rather than part of the acreage on each participating 
farm were retired. Average annual costs might be lowered still further if 
farm land in marginal areas were purchased by the government. The rule to 
be followed, if cost minimization is the objective, is to concentrate land 
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retirement (or purchases) in those areas where land values and hence rental 
rates are lowest in relation to the value of output per acre. A selective farm 
rental or purchase program obviously would have a much greater impact on 
certain areas tha.n t~e present program under which payments are distributed 
widely. Merchants and suppliers of farm services in such areas would be 
adversely affected. 
Purchase, Storage and Surplus Disposal 
At a cost of between two and four billion dollars annually, the United 
States probably could continue to maintain a balance between production and 
use of farm products w1thout supply controls, provided sufficient outlets for 
surplus commodities could. be found. It is difficult at pre sent to find addi-
tional outlets for farm products w.ithin the United States that do not substi-
tute wholly or in part for normal commercial sales. The net addition to the 
total demand for farm products of present internal food subsidy programs such 
as the school lunch, school milk and food stamp programs is less than 1 per 
cent of total production. There is little prospect of increasing internal con-
sumption of farm products by much more than one percent. 
The greatest. potential for increased use of farm products dearly lies in 
the developing countries, nc;t in the United State:> or in countries which ca.n 
afford to buy our farm products such as those in Western Europe. At present, 
under the Food for Peace program, we are disposing of commodities valued at 
about $1" 6 billion per yeaL It may be unrealistic, however, to count on an 
expansion of disposal activities to solve our farm surplus problem. Countries 
which might offer potential outlets may be unwilling to enter into contracts with 
the United States because of the fear of becoming too dependent on us for food, 
or because they fear additional imports might depress their own agricultural 
prices and hence retard internal developmenL The United States also may be 
reluctant, for political reasonsJ to sign agreements with some countries slJ.ch 
as Indonesia, the United Arab Republic or Mainland China which might be 
able to make use of additional quantities of food. For these very practical 
reasons, we may find it difficult to increase the scope of our present surplus 
disposal programs even H we desire to do so and are willing to pay for the 
commodities exported as well as the costs associated with handling and 
transportation. 
The United States has made use of selective payment programs to main-
tain or increase returns to producers of wool, sugar and cotton. In the ca.se 
of wool and sugar, the programs have been relatively easy to finance since 
both commodities are imported in large volume and tariffs are collected on 
all imports. A part of the revenue from import duties has been used to fi--
nance payments to producers. In the case of cotton, payments are now made 
to handlers or producers to make cotton prices more competitive and, at the 
same time, maintain farm incomes" These payments are financed directly 
from the treasury. 
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A direct payment program, such as the present one on cotton, is likely to 
be expensive unless the program is confined to a few commodities with a small 
volume of production. Costs can be held down by lowering the guaranteed or 
support price, by limiting payments to a specified volume, or by divorcing 
payments from production entirely. It is generally acknowledged than an un-
limited direct payments program without production controls, under which the 
government would make up the difference between prices that would clear the 
market and present support prices, would cost considerably more than the 
present combination of acreage allotment, land retirement and surplus dis-
posal programs. 
Conclusions 
While agricultural support programs can continue to make a contribution 
to the incomes of commercial farmers, as they have in the recent past, it is 
well to keep in mind that the major determinant of the long-run level of in-
comes in agriculture is the availability of alternatives. Added incomes from 
support programs will simply contribute to higher land values unless suf-
ficient numbers of farmers cease to bid for the privilege of farming. In the 
long run, programs which contribute to general economic expansion and make 
it possible for those in rural areas to obtain the education needed to complete 
for nonfarm jobs will probably add more to the welfare of commercial farmers 
than will support programs. 
The present combination of agricultural support measures is broadly 
acceptable to farmers, but the package is costly to the treasury. There are 
a number of ways in which costs might be reduced, but not without encount-
tering opposition from producers and those in rural areas who might be ad-
versly affected by attempts to limit production. Any realistic discussion of 
farm policy issues must take account of these restrictions. Furthermore, in 
considering future changes in farm programs, one must recognize that the 
trend in recent years has been away from general legislation towards partic-
ular programs for each of our major surplus commodities: wheat, feed 
grains, cotton, tobacco and dairy products. Greater differentiation among 
commodity programs probably is inevitable since programs that will be 
appropriate and acceptable for one commodity such as cotton may not be for 
another such as wheat or feed grains. 

POTENTIAL SHIFTS IN COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE 
RELATIVE TO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE; 
POLICIES FOR LONG-RUN SOLUTION 
TO SURPLUS PROBLEMS 
by Earl 0. Heady1 
We have now completed a 30-year attempt to restrain commercial agri-
culture within a market framework wherein supply has increased faster than 
demand. The task has not been an easy one, and it has been aided power-
fully in recent years by our ability to use part of our farm output as inter-
national gifts, low cost aids to development and for similar purposes. 
Fundamentally, our policy today, as it has been under both Demo-
cratic and Republican administrations in postwar years, is a simple variation 
of the short-run emergency program which we initiated in 1933. Then, as 
part of a depression mix, and given the knowledge of the time, it was per-
haps an appropriate short-run emergency program. It supposed that if we 
could only "live out" a few years normalcy would be returned, with accept-
able prices and incomes generated more through the market and less through 
public subsidy. This hope is still implicit in our sequence of variations of 
the same program; otherwise we would have turned from emphasis on short-
run orientations aimed at "getting by" the next few years and more towards 
longer-run permanent solutions. As we will show later, the prospects over 
the next 20 years are simply a mirror of those over the last 20 years; the 
supply of basic farm products which could be produced is so large in com-
parison to the expected future domestic demand that prices and income 
generated in a completely free market would be unacceptable to the majority 
of farmers. 
The important question is: Are we going to continue, over the next 20 
years, with a sequence of short-run policies still aimed at "getting by 
over the next year, " with the basic problem still remaining at that time --
even though we may have invested enough to solve it? The net cost of 
production control and price support programs over the 30 years since their 
initiation .has been roundly $50 billion. This does not include foreign dis-
posal, part of the cost of which should be added to domestic farm program 
costs. This $50 billion was enough to have purchased about 700 million 
acres of cropland at the average price prevailing over the period. It 
1Professor of economics and executive director, 
Center for Agricultural and Economic Development. 
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would have purchased 225 miUi.on acres at $200 per acre. In other words, 
the same funds could have been used to attain a permanent solution or con-
tainment of surplus capacity. But with the strategy used the funds were 
spent and the capacity and surplus problem remai.ns more real and intense 
than 30 years ago" 
The broad, aggregative physical and fiscal features of programs pro-
viding a long-run solutionu actually or permanently containing or eliminat-
ing surplus capacity once the funds have been spentu can be outlined easily. 
It is more difficult to specify the details from the standpoint of the farm firm 
whic:t allow such programs to be economically (and, therefore, politically) 
acceptable in the sense that they guarantee positive-sum gains particularly 
among farm familles and rural communities, but also over the entire popula-
tion. We have menticned the negative side of our historic farm policies 
(namely, spending enough funds to solve the surplus problem while still 
having it with us in full scale). But we also need to mention the positive 
side, Farm policies of the last 30 years can be interpreted as instruments 
to help guarantee positive-sum gains from agricultural and economic de-
velopment. Positive-sum gains refer simply, in a very broad sense, to 
providing conditions or supplementing income so that some people will not 
be made "worse off" in income or welfa.re as other persons gaino If some 
persons or communities sacnfice while others gain, we have no means to 
be sure that the negative outcomes for some can be added to the positive 
outcomes for others to provide a sum or net outcome which is either nega--
tive or zero. Without the farm programs of the last three decades we cer-
tainly would have had uncompensated losses to families of farms andrural 
communities for the benefit of the nation's consuming society genera.lly. 
The great upsurge in farm productivity, catalyzed and implemented by 
public and private research and education for agriculture, has brought 
great gains to the consuming society in two ways. It has (a) reduced the 
real price of farm-produced foods a.nd (b) released resources to produce 
other goods and services which consumers in a high income society desire 
more than additional food. But without the offsetting compensation pro-
vided through farm programs, the highly inelastic demand for farm products 
and the large a.nd inflexible short-run supply would have brought income 
losses to farm and related famiLies which cancel, or more, the immediate 
gains to the general society. In other words, the outcome promised to be 
negative sum, with the losses in rural communities being greater than t!1e 
gains to general society. In this vein, policies of the last three decades 
have been based on sound economic logico The important question, how-
ever, is whether this positive-sum outcome could have been attained with 
the same or smaller public outlay, while actually bringing more permanent 
solutions to the problems stemming from rapid technical advance and an 
oversupply of resources in agriculture. We have invested enough to have 
solved the problem, but it remains with us and as highly unsolved as three 
decades back. Shall we make equally large investments over the next two 
decades, only to have the problem as much unsolved as now? 
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Certainly we can set up a long-term goal, to provide appropriate and 
acceptable compensation programs and the conditions of positive-sum out-
comes along the way. We can do this while still arriving at a permanent 
solution--cutting our agricultural plant down to a size consistent with 
modem technology and prospective demand--by means of public expend-
itures over (say) 15 years. We select a period of 15-20 .years so that the 
rate of change will not exceed the ability of rural communities to absorb 
it and so that the annual public outlay to attain it is acceptable to the 
general public. We can attain this goal, however, only if we do now, in 
fact, institute a long-run plan to accomplish it. To attain .it, and to pro-
vide the appropriate mix of policy instruments, we must face up with the 
extent, location and nature of implied changes in production. In the fol-
lowing sections of this paper some of the changes in prospect for the 
future are outlined. They could be brought about either through public 
policy fashioned to attain the particular goals, or through more depend-
ence on market mechanisms. While both means could attain the same 
goal in the long run, they differ greatly in their distribution of gains and 
sacrifices over the farm and nonfarm populations. 
Empirical Study of Extent 
and Location of Surplus Capacity 
As a basis for long-range planning and programs, we have estimated 
the extent and location of surplus land, both as of the present and with 
projections to 1975. These projections have to be made, of course, 
against some level of prices. The levels of prices used in the analysis 
assumes a real price equal to that of the last 5 years. For projections to 
1975, a population of 230 million and a 50-percent increase in per capita 
real income are used. Exports for 19 7 5 were assumed to be 2 5 percent 
above the 1956-62 level for grains and soybeans. We estimated the amount 
and location of land needed to meet domestic and export demand, if real 
prices of the above level were attained. The estimates suppose that the 
above price levels would be attained in the market if the specified amounts 
of land were shifted from crop production to noncompetitive uses; or, they 
would allow a price support level which would cause no loss in treasury 
funds. 
The figures presented are directed at the most efficient national 
pattern of crop production. In other words, acreage for various crops is 
distributed among regions in a manner to provide the lowest national costs 
of production and transportation, considering the location of demand. We 
do not suppose, however, that every farm in each region is "most effi-
cient." The estimates for 1965 assume average costs of production within 
each region, while those for 1975 are based on the input-output relation-
ships and cost estimates outlined later. The acreage and patterns speci-
fied are for the major crops--wheat, cotton, soybeans and feed grains 
(com, oats, barley and grain sorghum). While some surplus capacity also 
exists for other crops, it is small as compared to that for the basic crops 
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mentioned above. 
The most efficient production pattern estimated assumes that produc-
tion would not be held in one region, by programs or institutional re-
straints, when it could be achieved at lower national costs in another 
region. For this analysis, 150 producing regions and 31 consuming 
regions are used. Considering the number of crops concerned, this is 
about the maximum that we could handle under the linear programming 
models used. (More recent models are somewhat larger.) If the nation 
were detailed into more regions and soil groups, even somewhat fewer 
acres would be needed to meet the domestic and export requirements; 
under lower prices, somewhat more land would be used. 
FirstJ we determined the amount and location of land needed to meet 
domestic and export needs in 19 65 if crop supply were to balance demand 
at the specified levels. Next, we estimated the amount and location of 
land needed to meet domestic and export needs in 1975 if supply and de-
mand were again balanced to give the real prices mentioned earlier, and 
if improvements in farming for each region were to follow the trend of the 
past two decades, Finally, we made the same projections,. but assumed 
that fanning in the Southeast would be as efficient as the rest of the 
country in c:-op production by 197 5. Histori.cally, Southern agriculture 
has made some improvements, but it has been restrained by small, low-
income farms depending mostly on labor and handicapped in mecbanization 
and new practices by lack of capital. Our suppositions for the South are 
modest; namely, that it only catches up to the current status of the rest 
of the country in mechanization and that it uses fertilizer (and correspond-
ing crop varieties) in modestly profitable amounts. The region could 1 of 
course, forge much further ahead j n light of its climatic advantages and 
potential in other farm pract.ices. 
To simplify the discussion, we wHl call the first set of figures 11 1965 
estimates, 11 the second set {assuming current trends in technical improve-
ment for all regions) "1975 projected technology,," Since the third set 
assumes that the Southeast will "catch up" on some practices, it will be 
called the "19 7 5 potential technology. " 
Our estimates show roundly 50 mi.llion acres of surplus land, for the 
crops mentioned, in 1965. The surplus land, of course, includes land 
which is under conservation reserve contracts, the feed grain program and 
other acreage diversion programs. To meet requirements, the following 
acreages a.re required under the efficient production pattern: 45. 8 million 
for wheat, 96.7 million for feed grains, 21.3 million for soybeans and 
11. 5 million for cotton. The distribution of this efficient production pat-
tern, by areas of land which would be devoted to these crops, is shown 
in fjgure 1. The distribution of surplus land, which is now in these crops 
or under acreage diversion programs which could be shifted to other uses, 
is indicated in figure 2. Under the most efficient distribution of produc-
tion among regions, the central producing regions (figure 1) for each com-
modity would become more specialized in their major crops than currently 
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holds true. 
For example, the central Com Belt would concentrate more intensely 
on production of com, although fringe com areas around the edge of the 
Com Belt and elsewhere would recede from feed grain production. Wheat 
would be more intensely concentrated in the central winter and spring 
wheat areas but large areas of land would be shifted from this crop in the 
Great Plains and other areas. Cotton, under the existing technologies of 
the two regions, would continue to shift from the Southeast to the South,.. 
west under a production pattern not restrained by acreage quotas and 
allowing national needs to be produced in the most efficient or competitive 
manner. The patterns outlined above are those which we would expect to 
be approached in the long run under allocations of a competitive market 
which reflect the modem state of technology, the magnitude and location 
of demand and without restraints which continue the distribution of pro-
duction in line with the historic mold. 
This 19 65 "efficient pattern" would require the shift of a large acreage 
to other uses in the entire South, although the concentration would be 
especially in the Southeast. Similarly, a large acreage would be shifted 
permanently from field crops, mainly wheat, over the entire reaches of the 
Great Plains stretching from Montana and North Dakota to Texas and New 
Mexico. Not needed for crops, this land would be a candidate for such 
uses as grazing, forestry and recreation. 
In 1975, under projected technology, we estimate that the surplus 
capacity, as compared to national needs under the most efficient produc-
tion pattern described previously, would increase to 66 million acres. 
As figure 3 illustrates, the distribution of surplus land over the nation 
would largely parallel that already outlined for 19 65. However, even more 
land could be shifted from the crops to other uses in the Northern Plains, 
the Southeast and the Southern Plains. A larger acreage also could be 
shifted in the southern Corn Belt and Lake States regions. The central 
Corn Belt, the Pacific West and the most highly specialized wheat areas 
would concentrate fully on crop production. 
The surplus acreage/ in the absence of some unexpected or enlarged 
foreign demand, is projected to grow over 10 years. This is because 
technological improvement (with the trends in each region extended to the 
future) has been increasing more rapidly than demand. The rate of im-
provement is more rapid in such regions as the central Corn Belt and parts 
of the winter wheat regions such as western Nebraska and Kansas/ north-
eastern Colorado, the Pacific Coast, etc. Thus the relative amount of 
surplus land is projected to increase in such geographic regions as the 
Southeast, the northern Great Plains, north and east Oklahoma, eastern 
Wyoming, etc. The term "surplus acreage" refers, as previously, to 
land not needed for field crop production and which could be shifted to 
grazing, forestry or recreation. 
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Under the potential technology for 197 5, supposing simply that the 
Southeast catches up with the rest of the country in the vein mentioned 
above, (1) the amount of surplus land would be increased and (2) the 
location or distribution of surplus land among regions would be changed 
(figure 4). Under this simple change in technology, one easily attain-
able even if over a slightly longer period of time, the surplus acreage to 
be shifted from wheat, cotton, feed grains and soybeans would increase 
to 73 million acres. 
Under the potent.i.al technology for 19 7 5, the amount of surplus land 
to be s~1ifted in the Southeast would decrease importantly and the region 
would become more highly competitive in cotton, feed grains and soy-
beans. The increased acreage of these crops and a corresponding de-
crease in surplus land (figure 4) to be shifted in the South, would cause 
the amount of surplus land in the latter region to decline. The total or 
national acreage of surplus land for the specified crops in 1975 would 
increase from 66 million to 73 million acres under the potential technology 
as compared to the projected technology. However, the surplus acreage 
in the South would actually decline, thus causing a greater surplus in 
many other regions because of (a) the better competitive position of the 
South and (b) the greater total surplus land under the potential technology. 
Under the potential technology, feed grain production would be added 
to the Delta and Southeast states and would expand in the Pacific Coast 
states. Soybean production also would increase in the Southeast and Delta 
states. Feed grain production in the Com Belt would decline by 7 million 
acres under the potential technology as compared to the projected tech-
nology, with much of the land shifted to soybeans. Soybean output in the 
Lake States and Northern Plains would contract with the improved competi-
tive position of the South in soybeans and feed grains and the consequent 
shift between feed grains and soybeans in the Corn Belt. Perhaps the 
most striking change would be the increase in cotton acreage in the South·-
east and Delta states at the expense of the Southwest, As compared with 
the projected technology wheat acreage and production under the potential 
technology would increase in regions of Montana, Colorado, New Mexico, 
the Dakotas and in similar locations. Such a decrease would be caused 
by the improved competitive position of the South in feed grains, its 
"second round effects" on land use .in the Corn Belt and the shift of cot-· 
ton east from the Southwest, with feed grains moving in as a replacement 
in the latter regions. 
The improved technology for the South assumed under the potential 
technology model does not represent practices which are impractical or 
unreasonable. The practices are already well known and are widely 
adopted in other regionso Generally, they require only more capital and 
larger farms--and perhaps a step up in education. They would place the 
South not only in an improved competitive position but also would bring 
it a larger income. 
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Surplus Capacity in 1975 
Demand for food is projected to increase under an expected increase 
in population and per capita income. Despite this, however, a growing 
surplus capacity for American agriculture is fores~en, either under the 
projected or potential technology. Perhaps even the estimates for po-
tential technology are conservative (since technology may increase more 
rapidly in the future, although large increments in foreign demand could 
offset this). 
The results, which would show a similar outcome if they were ex-
tended even another 10 years, suggest the futility of our historic poHcy 
in attempting to solve the surplus capacity problem of commercial agri-
culture. In year-to-year programs de signed to 11 stall for time, 11 we only 
postpone facing up to reality. We could have solved the problem per-
manently with the $50 billion spent on control and price supports over 30 
years (excluding any charge for surplus disposal programs). At the rate 
of $4.5 billion per year, we can spend $45 billion over the next 10 years, 
or $90 billion over the next 20 and still have the very same problem with 
us as today unless we change the nature of our programs. At the end of 
one or two decades, the money will have been paid out but the problem 
still won•t be solved. This procedure was acceptable at the outset of 
surplus control programs, or even desirable as a short-run emergency 
measure during depression and postwar readjustments. Likewise it was 
acceptable in an earlier period when we lacked sufficient knowledge of 
the persistence over time and the geographic magnitude of the problem. 
But it can no longer be so justified. 
The long-run or permanent solution of the problem would involve a 
shift of marginal production areas from field crops to grass, forestry or 
recreational uses in the manner outlined previously. The surplus land 
would be concentrated in particular regions and communities as suggested 
in figures 2, 3 and 4. Of course, this is the general pattern oflong-run 
adjustment which the free market would bring, as painful as it might be on 
particular communities or for agriculture in aggregate at the outset. 
The same long-run solutions and shifts could be aided by programs 
designed for this purpose, but they also would require concentrated ad-
justments and land use shifts in the same particular regions and com-
munities. The major problem in achieving a long-run solution through 
the free market is how to distribute the costs or sacrifices among differ-
ent groups of farmers. While the immediate impact would be lower returns 
for most all producers, incomes would be depressed most in marginal areas 
where high costs relative to yields and income cause low margins. Busi-
nesses and other sectors which serve agriculture in these communities 
also would be hit hard. 
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Programs could be designed to cause all participating farmers to be 
as well or better off after the long-run interregional shifts, and solve the 
long-run problem in the manner illustrated by the regional production 
patterns in figures 2, 3 and 4. The program could be voluntary and of 
delayed nature over an adjustment period of (say) 15 years. As a volun-
tary program, farmers would not need to participate unless they judged 
themselves to be bettered economically in doing so. With the $4.5 bil-
lion annually now spent on farm programs! we could buy up 45 million 
acres per year at $100 per acre (or 22.5 million acres at $200 per acre), 
although the rate would not need to be this rapid. Quite obviously, 
annual expenditures of the magnitude now being used for farm programs 
would provide funds for permanent retirement of sufficient land, even 
in a 1 0-year period, to provide long-run solutions which would shift 
land which is marginal in field crop uses. Such land could be retired 
in a manner consistent with the demand, technology and efficient 
resource use of the current and future economy. Even in 10 years, using 
our funds accordingly, and on the basis of voluntary participation and 
appropriate compensation rates, practically all of the land in marginal 
areas or regions of low advantage in location and technical conditions 
could be shifted. Older families lacking alternative skills may prefer 
not to participate at the outset. But a system of retirement benefits and 
compensation payments could gradually remove even this block. 
Thus, we have an important choice before us, given the annual out-
lay we make for controlling surpluses and supporting farm income: Should 
we continue the pre sent mold for another 10 or 15 years 1 with the problem 
being as bad or worse at the end of the period, or should we shift to a 
method which does provide a solution by investing over this time span? 
At the rate of $4. 5 billion over 10 years 1 or certainly over 15 years, we 
could provide a framework in which participating farmers and landlords 
in the marginal areas, those regions which would shift under market 
directives and nationally efficient production patterns, would be equally 
well or better off. On the other hand, farmers and land owners in regions 
not required to shift could similarly approach equality with present income 
and welfare under the existing structure of programs. Thus, over all ma-
jor farm groups and the taxpaying public in general we could approach a 
positive-sum change in income or welfare -- positive in the sense that 
no major one of these groups need to be made worse off and some could 
be made better off, with the result that the sum is positive. 
However, while this possibility exists, the problem is more than one 
of farm groups and the general taxpaying public. In the context of the 
long-run solution pointed out above, it is more one of the numerous 
other groups oriented economically to the rural community. In regions 
which would have to make major or complete shifts for the long-run 
solution, merchants and others would suffer a decline in income with a 
thinning of the population under an extensification of farming. 
-29-
Hence, while payments to farmers for permanent shifts in land use 
could leave them better off, the result would be negative for the rural 
community sectors which provide services to farm families. Although 
we cannot measure the "subjective magnitude" of (1) the positive gains 
to farmers and (2) the negative outcomes for merchants of "shifting 
regions," the sum of outcomes could well be negative. (This is poten-
tially more so with the free market as the adjusting instrument, since 
it also would leave broad groups of farmers with a decline in both in-
come and capital assets.) 
The major task in farm policy is to find a collection of instruments 
or program elements which provides a reasonable approach to a positive-
sum outcome over all groups under a long-run solution. Various groups 
oriented to the rural reg'ion1 including congressmen who do not want to 
see their districts eliminated, resist regional adjustments of the type 
posed because they imply a smaller population and reduced support for 
business and institutional sectors of the agricultural community. 2 The 
nonfarm population of agricultural regions is no less important than the 
farm population. Hence, we need to consider compensation means which 
makes long-run regional adjustments just as acceptable to the former as 
to farmers and land owners. Perhaps this is the most important single 
need or restraint to be overcome in devising programs which will in fact 
provide permanent solutions, in the vein suggested above, to the sur-
plus capacity problem of commercial agriculture. 
The task is more complex than in finding equitable me.ans for com-
pensating farmers and land owners, however. In farming, the capital or 
rental value of land can serve as the basis for payments which perman-
ently retire land from crop production (through means such as outright 
public purchase of land, the purchase of "rights" to produce specific 
crops or other means), 3 .and prevention of capital losses. Comparable 
"handles" do not exist for compensating rural merchants and similar 
groups. However, we certainly have numerous means which could serve 
2Perhaps a means to make congressmen "as well or better off" after 
adjustment, is to create a "House of Lords" made up only of those 
whose district is eliminated by population shifts. It would be a 
self-liquidating House, since while members would have life tenure, 
thinning of population in rural regions would eventually cease. 
3under the public purchase of "rights" to produce specified crops, 
farmers would still own the land and be allowed to devote their land 
to other particular uses. Should the need arise later, the "rights" 
held by the public could be relaxed or released, thus allowing the 
land to shift back into crop production. 
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as a substitute. The~e include long-term income tax averaging, extended 
state and federal assistance for schools, public subsidies for retraining, 
transportation subsidies and even a lowering of the age at which social 
security payments begin -- a type of "mustering out" pay for those who 
cease farming. 4 Using our present annual outlay for production control 
and farm income support over the next 15 years, we could undoubtedly 
go far in devising a mix of policy instruments to attain these conditions 
for the nonfarm population while guaranteeing assurance of positive-sum 
outcomes for farm families. 
We are less imaginative and bold in these respects than a small 
nation such as the Netherlands, where a combination of public land pur-
chase, subsidized retraining and a lower qualifying age for old age bene-
fits is being used to retire farm units which are marginal in size and in-
come and to syphon surplus labor from agriculture. When we face up to 
the fact that (1) programs of the current nature, or of the last 15 years, 
only provide year-to-year relief and provide no promise of long-run solu-
tion and (2) the over-all need is to provide positive-sum programs across 
both the nonfarm and farm populations of rural regions, we can be just as 
imaginative. 
4As an example, for those too old for retraining who might stay in a 
qualified adjusting area, the age might be shifted back 5 or 10 years. 
However, with the rescheduling for this group only, all persons 
would eventually "graduate". The eligible age then would be the 
same for all persons in the nation. (See Earl 0. Heady, "Agricultural 
Policy Under Economic Development," Iowa State University Press, 
Ames, 1962, pp. 467-478; and Earl 0. Heady, "Adaptation of Extension 
Education and Auxiliary Aids to the .Basic Problem of Agriculture," 
Journal ot Farm Economics, Vol. 39, 1957) •. etc. In the Nether-
lands where a similar method is used, persons accepting the option 
of the earlier age receive a lower payment rate up to the usual age for 
retirement. 
WHAT FARM POLICY IS IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST? 
By Lauren 8oth 1 
The farm policy of the United States has been a brilliant success 
in all things except for the level and stability of the farmer• s income. 
Throughout our national history 1 the public has been abundantly 
supplied with food and agricultural raw materials for manufacturing 1 and 
prices of these farm supplied goods have been low. Even in times of 
war 1 pestilence or drought this country has not been faced with a serious 
food problem like that of so many parts of the world today. 
The U.S. farming .industry has been progressive in lowering costs 
and improving techniques. Our public policy has been exceedingly wise 
in this regard. Federal and state governments have cooperated in scientific 
research and education programs which have fostered a continuous advance 
in productivity. Our agriculture is a dynamic industry which in the last 25 
years has been increasing output per man-year at a faster rate than the 
economy as a whole. In this last quarter century agriculture has released 
more than one-third of its manpower for use by the society in production 
of other goods and services. 
Our agriculture has been able to respond dramatically to a national 
call for more production to meet the requirements of two major world wars. 
It has served the national interest by furnishing large quantities of food 
beyond domestic needs for the relief of hunger in other countries. 
The U.S. farming industry also has been able to furnish several 
thousand technical experts for the development of agriculture in the less 
developed countries. Surplus capacity in American agriculture enables 
this country to carry out its objectives in foreign policy more competently 
than it could otherwise. Capacity to extend modern agricultural know-
ledge and to supply food directly where needed in support of national 
foreign objectives gives us a powerful advantage over our Russian and 
Chinese rivals for influence in the world. 
1Editor of the editorial pages, Des Moines Register & Tribune 
31. 
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II 
In discussing agricultural policy, it is well for us to consider 
these successes along with the failures which usually seem to get the 
most attention. It is well for us to look at the nation•s agricultural 
policy in its entirety and in historical perspective and not to think of 
agricultural policy only in terms of the restrictions on production, price 
supports and subsidies of recent years. 
The major thrust of American•s public programs in agriculture has 
been and still is toward increasing production. This expansionist poli.cy 
has greatly facilitated national economic development. It may well have 
been the single most important factor enabling this country to achieve and 
hold higher rates of output per person than any other part of the world. 
This pervasive public effort in agricultural research2 and develop-
ment has had cumulative effects. Scientific knowledge builds on itself 
in geometric progression. Public expenditures in agricultural research 
and education have continued to mount year by year. The financial 
rewards from new technology also have attracted increasing private 
investments in agricultural research and development. Since the end 
of World War II there has been a fantastic outpouring of new technology 
and the investments in fertilizer 1 chemicals, machinery and other produc-
tion goods necessary to make the new ideas effective. 
This surge of forces pushing agricultural production upward has 
hit the farm economy at the same time as a sudden change in the character 
of the demand for food. As the nation has grown richer, and better fed, 
demand for food has become more inelastic. The American consumer 
cannot be induced to buy larger amounts of food today even at sharply 
reduced prices. In the old economic textbooks, the demand for bread 
and potatoes was called inelastic, but demand for meat and dairy 
products was considered to be elastic. Today even the high quality 
protein foods face inelastic demand in the American market. 
The combination of these supply and demand forces delivers a 
crushing blow to prices of farm products and to incomes of farmers. 
Without government farm programs to hold supplies somewhat in check, 
without price supports and subsidies 1 net farm income clearly would 
have fallen to disaster levels. 
2 
For a recent mathematical estimate of the effect of publicly-
financed research and education on U.S. farm production, see 11 Research 
Expenditures, Education and the Aggregate Agricultural Production Function,,. 
Zvi Griliches, The American Economic Review, December, 19 64. 
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Any realistic farm policy must reckon with this conjunction of 
dynamic forces which is pushing production upward faster than com-
mercial markets are expanding. Persistent growth of supply, in the 
face of inelastic demand, results in chronic overproduction. It is no 
good to talk about eliminating the surpluses in government stockpiles 
as though that were a solution. This is a continuing problem of supply-
demand dynamics. Elimination of the stored surpluses would leave the 
underlying disequilibrium unchanged. 
Now it should not be surprising if, after more than half a century 
of intensive farm subsidies to increase production, we should be con-
fronted with an imbalance in the rates of growth of supply and demand. 
If the subsidies which have generated this growth in agricultural supply 
should now require compensating subsidies to farmers to offset the de-
pressing effect on their income, that, too, should not be surprising. 
The subsidies to protect farmers from their own excess production, 
to a large extent, caused by public action should not be looked upon as 
sinful while government spending for expanding production is regarded as 
sacrosanct. 
It is true that some of the methods we use to support farm income 
provide incentives to farmers to increase production further. But it is 
also true that the continuing subsidies being paid for research and educa-
tion in agriculture, for land development, for irrigation, for soil conserva-
tion, stimulate production. Those critics who are outraged by price supports 
as making the surplus problem worse never seem to be outraged by the other 
aspects of our farm policy which also stimulate production. If we aim to 
adjust our farm policy to reduce the pressure of over-production, we ought 
to look at the whole farm policy and not just one part of it. 
If we decide to do nothing to curb the injection of new technology 
and new capital into agriculture, we should not object to compensating 
public expenditures to enable farmers to maintain reasonable income 
opportunity in comparison with workers in non-farm occupations. 
III 
Considering the benefits the nation receives from abundant, 
efficient production of food and fiber, the cost of farm subsidy and 
control programs in recent years does not seem exorbitant. Studies by 
research economists in the federal Department of Agriculture, at Iowa 
State University, Cornell University, Pennsylvania State University and 
Oklahoma State University indicate that crop acreage control, price support 
and commodity storage programs have increased net farm income by some-
thing like $6 billion per year or about 80 to 100 per cent in the last 
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several years. 3 This increase in farm income has been accomplished 
at a public expenditure approximating $3 billion per year. Because of 
the inelastic demand for farm products, a relatively small public 
expenditure for production restraints and administered prices in 
agriculture has made possible a doubling of net farm income over what 
it would have been otherwise. 
If this seems unjustified on grounds of equity, it should be remem-
bered that income per person living on farms has barely maintained its ratio 
to income per person in the rest of the country in the last 15 years despite 
a sharp reduction in farm population. 4 The farm programs have enabled 
farmers to hold their own in relative income instead of suffering what surely 
would have been a drastic decline as a result of the increase in production. 
If it could be shown, nevertheless, that the intervention of the 
federal government into management and pricing in the agricultural industry 
had slowed down technical progress, we would be justified in doubting 
whether this intervention was in the public interest. The original acreage 
control and price support programs were strongly objected to on these 
grounds and still are by those who have not read the record. The experi-
ence of the last 30 years has shown that these interferences by government 
into the free market did not slow technical change; they speeded it up. 
The historical bases for acreage allotments were expected to prevent 
inter-regional changes of acreage in pursuit of least-cost production. This 
has not happened in significant degree. Between 1937 and 1960 total corn 
acreage dropped from 94 million to 82 million. Corn acreage declined by 12 
million in the South Central states and 4 million in the South Atlantic states, 
areas of low yield. In the Corn Belt, however, there was an increase of 3 
million acres o Cotton production has moved westward and away from the 
less efficient areas of the Southeast, despite the acreage control program. 
3uFarm Program Benefits and Costs in Recent Years, 11 Committee 
Print of the U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture, prepared by Walter W o 
Wilcox, senior specialist in agriculture of the Legislative Reference 
Service, Library of Congress. 
4Per Capita Farm Income from All Sources as a Percentage of 
Nonfarm Income from All Sources: 
1948-65.7 1952-59.7 
1949- 53.9 1953- 55.6 
1950-57.4 1954-54.8 
1951-64.1 1955-50.7 
1956- 50.2 
1957- 52.3 
1958- 58.8 
1959- 53.0 
1960-58.0 
1961 - 61.8 
1962-62.2 
1963- 63.1 
Handbook of Agricultural Charts, 1964, U.S .D .A. Econ. Res. Service 
It also should be·remembered that during tnese 15 years the·teduction in 
farm·s occur-red lar.:gely among the. lowest-income farms; presumably, the 
lowest-income pe·ople were leaving agriculture. 
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James 0. Bray and Patricia Watkins, of Stanford University, show 
in a recent study5 on technical change in corn production that price supports, 
rather than being detrimental to economic growth, caused new techniques 
to be adopted more rapidly and high-cost producers to be retired sooner than 
otherwise would have been the case. The most rapid rate of technical 
change ever experienced in the United States in corn production occurred 
during a period when price supports for corn were in full effect. The Bray-
Watkins study is an illuminating contribution to the subject of agricultural 
development. 
Bray and Watkins make a distinction between growth in agricultural 
production caused by improvement of extractive techniques or fertility-depleting 
operations and that caused by soil-restorative techniques. Among the extrac-
tive techniques are replacement of animal and human power by mechanical 
power and biological improvements such as hybrid corn. The limit of improve-
ment from extractive techniques is the natural fertility barrier. Such tradition-
al restorative techniques as crop rotation may lift the fertility barrier slightly. 
But the real breakthrough in corn production came during the early 1940s from 
the introduction of artificially-manufactured, cheap nitrogen. The yield 
potential in hybrid corn could not have been realized without this innovation 
in fertilization that has lifted the fertility barrier. We do not know yet how 
high this barrier can be raised. 
Our national farm policy of shielding agriculture from the dynamic 
forces of supply and demand was not adopted with the idea that it would 
facilitate economic development. But the programs proved to be an im-
portant force for modernization of agriculture. They provided the assur-
ance of future prices farmers needed to make the investment in fertilizer. 
IV 
Whatever else our national farm policy may have done, it has pro-
vided both abundance and rapid technical progress, which are of great value 
to the nation. The nation should not expect agriculture, with 10 percent of 
the population, to bear a major share of the cost of these contributions to 
the nation. To turn agriculture over to the free market would be like expect-
ing General Dynamics, General Motors or General Electric to produce jet 
airplanes and missiles at less than cost--and their workers to accept a 50 
percent cut in wages for defense production. 
S, Technical Change in Corn Production in the United States, 1870-
1960," Journal of Farm Economics, November, 1964. 
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The weakness of our farm policy is precisely in this area. The 
rewards for hard work, managerial competence, initiative and enterprise 
in farming are not high enough, in comparison with the rest of the economy. 
This is true by the standard of equality of opportunity and the standard of 
welfare equity. It is also true from the viewpoint of the national interest 
in maintaining a high quality of brains in the agricultural industry. As 
farming becomes increasingly complex, highly capitalized, more scientific 
and less traditional, we shall have to attract and keep able people in the 
business. The country will have to pay for this. Economic incentive in 
agriculture must be raised if the magnificent progress of this industry is to 
be maintained. The free market, unassisted by government, is incapable 
of providing this incentive. 
A policy of moderately higher incomes in commercial agriculture 
will not stop the migration of high-cost producers out of the industry. 
Migration from agriculture in recent years has been mostly from the 
lower end of the scale in size of farm, level of income, level of educa-
tion and level of production. This migration should continue. The nation 
can no longer expect agriculture to serve as a welfare industry, harboring 
the poor and incompetent who cannot be employed in an industrial society. 
This is a national problem and should be met by the nation in the 
same way as it meets the poverty problem in the cities--that is, by educa-
tion, health services, job counseling and the creation of new job openings 
through a policy of economic expansion. It is not closely related to the 
commercial farm problem. If the least productive third of farmers were to 
leave farming, this would have little effect on the total market supply of 
farm products . 
v 
If the nation should decide to redirect farm policy with the objective 
of raising farm income, what are the choices? 
The intellectual foundation for making such decisions has been 
enormously enhanced in the last dozen years or so. The land-grant 
agricultural colleges, the federal Department of Agriculture and some 
of the private universities have been increasing our stockpile of imagina-
tive research and original thinking on agricultural policy. The two institu-
tions sponsoring this meeting~ Iowa State University and North Carolina 
State, deserve special commendation for their leadership in this field o It 
is no longer accurate to accuse the agricultural colleges of ignoring the 
economic adjustment problems of agriculture in their studies. All of these 
institutions have gone far toward lifting us out of the realm of faith and 
traditionalism in our policy thinking 0 
-37-
We may obtain from recent studies dependable projections of the 
consequences to farm income and to the federal budget of various changes 
in farm policy. If we set a certain target of farm income, these scholars 
can tell us with considerable precision how much the cost will be for 
various types of programs, in terms of consumer expenditures in the 
rr:arket and federal taxes. 
Fortunately, this country is rich enough that it can choose over a 
wide range of farm policy. We can afford to pay for a high degree of 
voluntariness and few regulations, if that is what the people want, and 
still maintain high farm income. 
There can be no question but that the way to achieve a given level 
of farm income at the least governmental cost is through production control. 
The most expensive way to reach a given income target in terms of govern-
ment cost is through direct subsidies. 6 
Our farm income support programs have been compromises between 
these extremes. Farm income has been raised partly by production restraints 
and supply management, which increased the prices to consumers in the 
market, and partly by direct subsidies from government. 
These compromises do not please the absolutists who want to go 
all the way to supply management or the reverse. But they are quite 
practical in our democratic political system. In practical operation of the 
farm programs, it has been found that limited production controls and 
voluntary programs, even if that means a lower level of price support, 
are preferable to high price supports and strict controls. 
If we seek a higher farm income goal o we can (1) increase the 
government's budget for direct subsidies to farmers or (2) tighten up 
production controls to increase returns in the market or {3) elevate 
price supports without tightening production controls and run heavier 
government costs in management and disposal of surpluses. 
6see "A National Farm Program for Feed Grains and Wheat," 
National Planning Association. Also 1 "Farm Program Alternatives: Farm 
Incomes and Public Costs Under Alternative Programs for Feed Grains and 
Wheat," CAED Report 18 1 by Luther G. Tweeten 1 Earl 0. Heady and Leo 
V. Mayer 1 Center for Agricultural & Economic Development, Iowa State 
University. 
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The extent to which one or a combination of these methods must 
be used to reach a given income target depends partly on (1) how much 
expansion in foreign commercial sales of farm products can be achieved 
and (2) how large a quantity of these products is used in foreign aid 
(Food for Peace) programs. 
The need for government programs also depends on whether effective 
supply management can be accomplished by private farm organizations. If 
farmer bargaining power can be strengthened through private organizational 
arrangements, less government control will be needed. Marketing orders 
and agreements supervised by the federal government work well in balancing 
market supplies of some commodities -- so long as total grain output is held 
in check by government programs, providing a general shelter for all 
agriculture • 7 
An argument for tightening government production controls is often 
made on the ground that the public is likely to object less to a rise of food 
costs in the market than to a highly visible increase in the government 
budget. Returning to a higher level of price supports without controls 
would bring back the complications in surplus management that were regarded 
as scandalous a few years ago. High price supports with unrestrained pro-
duction tend to bring on "dumping" practices in foreign trade which run 
counter to U . S . trade policy. 
Is a policy of increasing the effectiveness of production controls 
and raising market prices to consumers politically feasible? If the question 
refers to acceptance by the general public, it seems to me the answer 
clearly is "Yes." There has been a great deal of talk in farming circles 
in recent years about "poor public relations," "bad press for agriculture" 
and the like. But I have found little evidence of this. In preparation for 
this paper, a search of recent (last 10 years) published materials of labor 
unions, consumer groups and urban groups failed to produce significant 
examples of protest against farmers because of high food costs. 8 
7About 90 per cent of all U.S. farm land in crops and pasture is 
devoted to food grain or feed for livestock. Over-supply and low prices 
of grain quickly spill over into livestock and other farm production. 
8Prof. Don Hadwiger of the Political Science Department of Iowa 
State University helped make this review of the literature. I am grateful 
to him for this assistance, but he bears no responsibility for the conclu-
sions reached here. 
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As a matter of fact, the AFL-CIO usually has backed farm income 
support legislation in Congress. Consumer and urban groups, to the 
extent that they have taken an interest in agriculture at all, have been 
more concerned with the problem of poverty in agriculture, migratory 
farm labor, the absence of welfare legislation for farm workers and that 
sort of thing than in food prices. The National Consumers League, for 
example, testifying in Congress on farm labor and rural poverty in 1964, 
argued that the consumer could well afford the slight increase in cost of 
food that might accrue through providing a minimum wage and better living 
conditions for farm laborers. 
The truth is that practically all the ojbection to farm production 
controls comes from certain farm organizations and agriculture-related 
industries, which have a stake in large volume farm production, and from 
theorists who see such regulations as beyond the pale of prescribed 
doctrine of free enterprise. Farm organizations in some cases have 
argued that consumer antagonism required a reduction in farm controls. 
There has been talk of farm price support legislation being a "bread 
tax" on consumers. So far as I have been able to find, this protest 
does not come from consumers. 
Urban congressmen, however, may well object to large government 
expenditures for agriculture in the budget. They may insist on a higher 
blend of production control in the farm program u mix. 11 Their complaints 
on farm legislation are not that farm income is being raised beyond a 
reasonable level but about the method used to raise farm income. They 
may argue more and more in the future that if farmers are to be guaranteed 
a certain level of prices,. there must be a limit to how much farmers can 
produce at that price. 11 Open end" price support is costly. 
From an economic standpoint, given the high rate of income in this 
country, it makes little difference whether higher farm income is achieved 
through more government expenditures or more controls over production. 
From a political standpoint, however, it may make a lot of difference. It 
may become increasingly difficult to maintain a high level of farm income 
through government subsidies, either direct payments or high price supports 
and disposal programs. The limiting factor seems likely to be the federal 
budget rather than consumer protests. 
VI 
Very likely we will continue to employ a blend of methods of 
supporting farm income, either adding more control and cutting subsidies 
or adding more subsidies while reducing restrictions if the budgetary 
hurdle can be surmounted. This pragmatic approach is the best one, 
since we are still feeling our way along in this business. 
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In making our decisions on future di.rections of farm policy, it 
would be well to avoid excessive attention to doctrine and moral philosophy, 
which leads to absolutist policies. We Americans, in our practical wisdom, 
frequently make fun of the Russians for their obsession with doctrinal con-
siderations--and rightly so. The lopsided development of the Soviet economy, 
especially the dismal results in agriculture, plainly are a consequence, in 
part, of adherence to the various Marxist dogmas about economic organiza-
tion, ownership of resources and pricing. We should be wary that we don • t 
get trapped in the same way by doctrine. 
Let me summarize the reasoning presented in this paper: 
First, the nation has benefited enormously from the rapid application 
of new technology in agriculture. 
Second, this technological advance has been generated and pros-
ecuted in large measure by government action. 
Third, the advance of technology has created surpluses and low 
prices, from the viewpoint of the farmer, or abundance and cheap food 
from the viewpoint of the public. 
Fourth, equity considerations require that the nation support farm 
income, since it obHges farmers to adjust to new technology, placing 
them at a severe income disadvantage in the free market. 
Fifth, price- support and other government programs used so far 
to support farm income have not slowed technological advance but on the 
contrary have facilitated it. 
Sixth, strict production control is the best way to maintain farm 
income if the objective is least government cost. Price support, storage 
and disposal of commodities, along with voluntary production restraints, 
cost more in taxes but preserve valued elements of individual freedom. 
Direct payments are the most costly, in terms of government expenditures. 
Seventh, no one method of protecting farm income is intrinsically 
right in all circumstances. The best combination of methods depends 
on how much control is deemed advisable; the level of exports, commercial 
and concessional, and on other special factors affecting each major 
commodity. 
REMARKS OF A CONGRESSMAN 
by Hon. Albert H. Quiel 
Before we talk about the problems of agriculture and discuss the papers 
of Dr. Robinson, Dr. Heady, and Mr. 8oth, I think I ought to point out the 
importance of agriculture. Agriculture is still our most basic economy. 
Without food to eat, people cannot survive. Without the fiber for our garb, 
there surely would be a shortage of warm clothing, and even from the land 
comes a great deal of the materials for the construction of our dwellings. 
Also, we should look at agribusiness; that is, all the industry which 
is dependent on agriculture. This gives us an indication of the true and 
total impact of agriculture within our economy. 
I'm glad these Farm Policy Review Conferences are held. I've attended 
a number of them. I think it would be good if all members of Congress were 
able to attend these meetings so that they could have a better understanding 
of the economic implications of the happenings in agriculture as well as the 
effects of the legislation which we enact, not only on the farmers of the 
rural community but on our entire country. 
President Johnson, in his inaugural address, spoke of the rapid changes 
that are occurring, yes, the fantastic changes that are occurring. 
We see this happening in the world with the dramatic changes in med-
icine--progress which is broadening the base of life so that many men are 
wondering what will be done about the doubling population in just a few 
years. 
People now look back on the trip of Lindbergh across the Atlantic 
Ocean just as young people of today are sure to look back on our first space 
travel •.. and the first episode of a man on the moon ..• with the same 
common-place attitude toward that travel as we now have toward air travel 
over long distances. 
We look at the communications satellite, remembering that in 19 56 the 
first cable was laid aero s s the ocean and that we could talk on a telephone 
anywhere around the earth. Tomorrow, with the space satellites, we will 
1Mr. Quie, a Republican, is U. S. Representative of the Minnesota 
First Congressional District. 
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be able to talk with anyone any place in the world and never have to 
worry about cables being cut or towers being toppled. Through the de-
velopment of these communications systems we see the problems of other 
places in the world, and these problems become our problems. 
We see that the same thing has happened in agriculture. Production 
in agriculture and output per man hour have increased greater here than in 
any part of our economy. 
When I look back to 1940--when I started farming--all of my hay equip-
ment and team of horses, too, all cost me less money than a hay conditioner 
does today. At that time, I didn't even know what a hay conditioner was. 
So we are involved in a rapid and dramatic change. 
It is best that we understand the economic implications; that is, that 
which is happening now and will happen in the future. 
For a good period of time farmers expected that there were some pan-
aceas in the form of legislation to the farm problems. 
Many people declared that had the McNarry-Haugen bills been passed 
the farm problems would have been solved. Efforts were made during the 
1930's to solve the farm problems, but they were not solved. World War II 
and a post war economy did provide a reprieve for a number of years. 
Attempts at panaceas after World War II have not been successful. Those 
who thought a Republican Administration would bring an answer to all of our 
problems were disappointed during the Eisenhower Administration. Those who 
thought we only would have to go back to a Democratic Administration to 
solve our problems are now disappointed. They see that many farms are 
worse off now than before, and the exodus continues. 
As more and more people live in urban areas--in fact, it is estimated 
that now only 7. l per cent of the American population lives in the rural area--
we can see that the non-farm Congressman will have a great effect on agri-
cultural legislation. Only 53 out of the 435 Congressmen are from rural dis-
tricts. I am one of those, one of the 53. But only 20.31 per cent of the 
people in my district are ruraL So you see after the next census, undoubt-
edly I will be shifted to a rural-urban district, rather than a rural district 
which, according to the Census Bureau, requires a farm population of 20 
per cent or more. 
When a rural Congressman looks at farm legislation he is not a free 
agent. He is dependent on his farm voters, and the fact that politicians 
have made promises in the past that cannot be fulfilled gives the rural Con-
gressman a difficult problem, trying to balance political expediency with 
economic feasibility. There has been a lack of economic understanding in 
the past that has caused many of our political difficulties. 
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Again I say that meetings such as these are extremely important. They 
bring into focus the impact of science of economics as it is brought to bear 
on the agricultural situation. 
We also see some basic philosophical differences between farm organ-
izations, and it is impossible to satisfy them alL As we work on legisla-
tion we realize that a bill is more in conformity with a view of one farm or-
ganization than any other. In making efforts to anie{ld the legislation to make 
the farm organization approve it--which previously d'id not approve it--we find 
that invariably we lose the approval of the former organization and, some-
times, all of the farm organizations. 
Many of the old arguments of the past, however, do not exist any more. 
We fought many a verbal battle over high rigid price supports versus flexible 
price supports. Nobody argues these any more, because it is accepted that 
the price support level must be close to the market price or else it will 
build up a surplus which is unacceptable to the non-farm taxpayer. We have 
had some heated verbal battles over mandatory controls versus voluntary 
programs; however, by and large now this struggle is over. There may be 
some controversy yet in the southern crops of tobacco, rice, peanuts and 
cotton; however, in the remaining commodities it is very doubtful that the 
mandatory programs would be acceptable to the farmers or the Congress. 
As we consider farm legislation in the future, however, the budgetary con-
siderations will be paramount. 
There are many individuals in Washington whose names are unknown 
in the country; however, the name of Gordon--the Director of the Budget--
is well known among farmers now. When I was home just recently, many 
farmers talked to me about Gordon and his speech, which has recently been 
reprinted in the Saturday Review of Literature. 
It is interesting to recall that the then Senator Humphrey, in a speech 
on August 18 of last year, indicated that perhaps the time had now arrived 
when we must determine what would be spent on agricultural programs and 
then administer them within that figure, rather than continually increasing 
the cost of programs as is presently occurring. 
Dr. Robinson gave the impression in his paper that long-range land 
retirement was the least controversial of the farm programs. I think it is 
true that this is the most economical program that we could have 0 It has 
done more for the least amount of money; however, it is an extremely con-
troversial program. 
Mistakes when the Soil Bank was first tried have given it a black eye, 
a black eye caused by acreage greater than 50 per cent of the land of some 
counties being idled by the conservation reserve. This was strenuously 
objected to. Also, stories of non-farmers who paid for farms with Soil 
Bank payments have been decried. Both of these faults were remedied by 
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administrative action later, but the criticisms remain. 
The program is still objected to by individuals from small towns; that 
is, by merchants from small towns who admittedly are in difficulty as the 
numbers of farmers decrease. Moreover, when they see a farm lying idle, 
with the person who was on a farm or could have been on a farm not pur-
chasing from the small town in the manner he used to, then these merchants 
lay the blame on the Soil Bank Program for the difficulty of this part of our 
economy. Also, there are a number of young men who would like to farm, 
but if there is no land available they then will look for opportunity elsewhere. 
Too, where neighboring land is lying idle in the Soil Bank--and a person 
would like to rent it--then that person raises great objection to the Soil Bank 
Program. 
The last and most recent criticism stems from the Administration• s crop 
land conversion program, which is very similar to the old conservation re-
serve aspect of the Soil Bank, except that grazing is permitted. When beef 
numbers were increasing and beef prices were down, expansion of that type 
of program did not meet with approval. And, undoubtedly, any attempt for 
long-range retirement programs permitting grazing would meet with great 
objection at this time. 
I also get the impression from Dr. Heady• s remarks that if we had 
balanced supply with demand, the problems of agriculture would then have 
been solved. I surely question that, since a balance of supply and demand 
through either short range--and therefore expensive programs--or long range 
retirement programs would have required a determination by the Department 
of Agriculture of what production is necessary. Any mistake that had been 
made in the estimates of need or production would surely have dramatic 
economic implications. Not only would there be fluctuation of prices due 
to even a slight shortage, but if the normal carryover was dipped into with 
any great amount in a year because the supply was not sufficient, then there 
could be a market disruption which would depend on the location of the 
carryover. If the carryover had moved toward terminal markets, and per-
haps the seaports, or was stored in a part of the country which had the 
most economical storage rates due to weather conditions, the line of sup-
ply would be greatly different from the normal situation when it comes from 
the farm. The only way a normal carryover could be used without market 
disruption would be to have the storage held on the farm and released from 
the farm. Then the channels of trade from the farm to the final user would 
be kept intact. 
With Public Law 480 for Peace Program, foreign disposal, the one con··· 
troversy that we will have this year--and a policy decision that will have to 
be resolved--is whether the program shall continue to be used as a surplus 
disposal program (and therefore its use greatly curtailed as supply is brought 
close to demand) or whether it will become a part of our foreign policy in 
which we will make commitments and keep our commitments for supplying 
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food whether food is in surplus or not. There will be great support, I know, 
this year for a change in the program which will permit the Department of 
Agriculture to go out into the market and purchase non-surplus food for 
Public Law 480. I would suggest that we give it a trial with dried skimmed 
milk, which is one of the most acceptable products overseas. 
The biggest controversy in domestic agricultural legislation will be over 
direct payments. The great controversy that began with the Brannan Plan is 
still raging today between the farm organizations. I think I should point out 
that one of the faults of the old price support programs of mandatory controls 
on some commodities had the effect of capitalizing the quotas into the value 
of the land. This has brought about increased holdings. We all know that 
the value of the tobacco allotment or a cotton allotment on southern farms 
act to increase the land value of those farms. However, direct payments 
also can be capitalized to the land. I have already talked to individuals who 
are in the market for farms and the purchase of farms in my Congressional 
District, and they speak of the feed grain base and the historical production 
within that base---the __ greater the number of acres of corn and the higher 
production history on com, the greater the amount of direct payments the 
farmer can expect to receive. 
We also see the problem with direct payments where a farmer is pena-
lized for not producing on all the acres which he contracted for under the 
feed grain program. The farmer contracts, for instance, to reduce 20 per cent 
of his acres, but actually does not plant com on all the remaining 80 per cent 
of his acreage. He loses his direct payments on that land, which he would 
have received had he produced on them; hence, there is an incentive to pro-
duce while, at the same time, the farmer has an incentive to reduce produc-
tion through the diversion payment. •• this is a confusing set of rewards 
and penalties. 
Another problem of our present farm programs is the low resale formula. 
The resale formula of 1 OS per cent of support price plus carrying charge was 
not too bad when price supports were high and the market price was usually 
below the support level. It gave an area in which the market could function 
during the year; however I now when the loan level is below the market price I 
usually the resale formula holds down the market price. This makes the gov-
ernment the greatest competitor in the market. The government handles the 
greatest volume of the grain and tends to fix prices more than has been- the 
case in the past. The concern for this is evidenced by the number of farm 
organizations which have advocated increases in the resale formula from 105 
per cent of price support up to 115, 12 0 and 12 5 per cent of the support level 
plus carrying charges. I have a feeling these papers which were read to us 
give neither enough emphasis in their study to direct payments or the resale 
formula and the implications these have on the economic situation in agri-
culture. 
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I am glad to see that there is more and more emphasis being placed on 
commercial agriculture versus the small farmer who would never, even with 
200 per cent of parity, be able to make an adequate living on the farm. 
To look at the one million farmers who produce 80 per cent of the goods 
is a different problem from the two and one half million farmers who produce 
less than 20 per cent of the goods---it is a wise decision! But the question 
the Congress, the Administration and the land-grant colleges must ask them-
selves today is "what is our policy toward the two million farmers who sell 
less than $5, 000 worth of farm commodities?" Should we actually move 
people out of agriculture/ giving them a mustering-out pay, as was suggested 
by Dr. Heady? 
I believe our past farm programs have actually encouraged the movement 
of people out of agriculture, because they have been the greatest incentive 
to the large producer through a guarantee of income, which enables the 
person with adequate capital to increase his holdings. The question is 
whether we should pay to keep them in, or pay them to get out--or strike 
some middle ground. Or should the policy be to keep people in agriculture 
and on the farm, no matter how small, as long as possible? Or should we 
have a policy that controls their flow from the farm to the urban community? 
If the direct payments were held to a limited amount, say $3, 000 per 
farm, this then would make the program beneficial to the small farmer. But 
the larger farmer would depend upon the market for his production over and 
above that which he would receive in $3, 000 in direct payments. 
If the policy were to encourage young people to go to occupations other 
than agriculture, then an individual who was on a farm at the time the pro-
gram was adopted could receive the funds. Any new individual, however, 
would not receive the direct paymentS and f therefore 1 he would not be en-
couraged to begin farming based on the payments. This is really the biggest 
policy·decision, and it has never actually been tackled in Congress. 
In closing, I just want to echo the thought that I've heard often and 
eloquently from Dr. Ted Schultz, who is with us here today: "Education and 
training are still the most important single factor in agriculture." 
By education I do not mean that we should only train people for occupa-
tions other than agriculture. Anybody who is to remain in agriculture, and 
not only survive but prosper, must be the best educated individual in all the 
various facets in farming we possibly can find. The best educated and 
sharpest individuals should not be finding employment elsewhere. Rather, 
the people in agriculture should have the best of education and training, 
though we realize, as the Secretary of Agriculture said before the Committee 
on Education and Labor last year, that only one boy out of l 0 will remain on 
the farm. And in the light of statistics I have seen lately, it appears that 
there probably will be even less than one out of 10 remaining on the farm. 
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We can see the necessity for the best possible education to enable rural 
boys to receive the education and training they can utilize for our techno-
logical age. 
It is unfortunate that children from farm families do not go as far in 
education as non-farm children do. There is something about agriculture 
that gives a training which cannot be assimilated in an urban community. 
This is evidenced by the fact that many schools speak so highly of farm 
youth. Many industries, too, such as IBM in Rochester, Minnesota, em-
ploy many individuals who live on farms, and they speak glowingly of the 
quality of these individuals. Today, however, this is not enough. Formal 
education is needed in the future as never before. 
We must remember that the best tools we can give any of the young 
people who are growing up in our rural communities is the best education 
and training that money can buy. There will be a reward to the rural com-
munity in the form of the young people who remain on the farm, and there 
will be a reward to our entire society when rural youth with good education 
and training have the skills to cope with our highly technological age and 
the fantastic changes it is bringing about today. 

ECONOMIC BASIS FOR A NEW AGRICULTURAL POLICY CONSENSUS 
by Theodore W. Schultz 1 
1. The economic crisis of the thirties is now history; the details have 
had time to settle and we now see more clearly than we could then what had 
gone wrong and what should have been done. At that juncture we were over-
whelmed by the disintegration of finance, trade and production and the re-
sulting mass unemployment. Agriculture stayed on the job but farm prices 
collapsed, causing a flood of farm bankruptcies. The political response 
took numerous forms. In retrospect, the inadequacy of this response was 
predominantly in the area of fiscal-monetary policy, and understandably so, 
because these policies were not understood at that juncture. They have 
come into their own only recently. 
2. The agricultural adversity of the late forties and fifties has not be-
come history, and we lack perspective. As yet the details of that period 
keep us from seeing clearly what U. S. agriculture was and still is up 
against. Although the basic economic circumstances had altered radically 
from that of the thirties, the political response to aid agriculture did not 
change accordingly; instead the same treatments were continued that had 
been used during the thirties. In the early thirties the rate of unemploy-
ment exceeded 20 percent; in sharp contrast, even with the slack that set 
in after 1957, unemployment in the two worst years, 1958 and 1961, was 
less than 7 percent. Meanwhile, markets for farm products have been 
stable and strong and trade has in general flourished. I am sure the ver-
dict of history will be that the sources of agricultural adversity under con-
sideration have been altogether different from those underlying the economic 
crisis of the thirties. The real sources are the economic forces that have 
brought about the massive decline in the U. S. farm population. There has 
never been to my knowledge such a massive internal migration. Over 23 
million farm people have been involved in changes in residence and net 
migration since 1940. Another way of seeing what has happened is in the 
fact that the U. S. farm population, which had already declined by one 
half by 19 59, has declined by another fifth since then. 
What about the political response to the adversity inherent in this 
picture of what has been happening to farm people? The answer is that it 
has been far off the marL If anything, the net effect of farm policy has 
been to push people out of agriculture. Surely, it is true, not a single 
agricultural program has been developed to assist farm people leaving agri-
culture and to compensate them for the losses they bear as a consequence 
1 Charles L. Hutchinson Distinguished Service Professor of economics at the 
University of Chicago;. 
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of the rapid gains in agricultural productivity. Whereas the role of fiscal-
monetary policies in attaining economic stability at full employment is ever 
clearer and is acceptable politically, the role of policy to redistribute the 
gains and losses inherent in economic progress is not as yet understood 
and policy-wise it is not on the agenda. 
The Pre sent Policy Juncture 
3. We are now at another juncture with respect to agricultural policy. 
It has come upon us not because of another and different economic crisis or 
adversity. It arises predominantly out of the inadequacies of existing agri-
cultural policy. There are those who attribute it to the costs of existing 
programs, which presently entail appropriations to the USDA of a magnitude, 
when divided by the number of farm operator families, equal to about $2, 000 
per family. But the size of these appropriations is not a matter of great con-
cern of the respective agricultural committees of Congress, provided Con-
gress will concur in them. The growing concern politically is with respect 
to the economic consequences of these programs upon the lot of farm people. 
The financial benefits go predominantly to the big tractor farmers, to those 
at the top of the farm ladder. Those at the bottom are all but forgotten 
people. For example, in 1963 farms with sales of less than $2,500 ac-
counted for 43 percent of all U. S. farm families; they, however, received 
only $51 of government payments per farm, not even enough to buy a wash-
ing machine. 
The Farm Income - Farm Wealth Paradox 
4. The public concern about agricultural policy is not so much a con-
cern with respect to the effects of farm programs upon the economic effi-
ciency of agriculture as it is a concern with regard to the welfare implica-
tions of these programs. The latter is confounded by the income-wealth 
paradox within agriculture. When we look at income, we find much more 
poverty in agriculture relative to that in the rest of the economy. But when 
we look at the net worth of the wealth of farm families they are much richer 
than nonfarm families. Two statistical pictures will reveal the basis of 
this paradox. 
Income poverty picture._ "The Economic Report of the President," 
January 19 64, classifies families with less than $3, 000 income as falling 
below the poverty line. It shows, using 1962 data, that 18 percent of the 
nonfarm a~d 43 percent of the farm families fall below this poverty line. 
Thus, by this measure, there is two and one-half times as much poverty 
among farm2 as among nonfarm families. 
2Half of this farm poverty is in the South and two-fifths of it is in the 
North Central region. The numbers of rural farm families with less 
than $3,000 income according to the 1960 Census are as follows: 
South 830,000 West 87,000 
North Central 581, 000 Northeast 72, 000 
Total 1,570,000 
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Wealth picture. It tells a wholly different story: The net worth of farm 
operator families is twice as large as that of nonfarm families, in round fig-
ures $44,000 and $21,700 respectively. The Federal Reserve Bulletin, March 
1964 reports important new data showing assets, debts and net worth of all 
U. S. families and of farm operator families. The figures that follow are the 
average amounts as of December 31, 1962. 
Own home 
Automobile 
Business, professions 
Life insurance, annuities, 
retirement plans 
Liquid as sets 
Stocks 
Bonds 
Other 
Misc. 
Personal debt (excl. auto) 
Total net worth 
(1) Mean 
(2) Median 
All u.s. 
familj~_g 
$ 5,975 
637 
3,913 
1,376 
2,579 
4,072 
456 
2,535 
1,528 
483 
$22,588 
7,550 
Farm Operator 
___ fami]jes __ 
$ 5,501 
681 
2 5, 7 67 
1,278 
2,309 
1, 354 
535 
5,940 
1,095 
486 
$43,973 
26,250 
Could it be true that our farm programs have be_E?.D .. §trongly biased in 
___ favor of farm wealth (income from property) and against income from 
farm work and entrepreneurship? 
Political and Economic Considerations 
5. They are yoked together by policy but it is easier for a donkey and 
a camel to work together than for economists and legislators. Nowhere is 
it more true than in agricultural policy. At this juncture, economists are 
generally agreed that major parts of U. S. agricultural policy fail to meet 
the test of economic efficiency or the test of an acceptable welfare standard. 
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It is also clear that the political consensus supporting our agricultural 
policy is waning like the moon wanes after it has been full. Yet it would 
be absurd to say that politics has undermined what once was a strong 
political consensus. I hasten to add that it would also be absurd to blame 
economists. What has happened, as I have already pointed out, is that 
the U. S. economy has changed greatly from what it was when the grand 
design of our present agricultural policy was cast. 
The public obviously has a stake in the economic performance of all 
sectors and in the welfare of all people. Economic analysis and political 
decisions seek to serve the public in these matters. We do well to banish 
the thought that economists wish to exploit agriculture by having it supply 
cheap food for consumers or by making it a reserve of cheap labor for in-
dustry. I know of no economist who is not aware of the gains in agricultural 
productivity and the impressive contributions that agriculture has made and 
continues to make to our economic growth. Nor does anyone doubt the tech~ 
nical progress of agriculture and the large role that the high skills of farmers 
and the advance in science and technology play in this progress. It also is 
noteworthy that the disapproval of economists is not dependent primarily 
upon whether they favor laissez faire or a modern welfare state. 
6. In spite of the trouble we are in, we have much to our credit. 
Despite our policy mistakes, ours is a modern agriculture which has no peer. 
As builders of agriculture we began early to complement private endeavor 
with public endeavor in ways that have made our long standing private-
public approach a model that others are trying to adopt. Our agricultural 
castle is a place to live, a place to work and an economic fortress. But 
like the castles on the Rhine, it is also subject to obsolescence. My con-
cern is the source of this obsolescence and its implications for policy. 
7. My approach rests on three propositions. (1) A public policy is 
dependent upon a political consensus. So it is with agricultural policy. 
To show that there is a decline in the consensus for agricultural policy, 
would be belaboring the obvious. My aim here is limited to a consideration 
of why the once large and strong political consensus has eroded. (2) A 
good economic basis is also good in the long run for a political consensus. 
This proposition so stated may seem presumptuous coming from an econ-
omist. It implies of course that the economic basis is both relevant and 
important in this connection. I hope I can convince you that it is true. 
(3) A new, strong political consensus to serve agriculture and to promote 
the general welfare and the welfare of farm people requires a new economic 
basis. This proposition rests on the judgment with which I began of the 
substantial interdependence between economics and political consensus. 
Here my aim is to show that the old basis is inadequate and that the 
requisite economic basis is in principle at hand. 
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I am sure you will agree that economists find it all too convenient 
to take political consensus for granted. They are not inclined to heed 
the warnings of political scientists, They seldom see the difficulties 
that beset the political process as it seeks to develop a workable con-
sensus. No doubt we have much to learn here in what it is that makes 
for such a consensus and how fundamental it is in our form of govern-
ment. It should be said that our political process has done well indeed 
in recent years in resolving very difficult basic policy issues in areas 
other than agriculture. With respect to these matters, political con-
sensus has not come easily. Nor are all policy issues primarily depend-
ent upon economic considerations. Social values deeply held are some-
times at stake. Ideas and theories with respect to the proper role of 
government are also important. The style of the American economy is 
that of a "welfare state". 3 There are some who dislike this phrase, but 
let me explain what it means in this context. Our welfare state is neither 
"liberal" in the nineteenth-century sense nor authoritarian in the form that 
calls itself "People's Democracy." Our welfare state represents a partial 
rejection of laissez faire as it once prevailed fairly widely in the INestern 
World, in which the "emphasis was on freedom for the individual from 
government, not on services to him by government. " 4 It also rejects the 
modem form of the authoritarian state j in which the emphasis is placed on 
service to the individual, service determined from above and enforced by 
abandonJng political and civil freedom. Between these two systems there 
has emerged our type of welfare state which "tries to fmd a middle path 
between service without freedom and freedom without service. 5 Because 
it is a tortuous path, political consensus does not come easily. I shall 
not take it for granted. 
Erosion of the Old Basis 
8. It is self-evident that the potent consensus of three decades ago 
with respect to agdcultural policy, is gone. Let me repeat, however, it 
is gone not because of any perversity on the part of Congress, the execu-
tive branch or the courts. Nor are the farm organizations to blame in spite 
of the Jncreasing divergency in their policy views, Nor is labor or busi-
ness at fault, nor urban people generally albeit they have been gaining 
rapidly in political representation, Surely, too, it would be most superficial 
3see my, "Our Welfare State and the Welfare of Farm People," The 
Social Service Review, 38 (June 19 64). 
4Jacob Viner, "The United States as a Welfare State," in "Man, 
Science Learning and Education, " Sanford W, Higginbotham, ed, 
Rice University, 19 63. 
5v· ·t mer, 2£· g_. 
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to attribute it to agriculture's bad press. 6 This political consensus is 
gone because of the erosion of its old economic basis. Let me identify 
some aspects of the erosion of which I speak. 
One basis was to counteract the adverse effects upon farm people 
of the mass unemployment and of the drastic decline in international trade 
that occurred in the thirties. Differences between small and large farms, 
or between the poor and not so poor were swamped by the disintegration 
of the economy. But the war changed all that. The economy staged a 
robust performance and trade revived with a strong export demand for U.S. 
farm products. Business recessions and recoveries, however, one again 
became clearly evident. To cope with the adverse effects of such re-
cessions upon agriculture, I advanced in 1945 the economic logic for 
compensatory income payments to farmers. In my judgment, such pay-
ments should be linked to the state of unemployment and they should be 
designed to complement compensatory fiscal policy and to free farm pro-
duct markets. 7 But this proposal has been to no avail. We stayed with 
the economic basis befitting the Great Depression despite the erosion it 
engendered. 
Another basis was to reduce the price uncertainty confronting farmers. 
The attainment of this aim has meant much to farmers and it continues to 
be important. The trouble here arises out of the fact that it has been much 
overdone. But to go back, no one can deny that large fluctuations in the 
prices of major farm products seriously burdened farmers. Price uncertainty 
of the magnitude that then prevailed caused much capital rationing. Even 
fairly small annual variations in yield led to large fluctuations in farm pro-
duct prices. Overly high price supports became the remedy which, how-
ever, soon disturbed the real value of particular major farm commodities. 
A system of forward prices8 for agriculture (assuring producers of price 
stability in the future) could have averted and still can avert these price 
distortions. 
Meanwhile, our government has done much to maintain economic 
stability. We now have a number of built-in economic stabilizers. In 
addition we appear to be learning how to use discretionary fiscal and 
6see my, "Agriculture's Bad Press: Distinction between the Apparent 
and Real Difficulties Affecting Farm City Relations," paper presented 
at the Farm-City Committee Seminar, Chicago, Ill., August 6, 1964. 
7see my, "Agriculture in an Unstable Economy," McGraw-Hill, 1945, 
Chap. X. 
8n. Gale Johnson, "Forward Prices for Agriculture," University of 
Chicago Press, 1947; also my "Agriculture in an Unstable Economy," 
Chap. XII. 
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monetary instruments. As Firch has shown, 9 these new stabilizers and 
instruments have substantially reduced the effects of business booms and 
recessions upon the domestic demand for farm products. But, here too, 
the grand design of agricultural policy has not been adjusted to take 
account of these favorable developments and this failure has further con-
tributed to the erosion here under consideration. 
Still another basis was to achieve more soil conservation. There 
were strong indications that we had been under investing in soil conser-
vation. Hugh Bennett did much to make us aware of soil erosion. The 
dust bowl dramatized it. Soil conservation also became a way of reduc-
ing production, if only in the short run. But this aside, there was a real 
economic basis for increasing this type of investment. Yet when such 
investments are carried beyond a certain point, there is an over invest-
ment. We have gone far beyond this point. Thus we are now overdoing 
what was at the outset a very good thing. The ambiguity of the much 
idealized notion of conservation especially among urban people has won 
political support for many programs which have attached to them the word 
"conservation." But even this ambiguity has its limits. Thus, here too, 
the over investment under the umbrella of conservation has been reducing 
the political consensus in support of agricultural policy. 
Real Economic Basis 
9. The hard core of our agricultural adversity is in the unprecedented 
transformation of agriculture and the massive decline in the farm popula-
tion that this transformation entails. The burden of this transformation 
does not fall on land or on farm property generally. It falls on people, 
on particular groups of farm people. It falls especially hard on the un-
skilled who are uprooted. The value of their farming skills is very low. 
It is all well and good to conserve our soils but it fails to a.id those 
farm people who bear most of the burden of this transformation. 
10. Government payments to farmers and USDA expenditures to sup-
port farm prices are tied to land and commodities. They are strongly 
biased in favor of income from farm property; income from farm work comes 
off a very poor second best. (This is my answer to the question raised 
earlier. ) Returns to farm land benefit and capital gains on investment in 
land mount, but the earnings of farm people for the work they do is sorely 
depressed. The incentive is to acquire even more farm property and use 
more fertilizer. Farm people, however, who depend mainly on work for 
income, those who are low on the property ladder, are not helped in 
finding better paying work. To make matters worse for them, one of the 
effects of our present farm programs is to reduce the demand for human 
effort (work) in agriculture. 
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Although it is true that the public is ill-informed about the chronic 
adversity burdening so many farm people, it is vaguely aware that the bil-
lions of dollars appropriated annually for agriculture fail to improve the 
welfare of those large numbers of farm families at the bottom of the farm 
ladder. The public is not wrong in its apprehension: The flow of govern-
ment payments to farm people strongly supports this view. A few figures 
will suffice. In 1963, 11 percent of our farms had sales of $20,000 and 
over. These farms had over $12, 000 of income per farm; they also have 
much wealth, and yet they garnered 54 percent of all government payments. 
At the other end of this scale, 56 percent of our farms had sales of less 
than $5,000. Yet only about 9 percent of all government payments were 
allotted to them. The following estimates are for 1963: 
Distribution Government Payments 
of farms Total Per Farm Distribution 
Farms with sales (per cent) (million dollars) (dollars) of total 
{Qer cent} 
$20,000 and over 10.7 918 2,391 54.5 
$1 0 1 0 0 0 to $19 I 9 9 9 16. 6 398 670 23.6 
$ 5 , 0 0 0 to $ 9 , 9 9 9 17.0 213 350 12.6 
$ 2 t 50 0 to $ 4 1 9 9 9 13.0 80 173 4.7 
Le s s than $ 2 , 50 0 42.7 77 51 ~ 
Total 100 11686 472 100 
11. Let me summarize the implications of my approach. We have 
land use problems and commodity disequilibrium problems but these prob-
lems are not at the core of agriculture adversity. The problem that matters 
most pertains to farm people who are bearing the losses of economic Qrogress, 
specifically of the transformation of U. S. agriculture. 
The market for the skills that are required in agriculture has been long 
depressed. Although the labor force devoted to farming has declined by one 
half since 1940, the market for these sk.ills is still in serious disequilibrium. 
Older members of this labor force have had no real alternative but to settle 
for the depressed, salvage value of the skills they possess. In many farm 
areas the quality of elementary and secondary schooling has been and con-
tinues to be far below parlO and thus the oncoming generation from these 
areas is ill prepared to take advantage of the strong market in other parts 
of the economy for high skills. The vast expenditures by the federal gov-
ernment on behalf of agriculture have not been used to raise the level of 
these skills; and, to repeat, these expenditures have been made in ways 
that enhance the income from some classes of property and that worsen the 
!Osee my, "Underinvestment in the Quality of Schooling: The Rural 
Farm Areas," in "Increasing Understanding of Public Problems and 
Policies," Farm Foundation, 1964, pp. 12-34. 
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personal distribution of income among farm families. Thus it should not 
come as a surprise that although farm families are presently a very small 
faction of all U.S. families, they account for much of the observed pov-
erty and that many of the families in urban areas who are below the poverty 
line have recently come from our farms. 
Looked at in terms of poverty, the South is burrlened with many more low 
income families than other regions basically for three reasons: 
1, It is more dependent upon agriculture than the rest of the United 
States. (It accounted for over 4 5 percent of all U.S. farms at the 
time the 1959 census of agriculture was taken.,) 
2. The labor force in the South is more largely Negro than i.n the Nort.h 
and West and in terms of marketable skills the Negroes in the South 
are even worse off than the Negroes in other regions. 
3. Relatively more of the whites in the labor force in the South have 
low skills than whites in other regions. 
In short the South has been lagging seriously in providing people the 
opportunities to invest in acquiring the high skills for which the demand has 
been increasing at so rapid a rate, predominantly because of social, po-
litical and economic discrii'1ination adverse to poor people. 
A Positive Progra!ll 
12. Although poor people are classified by residence, poor families 
are not a local matter. They are not a state's right. They are not spe-
cific to agriculture. Their lot is related to unemployment, to the adverse 
incidence of economic growth on particular sectors and occupations, and 
to discrimination. Thus, the poverty in agriculture cannot be neatly iso-
lated from the performance of the general economy. While the program 
here proposed deals with farm families who are poor, the propositions on 
which it rests are general in their scope. 
For a program to be efficient, the first proposition is that the addi-
tional income must come primarily from earnings, Our economic develop-
ment of recent decades strongly supports this proposition. One of the 
implications is that subsidies and public controls over firms and prices 
to increase the income from property are an inefficient program. 
(Let me i.llu strate: In 19 59, 16. 5 percent of the farm operators in the 
South were Negroes. The average value of the farms they operated 
was $6,200. Suppose these farms were all fully owned by these 
Negroes free of debt. Suppose that the rate of return were 5 percent 
and that by some new farm program the rate of return on this $6,200 
were to be increased to a 1 0 percent rate of return. Such programs 
would add only $310 to the income stream of these Negroes. This 
approach, however, could not avoid distorting seriously the alloca-
tive efficiency of that part of agriculture.) 
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The next proposition pertains to identifiable disequilibria. The price 
(cost) and value productivity (income) of material inputs, i.e., fertilizer, 
machinery, etc. , are in general not in disequilibrium. There are apparent 
"economics of scale." The value productivity (income) of farm land ex-
ceeds its value for reasons of government payments and other realized bene-
fits from the farm programs. Nevertheless, a large additional increase in 
the income streams from farm land would do little to reduce the poverty in 
agriculture. 
(To illustrate: Suppose the rate of return on the existing value of 
farm land were somehow to be increased by 50 percent, say from 
5 to 7 1/2 percent. Even so large a jump would add less than $644 
of additional income per farm family. The Federal Reserve survey 
cited above indicates farm land and other "business" assets were 
$2 5, 7 6 7 per farm family as of December 31 J 19 62 • An additional 
2 1/2 percent return on this figure would add only $644. But not 
all of these farm assets are land; for they include livestock, 
machinery, and so on. More important, since the farm families 
who are really below the poverty line in all probability own little 
farm land in terms of value, they would benefit little indeed.) 
The earnings of human agents in agriculture, whether they are self-
employed or work for hire, are depressed seriously by a chronic disequi-
librium which is fundamentally related to our type of economic growth. 
This disequilibrium has been aggravated by the slack in aggregate demand 
(surely so since 1957) causing the lack of enough jobs to maintain high 
employment. It has been aggravated also by the low level of skills of the 
millions of farm people who have been leaving agriculture. 
The principal parts of a positive program to assist low income farm 
people are in principle clear and cogent: 
1. Fiscal and monetary policy that will maintain a high level of 
employment. 
2. Programs that will provide farm people with the types of skills 
for which the demand is strong. 
3. Stronger and better enforcement of policies to eliminate discrim-
ination against Negroes. 
4. Programs to increase the economic opportunities of farm people 
by assisting them with job information,. by helping them to move 
and become established in the new community, and by providing 
them with on-the-job training. (In future decades when historians 
turn to this post World War II period, they will be shocked to find 
that although the U. S. government appropriated billions of dollars 
annually to aid agriculture and although many millions of people 
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were leaving agriculture--over 23 millions in terms of changes 
in residence and net migration from 1940 to 1962--not one agri-
cultural program was developed to assist farm people undertake 
this massive migration out of agriculture.) 
We are at a propitious juncture which promises a better deal for farm 
people. Poverty at long last has been placed high on the political agenda. 
Schooling is also there and hopefully it will not by-pass the poorer farm 
areas but will begin to correct the serious under-investment in the quality 
of elementary and high school education in these areas. The political 
response to the high costs of existing farm programs is also a strong posi-
tive factor. But it remains to be seen whether the agricultural committees 
of Congress assisted by the USDA will soon respond with programs that will 
assist farm people through the adversity they face, consistent with accept-
able welfare standards. When they do a new, strong political consensus for 
agricultural policy will emerge. 
APPENDIX 
Dl.stribution of U.S. Farms by Value of Sales and Income, 1963 
(From U.S. D. A. Farm Income Situation, November,,. 1964) 
Class Farms with No. of Distribution Income Qer farm OQerator family 
No. sales farms of farms Realized Off farm Total a 
{000) {Qer cent~ net income .. income 
1 $20, 000 and over 384 10.7 $10,180 $2,177 $12,357 
2 1 0 1 0 0 0 to 19 1 9 9 9 594 16.6 6,207 1, 512 7,719 
3 5, 000 to 9,999 609 17.0 3,731 1,778 5,509 
4 2,500to 4,999 463 13.0 2,337 2,080 4,417 
5 Less than 2,5001,523 42.7 1,029 3,222 4,251 
(Sa) Part-time 903 25.3 919 4,450 5,369 
(5b) Part retirement 418 11.7 1,086 1,880 2,966 
(5c) Other 202 5.7 1,406 510 1,916 
6 All farms 3,573 100 3,504 2,431 5,935 
aincludes non-money income from farm food and housing. 
) 
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COMBATING RURAL POVERTY 
by C. E. Bishopl 
Poverty has become a major subject in discussions of public policy. 
With amazing speed the pendulum of thought in the wealthiest nation on 
earth has swung from affluence to poverty. As America has discovered 
its poor I it has begun an extensive examination of current policies and 
programs with reference to their failure to improve the levels of living of 
its low income families. Concurrently I there have emerged demands for 
new programs designed specifically to improve the levels of living of low 
income families. 
In this chapter emphasis is upon the nature of the low income problems 
in the United States and the types of programs consistent with solving the 
various problems. 
Taking Stock 
Current usage of the word poverty is most confusing. Poverty must be 
measured against some standard. It is most meaningful when defined with 
reference to a national or community norm. Poverty I therefore I is gener-
ally considered to be reflected in the consumption patterns of families I and 
indexes of living are commonly used as indicators of poverty. During the 
last few years, emphasis has been placed upon a level of money income 
roughly sufficient to purchase some minimum bundle of goods and services. 
In the United States/ families whose annual money income is less than 
$3/ 000 are said to be poor. In some cases I however I the definition is 
more rigorous and is in terms of ownership of sufficient assets to be able 
to purchase those goods and services which are regarded as constituting a 
socially acceptable minimum level of living. Thus it is sometimes difficult 
for persons who own their homes or other property to obtain welfare as s.ist-
ance. In popular usage/ howevec the current level of family money in-
come is generally taken as a first approximation of the extent of poverty. 
The Extent of Poverty 
As indicated above I families in the United States who have current 
money incomes of less than $3/000 annually are considered to have less 
income than is necessary to purchase the goods and services deemed to 
constitute a minimum level of living. According to a recent survey 
approximately 8. 8 million families in the U. S. had money incomes of 
lExecutive Director 1 Agricultural Policy Institute 1 North Carolina 
State I Raleigh. 
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less than $3,000 in 1963.2 Hence 18.5 per cent of the nation's families 
had incomes so low that they are considered to be living in poverty. 
Although a high proportion of the population is considered to be poor, 
and public concern over domestic poverty probably is greater today than at 
any time since the depression of the 1930's, it should be emphasized that 
real incomes are increasing rapidly in the United States and that the pro·-
portion of families in the low income category has fallen sharply. In 1947, 
for example, 32 per cent of the families had a money income of less than 
$3, 000 (in 19 63 dollars) compared with 18. 5 per cent of the families in 
1963.3 
The level of income which is considered to constitute poverty varies 
over time. As per capita real incomes increase, the level of income con-
sidered to be minimal also increases. Thus a reduction of more than one-
third in the per cent of families with money incomes under $3, 0 0 0, does 
not necessarily mean a reduction of one-third in the number of poor fam-
ilies. Nevertheless, such a sharp reduction in the per cent of families 
in the low income category is encouraging for it means that many low in-
come families are benefiting from economic growth. 
The Incidence of Poverty 
Poverty bears more heavily upon some segments of the population than 
others. There are more poor white families than nonwhite families (Table 1). 
However, the proportion of nonwhite families in the poverty category is 
two and one-half times the proportion of white familes. Likewise, the per-
centage of farm families in the poverty category is two and one-half times 
that of nonfarm families; but there are five times as many poor nonfarm fam-
ilies as there are poor farm families. 
The relative incidence of poverty is greater in the South than in the rest 
of the nation. 4 In 1963, 28 per cent of the families in the South had money 
incomes of less than $3, 000. 5 However, there were more poor families m 
the rest of the nation than in the South. In the case of rural families the 
situation is quite different. The South has more poor rural nonfarm families 
and more poor rural farm families than the rest of the nation. Furthermore, 
a greater percentage of the rural families in the South are in the poverty 
2current Population Reports, Consumer Income, Series P-60, No. 43, 
Sept. 29, 19 64, p. 3. U. S. Department of Commerce. 
3Ibid. 
4 A. P. Bird, 11 Poverty in Rural Areas of the United States. 11 USDA, ERS, 
AER No. 63, Nov. 1964, p. 5. 
5current Population Reports, .Q£.. cit., p. 4. 
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category. Even in the South, however, there are four times as many poor 
nonfarm families as poor farm families. 
Table 1. Number and Percent of Families with Total Money Income Less than 
$3,000 in the United States, 1963 
Item 
U. S. total 
Nonfarm 
Farm 
White 
Nonfarm 
Farm 
Nomv;;ite 
Nonfarm 
Farm 
Number of 
families 
(millions) 
8.8 
7.4 
1.4 
6.7 
5. 6 
1.1 
2 0 1 
1.9 
0 2 
Percent of 
families 
18 0 5 
17.0 
43.4 
15.9 
14 0 1 
39 0 6 
43.1 
40.9 
78.9 
Source: Current Population Reports, Consumer Income, Series P-60, No. 43, 
Sept. 29, 1964, p. 21, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
The incidence of poverty varies with the age and education of the rural 
farm population. A recent study by Glasgow and Baum concluded that the 
average income of farm males was substantially less than that for nonfarm 
males and that the income disparity inc rea sed with increasing age. 6 
The relationship between education and income has been clearly defined 
in several recent studies. 7 Sixty-four per cent of the heads of families with 
annual incomes of less than $3,000 also have less than eight years of formal 
schooling. 8 Other studies have noted the inferior amount and quality of edu-
cation of rural youth. 9 A summary of some salient research findings empha-
sizes the relationship of inferior education and rural poverty. The dropout 
6R. B. Glasgow and E. L. Baum, 11 Considerations for Planning Economi.c 
Development of Rural Areas, II Journal of Farm Economics. 45(5):1083-
1091. 
7 See, for example, T. W. Schultz, 11 Reflections on Investment in Man, 11 
Journal of Political Economy Supplement, October 1962 and other arti-
cles in the same issue. 
8A. P. Bird, 2£· cit., p. 20. 
9T. W. Schultz, 11 Underinve stment in the Quality of Schooling: The Rural 
Farm Areas, II National Agricultural Policy Conference, College Station, 
Texas, Sept. 15, 1964; and J. D. Cowhig, School Dropout Rates among 
Farm and Nonfarm Youth: 1950 and 1960. ERS, USDA, AER No. 42, Sept. 
19 63. 
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rate among students in rural areas is approximately 50 per cent greater 
than the dropout rate for students in urban areas. 10 Moreover, not only do 
relatively more rural youth than urban youth drop out of school but they drop 
out with less schooling. Over one-half of the dropouts in rural areas do so 
before they reach high school while only about one-third of the urban drop-
outs fail to attend some high school. 11 Cowhig and Schultz have called out 
attention to the high retardation rates for rural farm white males in the South. 
Relatively few farm youth go to college. l2 Furthermore, they encounter 
more difficulty in getting into college. A number of studies which have re-
cently been completed indicate that pupils from rural schools make lower 
grades on achievement tests than students from urban schools. One recent 
study, for example, indicates that rural pupils in some areas score about 15 
percent lower on tests of reading, spelling, arithmetic and social studies 
and about 25 percent less on grammar and science. 13 Thus, rural youth have 
more deficiencies in preparation for college than urban youth, and it is nec-
essary to take time to make up these deficiencies or suffer higher attrition 
rates. 
Cowhig has shown that income differences are associated with differ-
ences in education and that they tend to be cumulative over time. When 
consideration was given to social and economic circumstances of the fam-
ilies, Cowhig reached the important conclusion that "the major reason for 
higher rural than urban droupout rates is the greater concentration of low 
income families in rural areas, the higher proportion of rural parents with 
comparatively little education, and--related to both of these factors--the 
more frequent employment of rural parents in low-status occupations." 
The research cited above emphasizes the importance of human resource 
development in combating rural poverty. The low productive capacity of 
10cowhig, ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12Education Status, College Plans and Occupational Status of Farm and 
Nonfarm Youth, October 1959, Series Census ERS (P-27) No. 30, p. 22. 
13John Folger, "Good Schools for Small Communities," unpublished man-
uscript, Agricultural Policy Institute, 1965. 
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much of the current rural population has also been emphasized.14 Other 
research has emphasized the underemployment of labor in agriculture, par-
ticularly in the South.15 
Approaches to Policy_ 
The above discussion makes it clear that there are many facets of rural 
poverty and that no single approach is likely to cope effectively with all of 
the different elements. At least three aspects of the low income problem 
must be singled out for special treatment. The policies relevant to coping 
with each of these problems are distinctly different. 
Attacking Individual and Family Poverty 
Real poverty characterizes those individuals and families who own too 
few assets to yield an income high enough to sustain a minimal level of living 
even when their resources are optimally employed. This situation character-
izes the aged, the disabled and many of those in broken homes who have 
dependent children. These people are poor not by choice and not because 
theydo not employ their resources efficiently but by virtue of the fact that 
they own so few resources. In other words, they are locked in the poverty 
category and will continue there unless provided with outside assistance. 
This low income category also includes those whose skills have been 
rendered obsolete by changes in economic and technological conditions and 
those who for various reasons may be temporarily unemployed. Thus, this 
category contains a temporary and a permanent component. 
The obvious approach in coping with the permanent facet of this type of 
low-income problem is through direct income payments. The major policy 
questions concern the size of the payments and regulations governing the 
manner in which the payments are made. 
Clearly the payments must be sufficient to sustain a minimum level of 
living. The payments may be made in kind or in money, but from the stand-
point of the recipients payments in money are preferable. A more important 
question concerns the regulations governing payments. Clearly every effort 
should be made to insure that those who can emerge from the poverty cate-
gory are encouraged to do so. Unfortunately, under many current programs 
costs are attached to emerging from poverty. These programs carry pro-
visions whereby individuals are penalized for obtaining higher incomes in 
that as earned income increases welfare payments decrease. Costs in 
14G. S. Tolley and H. W. Hjort, "Age-Mobility and Southern Farmer 
Skill - Looking Ahead for Area Development," Journal of Farm Economics. 
45(1):31-46. 
l5see, for example, C. E. Bishop, "Underemployment of Labor in South-
eastern Agriculture," Journal of Farm Economics. 36(2):258-272. 
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the form of time and effort are involved in becoming a participant in most 
welfare programs. Thus, program participants who find that their benefits 
decrease as their incomes increase may be discouraged to accept the risks 
and penalties associated with part-time or even full time employment. 
Obviously, it is desirable to provide incentives for those who can do so to 
emerge from the poverty category. This can be done by making the income 
payments independent of income or, perhaps even better, by making pay-
ments an increasing function of income. At least it may be desirable to 
offer bonuses in the form of continuation of welfare payments for a specified 
period of time as an incentive to obtain employment. 
Another aspect of family poverty whj_ch warrants further consideration is 
that of human resource development. It was emphasized above that people 
in the poverty category own few resources other than labor. Moreover, there 
is little capital accumulation by families in this situation; thus the prospects 
for emerging from the poverty category depend heavily upon increasing the 
returns for labor services. Intensification of training and retraining for those 
whose skills have been rendered obsolete or who could develop marketable 
skills is one obvious way of increasing earning capacity of labor. 
Even more important, however, is the need to insure an exodus from the 
poverty category by the children of these now in this category. The major, 
and perhaps the only, avenue out of poverty for these people is through edu-
cation and training. The relationship between education and training and 
earnings is so important that a system of rewards and/or penalties should be 
considered to encourage school attendance for the children of those who are 
trapped in poverty. This could be done by reducing welfare payments for 
school absences or perhaps better by providing additional payments to 
parents whose children meet minimal attendance targets. Beyond some 
age it may be desirable to make payments directly to the youth. 
The main point I wish to make here is that we should endeavor to u.se 
market incentives to encourage human resource developments, Efforts to 
develop these resources should be rewarded and any penalties associated 
with development should be removed in the interest of assisting people to 
emerge from poverty and to reduce the long-term costs of welfare programso 
Attacking Area Poyerty 
The incidence of low incomes is not uniform over geographic areas. 
Recent discussion of low incomes has emphasized the fact that "pockets 
of poverty" have developed in various regions of the nation. These con-
centrations of low income people emphasize the need for area attacks on 
poverty. 
In the United States we are prone to assume that all areas can become 
thriving centers of economic activity and population growth. Even casual 
observation should reveal that in order to achieve reasonable family incomes 
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it has been necessary in many areas to sharply reduce population. In short, 
the existence of economic poverty should not be confused with the existence 
of economic opportunity. Effective policies must distinguish between prob-
lem areas and opportunity areas. The possibilities for an area to become 
economically viable and the kinds of changes which will be necessary vary 
greatly from one area to another. An attack on poverty in rural areas may 
require changes in economic structure and development of the infrastructure 
as well as resource development. 
Most attempts at area development have stressed industrial development 
and the creation of nonfarm employment opportunities. Efforts also have 
been made to increase farm productivity and incomes. However, the efforts 
toward structural reorganization of farming in the impoverished areas have 
been feeble indeed. The average· age of farm operators is increasing sharply. 
The average age of farmers is higher in the low-income areas than in other 
areas. Moreover, the s.ize of the land holdings is less than in other areas. 
In order to improve the economic viability of these areas and to provide op-
portunities for young families, it may be desirable to consider a system of 
payments for early retirement and for sale or rental of farm property to in-
crease the size of the remaining farms. In some areas it also may be de-
sirable to consider the use of zoning and other techniques to prevent the 
further parcellization of farms and the development and perpetuation of low 
areas. 
Some areas have good economic potential. but lack the basic infra-
structure. The construction of highways, hospitals, schools and libraries, 
for example, may be a necessary condition for local resource development. 
Lakes, parks and other recreation and retirement activities as well as the 
further development of agricultural and industrial enterprises may be im-
practical without improvement in the infrastructureo 
One of the most needed changes in infrastructure is the further consoli-
dation and improvement of schools. Much more vigorous programs in this 
area will be needed before rural youth are assured of educational and 
training opportunities comparable to those enjoyed by their urban counter-
parts. 
An effective attack on area poverty will require better community or-
ganization, development of local leadership and analysis of area economic 
opportunities. In this respect, we could learn much from the programs of 
community guidance being conducted in Holland, Sweden and other countries 
of Western Europe, where families are meeting in groups to consider the 
developmental potential of their communities. 
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Reduction of the Farm Labor Force 
A third major facet of an attack on rural poverty is through a reduction 
and change in the composition of the farm labor force. The low incomes in 
rural American cannot be solved unless a high level of nonfarm employment 
is maintained. Low incomes in agriculture usually are associated with 
underemployment rather than unemployment. Transfer of many underem·-
ployed people to nonfarm employment is an essential aspect of income im-
provement for families in most rural areas of the United States. This ad-
justment, of course, has been taking place rapidlyJ especially since 1940. 
From 1940 to 1962 more than 23 millions of people changed from farm to 
nonfarm residences. 1 6 
This massive flow of people out of agriculture has been a major factor 
in improving levels of living of farm families. Although there is a contin-
uous flow of labor from farm to nonfarm residences, the magnitude of the 
flow varies considerably from year to year. During periods of low unem-
ployment the flow increases as the wages of nonfarm labor increase in 
comparison with farm labor. When the unemployment rate is greater than 
5 per cent of the labor force, the rationing of jobs and difficulties of ob-
taining nonfarm employment pose important barriers to mobility.l7 A full 
employment policy involving an increased demand for labor in nonfarm em-
ployment is an essential aspect of a transfer of labor from farms. It is a 
necessary condition for continued improvement of levels of living in rural 
areas. 
Migration is proceeding, however, in spite of the unemployment which 
has prevailed. Tolley estimates that if the United States maintains about 
the same rates of unemployment during the current decade as prevailed 
during the last two decades approximately 40 per cent of the rural farm 
males who were between the ages of 5 and 65 in 1960 will transfer to non-
farm residences by 1970 (Table 2). However, the incidence of migration is 
highly selective with respect to age, varying from a high of almost 75 per 
cent of those between the ages of 15 and 24 to a low of only 11 per cent for 
those between 45 and 65 years of age. 
1 6Farm Population Estimates for 1910-62, ERS, USDA, ERS-130, Oct. 
19 63. 
17 C. E. Bishop, "Economic Aspects of Changes in Farm Labor Force," 
in "Labor Mobility and Population in Agriculture, " Iowa State 
University Press, 1961. 
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Table 2. Projections to 1970 for Males Remaining on Farms and Migrating 
off Farms in the United States 
Age Number of 1960 Number expected Implied Percent 
in rural farm males to be rural farm off-farm migrating 
1960 surviving to 1970 males in 1970 migration 
------(thousands) 
5-14 1,542 631 911 59.0 
15-24 985 259 726 73.7 
25-34 566 436 130 23.0 
35-44 750 629 118 15.7 
45-65 1,287 1,140 150 11.7 
Totals 5,130 3,095 2,035 39.7 
Source: c. E. Bishop and G. S. Tolley, "Manpower in Farming and Related 
Occupations," Education for a Changing World of Work, OE 80025, 
U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 19 63. 
Migration from farms is structured largely by employment conditions. 
The young, who have less invested in agriculture, and who have better non-
farm employment opportunities and a longer period of prospective employment 
in which to recoup the costs of migration, are transferring out of agriculture 
in very large numbers. As a result the average age of farm operators is in-
creasing rapid! y. Over time, this will result in a continued and accelerated 
reduction in the agricultural labor force. 
The above changes appear to be in the right direction. These changes, 
however, are not without substantial costs. Net migration, for example, is 
less than one-half of gross migration. This suggests a substantial backflow 
of people to farm residences and creates doubts concerning the efficiency of 
migration as it is now operating. Furthermore, there is cause for concern 
over the aging of farm operators. A substantial part of our farm resources is 
owned by farmers of advanced age who have little flexibility. These re-
sources are virtually locked in current uses. In view of the age selectivity 
of migration and the aging of farmers, manpower policy is an important 
aspect of agricultural adjustment. 
This nation has never developed an explicit manpower policy for agri-
culture. Land use and conservation policies have been developed and 
farmers have been provided with subsidies to encourage them to make 
specified uses of land. Likewise, special credit programs have been de-
veloped to encourage farmers to make particular types of investments. 
Special programs of agricultural education have been developed for farm 
youth, .but education and training programs have not been related specifi-
cally to manpower policy. In view of the changes now taking place and 
the importance of occupational and geographic mobility of labor to 
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a solution of low income problems in rural America, an explicit manpower 
policy for agriculture should be developed. This policy should seek to 
(l) gauge the employment potential of agriculture, (2) provide counsel to 
individuals and families concerning income potentials in farm and nonfarm 
employment, (3) continue specialized training programs for those who are 
to continue as farmers, (4) initiate nonfarm vocational training for those 
who have limited opportunities in farming, and (5) provide special counsel-
ling, guidance and possibly relocation loans or grants to those who trans-
fer to nonfarm occupations. The objective of these programs would be to 
increase the productivity of and returns for labor services. In the same way 
in which land use policy has recognized that there are substantial differences 
in the productive potential and best uses of land, farm manpower policy 
would emphasize the differences in productive potential and adjustment ca-
pacity of farm people. 
Any additional aspect of a farm manpower policy should include the 
development of an "early warning system" to detect change in technology 
which are likely to substantially decrease farm manpower needs. Changes 
in farm technology usually increase the productivity of capital relative to 
that of labor and thereby encourage the substitution of capital for labor in 
the production of farm commodities. Early detection of these changes a.nd 
analysis of their probable magnitudes should make it possible to cushion 
the ensuing adjustments. 
A further aspect of manpower policy is concerned with those who for 
one reason or another are not motivated by market phenomena. The market 
reconciles the preferences of resource owners and those of consumers. It 
is not possible, therefore, for people to choose arbitrarily the uses which 
they make of their resources and at the same time to specify the income 
which they will receive. Once the use of resources has been specifiedu 
income has been largely determined. Certainly, society has no responsi-
bility for providing minimum income levels to individuals who are unwilling 
to employ their resources productively. To the extent that this is a problem 
of significance, however, it would seem desirable to determine the reasons 
for lack of motivation and to take steps to improve the use of resources 
through better occupational guidance of youth and increased incentives to 
change. 
In summary, in this chapter we have argued that the problems of rural 
poverty are quite complex. They cannot be solved by treating all people 
and all areas as if they were homogeneous. It is the heterogeneity which 
is the essence of the poverty problems. Effective programs to cope with 
poverty, therefore, must give due recognition to differences among families 
and areas and must be tailored to the needs of each. 
PAST 1 PRESENT AND FUTURE CAPACITY TO DEAL 
WITH RURAL POVERTY THROUGH PUBLIC AIDS AND PROGRAMS 
Lee R. Martin 1 
Poverty is considered to be measured by low disposable incomes 
to human resources 1 in relation either to a specified level of living or to 
incomes of resources with similar potentials. There are valid critisms of 
usmg any income measure as the sole criterion of poverty I but until better 
measures of wealth are available to supplement income data I there is little 
choice. .Better measures of economic welfare are badly needed. Here the 
commonly used poverty boundaries of $3000 in net annual cash income for the 
family and $1500 for the unrelated individual are assumed. (6) 2 
It would be too much to examine all possible elements in a poverty 
program 1 and all the administrative possibilities for carrying out public 
programs. What is under discussion are program elements that could be 
carried out largely by the land-grant system--the land-grant universities with 
their capacities for extension I research and instruction I and the U. S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) with parallel capacities in research and with 
capacity for carrying out action programs. 3 
1. Historical Discussion 
A search for references to programs dealing with rural poverty reveals 
few examples before 1933. However 1 from the beginning of effective self-
government 1 a great many public actions that affected farming were intended 
to improve the welfare of farmers or consumerfi' or both. 
lProfessor of Resource Economics 1 School of Natural Resources, The 
University of Michigan. 
2The numbers in parenthesis refer to the numbered bibliography at the 
end of the paper. This bibliography includes unquoted studies exam-
ined in the process of preparing this chapter. 
3It seems reasonable to assume no major institutional reorganizations 
in relevant areas 1 and no creation of new institutions; none of the 
better known political commentators has interpreted the 1964 election 
as a mandate for major structural changes like those carried out 
during the New Deal. 
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A. Accessibility to Land. Early land programs were intended to bring 
arable land into production as soon as possible. The programs were quite 
successful for land that could be used for intensive agriculture; problems 
arose from the distribution of forest and grazing lands. The philosophy for 
nearly a century and a half was one of opening up economic O}lportunities by 
making arable land available at little or no cost, with few conditions imposed 
on land use. There was little tendency in Washington to be concerned with 
the welfare of families whose breadwinners could not eke out a livlihood 
under prevailing conditions. There was also tittle direct concern with 
efficiency of resource use 1 and practically none with resource conservation 
problems. 
B. Accessibility to Information. In the 19th century, there came more 
explicit recognition of the role of information in agriculture. In 18 62 the 
land-grant system for creating and disseminating relevant scientific know-
ledge began to evolve into the effective mechanism it is today. The Morrill 
Act of 1862 stimulated the creation of the land--grant colleges and another act 
in that same year established the USDA. The Hatch Act of 1887 institution-
alized agricultural research 1 the Smith-Lever Act of 1914 led to the Coopera-
tive extension Service 1 and the Smitp-Hughes Act of 1917 began federal 
support of vocational education in agriculture. 
In the beginning of the land-grant system, efficiency may not have been 
an explicit consideration 1 but it increased steadily in importance. Very 
early in this period information was regarded as a means for raising the y1.elds 
of less productive farmers; it was assumed that income and welfare would 
rise as a result. The land-grant system is a social innovation of the first 
order of magnitude. Much of the growth in agricultural output supports the 
validity of the overwhelming importance of information. Even though the 
land-grant system neither created nor disseminated all of the information that 
sustained agriculture 1 s phenomenal growth, the system succeeded beyond ~he 
fondest expectation of its founders. As Schultz \40 1 42} and many others have 
said I and as Griliches (19) has demonstrated for h~lbrid corn 1 the benefits 
have gone more to consumers than to farmers, 
That an individual with land resources and information should be able 
to produce an adequate income was still the philosophy of this period. 
Recognition of the existence of relatively· low farm income grew 
in the 19 2 0 1 s and developed into a concern with agricultural credit. 
After the Civil War, the political leadership for agriculture oscillated 
around a central position of disenchantment with laissez faire economics 
and its policy conclusions. There was concern for national policies dealing 
with money supply I tariffs and foreign trade, antitmst policies and other 
-73-
methods for regulating monopoly. 4 Concern by agricultural leaders for 
"nonfarm" policies became more diluted from the 1920's on, because 
agriculture concentrated increasingly on agricultural policy. 
C. Accessibility to Credit. Some concern for low income was directed 
toward making more resources available to farmers. The outcome of this low-
key credit ferment has been a reasonably satisfactory farm credit system, 
including production credit, intermediate credit 1 and mortgage credit. 
Improvements in credit probably C~.ssisted more farmers in avoiding a low-
income status than it rescued. The credit system may have contributed to 
the retention of redundant human and land resources in agriculture; if capital 
resources are also redundant I one might argue with kind of soft logic that 
injections of additional credit in agriculture contributed to the redundancy 
in capital resources. 
The turn of the century saw a steady growth of interest in the conservation 
of natural resources, although the initial .interest was not so much for 
arable lands as for "the protection of navigable waters in streams, the control 
of forest fires I government regulation of the cutting of timber 1 the retention 
by the government of underground mineral rights in lands granted to private 
interests and so on." {3, p. 123) Arid land reclamation programs preceded 
soil conservation by almost a generation. Reclamation was an attempt to extend 
the "land " frontier by continuing to make land available to farmers. 5 The 
agricultural conservation program came into being during the New Deal, and 
has been continued. While conceptual cobwebs in conservation have gradually 
been swept away 1 an interested observer for three decades might be permitted 
to make the unsupported observ:J.tion that decisions connected with the agricul-
tural conservation· programs have consistently kept one eye on their direct 
income effects . 
4concern over monetary policies led eventually to the Federal Reserve 
Act (1913); feelings before the trust-busting era led to the Sherman 
Antitrust Act (1890) 1 and to an impressive list of regulatory statutes. 
Concern over inequalities in income distribution led to the income 
tax a·mendment (1912). A major farm organization was instrumental 
in massing congressional support for a 1940 extension of the 
reciprocal trade agreements program. (10, pp. 140-155) 
5That reclaimed land does not represent a net addition to productivity 
or to land in cultivation was shown by Tolley (51) 1 who concluded in 
l959: "Tne analysis suggests that main effects of western reclamation 
have been in the South I where perhaps 480 million dollars worth of 
production have been displaced ... Since 480 million dollars is about 
five percent of gross income in the South 1 it may be that one farm 
worker for every twenty remaining in southern agriculture has been 
displaced by western reclamation." 
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D. Accessibility to Markets -- Prices I Markets and Supply Management. 
The New Deal represents a watershed in agricultural policy 1 with the role of 
demand and supply explicitly recognized and income programs built around· 
efforts to bring supply and demand into balance at a satisfactory level of 
prices. The selected instrumen-:: was input control, and the input use tha.t 
could be most easily controlled was judged to be land. Unfortunately for the 
selection 1 a technological revolution that had been slowly gathering momentum 
burst upon the rural scene and vastly increased the extent to which purchased 
inputs could be substituted for land and labor. 
There was explicit recognition of rural poverty and experimental direct-
action programs were designed, with the Resettlement Administration and its 
successor agencies as examples. This road to welfare improvement was 
based upon increasing production in low-income units. Had it been a great 
success it would have aggravated supply management problems, Credit 
programs were redisigned to be more effective against poverty by making more 
resources available to small farmers along with information o World VVar II 
brought the credit goal back to efficiency with a gradual abandonment of the 
welfare elements in earlier programs, perhaps due more to war-induced 
squeezes on funds and trained personnel than to any conscious abandonment 
of the earlier philosophy. 
From 1939 to 1947 or 1948 1 the economic environment facing rural people 
was more favora.ble than it had been since World V\Tar l. .Not only could 
productive capacity in agriculture be unshackled, but large accumulated 
stocks played a crucial role in winning the war (and in reconverting to an 
almost believable level of economic productivity in the western world, even 
in Italy 1 Germany and Japan). Nonfarm employment was plentiful, and much 
of the excess manpower that had been dammed up in agriculture for two . 
decades was drained off into the armed forces u or in nonfarm employment. 
There was massive migration to large urban centers, while urban centers in 
the agricultural regions were able to locate economic activities that 
provided employment opportunities nearer to underemployed rural resi.dents. 
Per capita income differentials between the low-income and high-income 
states (also between the rural and urban states) narrowed considerably 
from 1940 to 1959; analysis of income changes in the 14 southern states 
reveals that nearly all the improvement of the 19-year period actually took 
place during 1940-45 I when effective demand was adequate or even 
excessive. (9 1 p. 2 7 2) 
In spite of the welcome improvement in rural welfare, the war petiod 
turned out to be only an interruption in agricultural programs I not a 
turning point. Technological change, not even slowed down by the war, soon 
accelerated further, and the reappearance of surpluses forced attention back 
to supply management 0 Actual and suggested programs represented different 
combinations of the stick of coercion and the carrot of incentives. But none 
of the combinations actually achieved great success either in reducing stocks 
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to optimum levels or in raising incomes of farm people near equality with , 
nonfarm incomes. Nevertheless 1 the farm income situation was much better 
than it would have been without the programs. 
From the New Deal on 1 the preambles to agricultural programs and 
the Congressional debates paid considerable lip service to the contribution 
the programs would make to the improvement of low farm incomes. It became 
possible in the 1950's and then fashionable for analysts to point out that rural 
poverty was being affected very little by conventional agricultural programs. 
In an unpublished doctoral dissertation I Pavlick estimated the income effects 
of federal farm programs on Appalachian farmers and found that the programs 
~ad little impact on farm poverty. (38) 6 
E. Direct Action on Poverty. In the 1950's it came to be recognized 
that different approaches were required. Because the political climate was not 
not favorable for structural changes 1 poverty programs could be characterized 
as shoestring, operations or as social experiments in inducing regional· 
economic growth. Goals of the domestic poverty programs were to be achieved by 
achieved by reorienting and coordinating existing public programs 1 particu-
larly those involving federal agencies. An extreme example was the 
reassignment of technical specialists in soil conservation to the task of 
preventing further erosion of human capacities in impoverished rural counties. 
It was implicit in the programs that the information required to stimulate 
economic growth was readily available in the form needed. This led away 
from including much research and led toward the use of "consultants" who 
were assumed to have the all-important information for designing and 
carrying our effective measures. Perhaps the most important unmet need was 
the conceptual framework for economic growth. Whatever empirical informa-
tion was at hand could not always be placed in a context that led to useful 
or valid interpretations. Only in the last few years has research been~ 
included in poverty programs I especially basic research into the underlying 
structural relations. The resources allocated are still quite inadequate when 
considered in relation to the magnitude I complexity and importance of the 
problem. 
6Pavlick 's results were stated as follows (p. 68): "The findings were 
tha.t income effects are small~ Only one-fourth to one -third of the farmers 
farmers participated directly in farm programs 1 although rn.ost are 
probably affected indirectly. The average increment to participating 
farmers was about $30 while the average increment to all farmers was 
from indirect effect was about $120." It should be added that the 
indirect effects are based on an estimate of what income would have 
been without federal programs; the indirect in,come effect on an 
individual farmer would be roughly proportipnal to his volume of out-
put. 
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Evidence of "outside concern" evoked useful responses from low-
income areas, almost always energetic and sometimes constructive. The 
limited availability of useful information probably kept the released energy 
from being transformed into more dramatic results. 
Making small amounts of financial assistance available was probably 
designed more to stimulate local response than it was to play a vital role 
in making up capital deficits:. The magnitude of capital was underestimated I 
because of the failure to include human capital and social overhead capital. 
The most important recent improvement in the welfare of farm people 
came about as a result of extending the coverage of Social Security to farm 
people. To quote Schultz: 
Ten years ago farm families of which the head .. was 65 years of a 
age and over I received a median income of only $11028; by 1959 it 
had risen to $2 I 176 and for 1960, .. it had become $2,294... Farm 
families are now receiving about the same amount of income I whereas 
ten years ago 1 they received only two-thirds of that of rural nonfarm 
families. (44) 
Table 7. 1 shows the realized costs of agricultural and related programs 
for fiscal years 1932-59. For the entire 27 years, realized costs were 
approximately $39 billion-- $18 billion for price and income stabilization, $7 
billion for conservation I $1. 6 billion for credit (R. E. A. and F. H. A.) I 
$2.1 billion for research and education 1 $1.2 billion for marketing services 
and regulatory activities I $ 3. 7 billion for school lunch and donations 
(including $1 . 5 billion for donations abroad 1 but not including Public Law 480 
480) I $0. 5 billion for the Farm Credit Administration, $4.2 billion for wartime 
subsidies, and 0.8 billion for other. For the 1932-39 period the realized costs 
ran at an annual rate of nearly $600 million. During the 1940-49 period the 
annual realized costs averaged almost $1.3 billion; for 1950-59 the annual 
average was 2. 2 billion I and the annual average for the 27 years was close 
to $1. 5 billion. 
Table 7. 2 shows budget appropriations (not really costs) for agriculture 
and related program for 19 60-64. During this period the annual appropriation 
ran to nearly $7 billion on the average, with foreign assistance programs 
averaging over $2 billion per year. 
Table 7. 3 shows 1964 actual spending (again not realized cost) and 
budget proposals for fiscal year 1965 and 1966. For these three budget 
periods I the rate approached $7.5 billion although the totals were projected 
to decline from a high of over $8 billion for fiscal year 1964. 
Actual and proposed budget appropriations for fiscal years 1960 through 
1966 total up to $47.5 billion of which $12.7 billion was for foreign assistance 
assistance and $26 billion for stabilizing farm incomes. 
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Table 7. 2 
Appropriations for Agriculture and R. E .A. and F. H .A. Loan Authorizations , 
Fiscal Years 1960 through 1964 
FY 
FY FY FY FY FY 1960-
Program 1960 1961 1962- i963 1964* 1964 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Price and Income Stabilization 
Programs: 3,775 3,149 4,985 4,372 5,826 22,143 
Price Support, supply and 
related activ1ties 2,044 l 1152 936 2,278 2,799 9,209 
Foreign assistance programs 1,265 1,443 3,461 1,527 2,430 10,126 
Removal of surplus agricul-
tural commodities (Sec. 3 2} 251 320 326 318 362 1,577 
Sugar act P'rogram 69 72 76 78 80 375 
Expenses, A.S.C.S. 88 88 105 95 115 491 
Other A. S.C. S. 50 67 75 60 69 330 
Other Programs 8 7 6 7 7 35 
Resource Conservation Programs: 873 1,004 981 1,001 1,061 ·4,920 
Agricultural Conservation Program 215 213 209 213 220 1,070 
Conservation reserve 317 318 301 300 294 1,530 
Soil Conservation Service 133 155 179 193 210 870 
Forest Service 208- 318 287 295 310 1,418 
Other 5 27 32 
Credit and Related Programs: 507 820 798 866 913 3,904 
Lending Programs, R. E .A. 250 320 418 490 506 1,984 
Lending Programs, F. H. A. 257 500 380 376 407 1,920 
Research, Education, Marketing 
and Regulatory: 304 347 352 382 398 1,783 
Research 202 239 235 258 268 1,202 
Extension Service 64 67 71 76 77 355 
Marketing Services 35 37 42 44 48 206 
Other 3 4 4 4 5 20 
School Lunch and S:Qecial Milk · 
Programs: 177 185 296 325 239 1,222 
All other 6 7 7 7 8 35 
GRAND TOTAL 5 ,,64.1 5 £~10, 7,418 6,954 8,482 34,005 
* Budget Estimate 
Note: Figures may not add to totals due to rounding. 
Source: Congressional Record, Vol. 109, Part 2, January 31 , 1963 to 
February 21, 1963, pp. 1859-1863, US Government Printing Office , 
Washington 1963. 
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Table 7. 3 Budgets Proposed for Agriculture and 
Related Activities, 1964-66. 
Program FY FY 
1964 1965 
actual estimate 
FY 
1966 
estimate 
(millions of dollars) 
Farm Income Stabilization: 4 e 144 3e103 2e716 
Price support 1 supply and purchase program 31175 21293 11864 
National Wool Act 73 32 39 
International Wheat Agreement 126 30 28 
Transfer of commodities to supplemental 
stockpile 38 80 75 
Removal of surplus agricultural commodities 240 242 312 
Conservation reserve and cropland 
conversion 297 211 161 
Sugar Act 87 103 95 
Other 108 112 144 
Financing Rural Electrification and TeleJ2hones: 342 199 200 
Present programs 342 367 377 
Proposed legislation -168 -177 
Financing Farming and Rural Housing: 250 242 138 
F. H .A·. I present programs 259 248 111 
F. H ... A. I proposed legislation 40 
F. C .A. I present programs -9 -6 -5 
F. C .A. I proposed legislation -8 
Agricultural Land and Water Resources 409 441 424 
Soil Conservation Service I present programs 193 209 218 
S.C. S. I proposed legislation for user charges -20 
A. c. p. I payments I including c. c r c. loan 213 226 223 
Other 3 6 3 
Research and other Agricultural Services 414 493 466 
Present programs 414 493 523 
Proposed legislation for inspection fees -57 
Total, Administrative Budget 5,560 4,477 3,944 
Trust Funds (main!~- federall~ SJ2onsored 
farm credit institutions) 496 615 495 
Intragovernmental Transactions and Other 
Adjustments -210 -443 -326 
Forest Service 317 361 340 
-81- FY FY FY 
1964 1965 1966 
actual estimate estimate 
Food for Peace 11704 11661 11661 
Sales for foreign currencies 11415 11247 11140 
Grants for famine relief and other purposes 228 211 306 
Long-term credit sales 60 204 2I6 
School Lunch and Special Milk Programs 278 294 302 
Food Stamp Program and Other 68 148 193 
GRAND TOTAL, Agriculture and Related 
Programs 8,213 7 '113 6,609 
Note: Figures may not add to totals due to rounding 
Source: 11 Text of President • s Message and an Analysis of Federal Budget of 
$99.7 Billion 111 New York Times 1 January 26 I 1965 I pp. 25-32. 
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Little of the expenditure for price and income stabilization reached the 
lowest-income farmers because individual payments tended to be proportional 
to out-put or to acreage of arable land owned by the recipient. Low-income 
rural residents characteristically have smaller bundles of productive · 
resources. Conservation payments tended to be jointly proportional to the 
quantity and quality of land resources. Likewise 1 credit programs (espec-
ially after FHA gradually evolved into a conventional lending agency) could 
bring about little abatement of poverty 1 because the lowest-income farmers 
had such a small resource base with which to start. The REA program 
undoubtedly raised welfare throughout rural areas by bringing electricity and 
telephones within easy reach. At best, research and education were neutral 
in their effects on poverty, increasing over-all efficiency, but with more of 
the benefits accruing to consumers. School lunches and other donations 
increased the demand for farm oroducts and enhanced the welfare of the 
recipients, as did the distribution of surplus agricultural commodities through 
welfare agencies; many low-income rural residents were eligible for surplus 
commodities, and some of their children received free school lunches. FCA 
loans probably had little effect on poverty. Wartime consumer subsidies 
obviously benefited the most productive farmers and the consuming units that 
received the subsidies. 
While nearly one-half of the realized cost of 27 years of programs was 
assigned to price and income stabilization, only a small part became income 
for farmers in the lowest quartile. Whether this situation has always been 
understood by urban Congressmen and Senators who supported agricultural 
legislation faithfully is not clear. 
The relative magnitude of direct action on poverty can be seen from 
1964 budget estimates quoted by Schultz . 
. . . there are six soil conservation ... accounts which will require 
$200 million . there is an "agricultural conservation program" which 
will cost $221 million; a "land-use adjustment program," $27 milHon; 
an "emergency conservation program," $5million; and a conservation 
reserve program which calls for $294 million. There are also a couple 
of billions of dollars of payments that are tied to acreage allotments. 
But there is one little item that is different; it is a new item in the 
1964 budget, called "rural renewal," which is to provide "technical and 
loan assistance to local public bodies for economic development in 
rural areas," a new program about which there is now much ado in the 
top echelon of the USDA, which could assist farm people. For this 
new venture, the budget request is $1.8 million -- not even 3/100 
of one per cent of the total USDA expenditures this year! (44, pp. 3-4) 
The magnitude of this rural renewal effort may be seen even better by 
referring to Moore's estimate (3 4) of rural poverty: 17 . 4 million rural 
people (11 • 4 million nonfarm residents and 6. 0 million farm residents) . 
Spread among 1 7. 4 million people, $1. 8 million for rural renewal 
comes out almost exactly as a dime a head! 
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2 . A Poverty Program 
It makes little sense to discuss in general terms the capacity of the land 
land-grant system to deal with poverty. No agency now in existence is so 
versatile as to be able to administer effectively -- let alone design all the 
programs that are possible. The capacity of the system depends in large 
measure on the program. For that reason it may be useful to outline in broad 1 
general terms a program that would begin to eat away at the hard core of 
rural poverty. 
What follows is a design for designing a program. It is argued that the 
information that can be mustered now for designing a program is nowhere 
near adequate -- we simply do not know how to design programs except in 
very broad general terms 1 because the information is not available. Past 
programs have proceeded on the unwarranted assumption that information 
was not one of the limiting factors; it followed that there was little need 
for research and for social experimentation with small- scale programs, For 
example 1 the RAD program evoked a surprising response from impoverished 
communities; the results have been disappointing except in a few instances 1 
because workers at the grassroots level were not able to bring useful informa-
tion to the communities that had themselves poised for action" 
The general outline of the program is as follows: (a) full employment; 
(b) agricultural reorganization; (c) human resource development; (d) social 
overhead capital; (e) area planning and development; (f) leadership develop-
ment; and (g) income transfers. The keystone to the program is the creation 
and dissemination of relevant information and this is the strong suit of the land 
land-grant system. 
A. Full employment. Any effort to achieve substantial improvements in 
rural welfare while the over-all unemployment rate hovers around 5 percent 
resembles the Hindu rope trick in more ways than one. Unless the 
unemployment rate can be lowered considerably 1 the prospects of relieving 
underemployment and unemployment in rural areas will be slight. What 
improvement is achieved under these conditions is likely to be at the 
expense of welfare in other sections of the society. 
For "The Great Society" to materialize for the rural population 1 the 
goal for employment of human resources must be set above 96 percent. 
A level of 98 or 98 l/2 percent would make creation of economic opportun-· 
ities for rural residents much easier. While policies to increase the 
utilization of productive capacity are understood in general terms 1 there 
are several serious problems. 
Means must be found of avoiding the chronic inflation that is a 
clear and present danger when the economy is "heated up" to the suggested 
level. The information underlying decisions to arrest inflation is not 
fully available, but there is no reason to think it cannot be obtained from 
research. Only during the last decade or so has this type of research been 
attempted and then on a small scale. The stake of rural residents is so 
great in the findings of this research and the competence of the land-grant 
-84-
system such that the system should involve itself in this effort on a 
considerable scale. 
It may be useful at this point to digress for a moment or two to attempt 
to lay some illusions about the land-grant system to rest. First the USDA 
represents the largest and most versatile collection of social science 
research resources in the federal gcvernment. It is simply not true that the 
research competence of the department is limited to technical agriculture, or 
to the applied agricultural sciences. 
Second 1 the land-grant universities comprise an even larger and more 
diverse collection of social science research resources. The agricultural 
colleges themselves represent consi.derable breadth and depth in the social 
sciences; experiment station directors can call upon research competences 
anywhere in the university almost as easily as they can muster those in the 
agricultural colleges, 
Third I the writer is of the opinion that there is a volume of research 
resources in the USDA and in the land-grant universities that could be trc.ns-
ferred to poverty-related research without great harm to the research needs 
of commercial agriculture. Schultz (42) and (43}, Paul Miller {33), and 
Brinser and Martin (9 1 chapters 6, 8 and 9) have written at length on these 
challenges to land-grant universities. 
To return to the basic issue -- the design and execution of programs to 
achieve fuller utilization of productive resources -- other questions arise. 
The effectiveness of the 1964 tax cuts in increasing purchasing power and 
employment opportunities is now virtually unchallenged 1 but one wonders 
whether tax cuts will continue to be an optimum means for increasing 
effective demand. Much of what Uncle Sam put back in taxpayers' pockets 
was removed on the second round of spending by state and local taxation, 
with a considerable improvement in welfare. More information is needed for 
making the optimum choice of means for injecting employment-increasing 
purchasing power into the economy--choosing among tax reductions (income 
or excise) , increased government spending for human capital formation 
(education and training) , social overhead capital of all sorts, research a.nd 
development 1 and natural resource investigations, among the realistic 
alternatives. 
A final reason for involving the land-grant system in a full employment 
research program is to begin to educate the rural population and their 
leaders on the relevance of stabilization policies to rural welfare. 
Congressmen with large rural constituencies have tended to oppose measures 
measures to enlarge effective demand, These voting positions may be due 
to the failure of impoverished rural residents to qualify and vote; further 
removal of real and imaginary obstacles to votlng might broaden consider-
ably the extent to which the interests of all segments of the little societies 
are represented in national decision making. 
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B. Agricultural Reorganization. Improving the welfare of rural residents 
does not require that agricultural efficiency be sacrificed or even ignored. 
Welfare and efficiency are masters which can be served simultaneously 1 
although not on an unintended basis. I concur in the following suggestions, 
made by Bishop in an earlier draft of his chapter: (l) changing the kinds 
and amounts of farm products produced in low income areas, {2) increasing 
the amounts of capital and changing the form of capital invested per farm.~ 
(3) improving managerial skills 1 (4) coordinating marketing and farm 
adjustments, and (5) expediting migration of labor from farm to nonfarm 
employment. 
Full employment is a necessary condition for voluntary transfers of human 
resources from farm to nonfarm activities, and farm-to-nonfarm transfers will 
greatly facilitate agricultural reorganization. Making more and better educa-
tion available in the rural areas will also help in improving managerial skills. 
C. Human Resource Development. Once economists could conclude 
confidently that the national income would be a function of the number 
of workers employed and the volume of capital they used. With an absolute 
redundancy in unskilled and farm workers , and with a growing unemployment rate 
rate among blue-collar workers, the importance of human capital -- formed by 
investments in education 1 training 1 work experience and health -- has 
come in for increased recognition. 
Human capital is a major contributor in explaining increases in national 
income in the United States, as Schultz (41) and Denison (11) have pointed 
out. Increases in human capial seem to explain more of the growth in national 
income than increases in private producer capitaL Griliches (21) found that 
education helped considerably in explaining the growth in agricultural output, 
1940-60. Herman Miller (32} showed that educational differences were 
associated with large differences in annual lifetime earnings. 
Education and training appear to be very rewarding investments for 
individuals as well as for societies. At an intermediate level between 
individuals and societies 1 human capital plays a very considerable role in 
the economic welfare of communities and regions. If natural resources have 
become less important factors in the location of economic activities 1 human 
capital has become more important as a locational factor. When other 
considerations are equal or nearly so, the availability of human capital 
becomes the critical determinant of many locational decisions. 
Communities and regions aspiring to increase employment and income 
must be prepared to make several kinds of public investments in order to 
improve their prospects. One of these is human capital formation. The 
need may be for improvement i.n the quali.ty of public education, for estab-
lishing opportunities for higher education 1 for vocational training, for on-
the-job training, or for a combination of these. Low-income areas are 
frequently characterized by low average levels of education among the 
population and work force, and by c less than adequate provision of 
opportunities for education, training and experience. 
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Because our understanding of the influence upon economic growth of the 
different forms of capital (private producer capital, human capital, social 
overhead capital and technology) is inadequate, we are not always able to 
give useful advice to societies or communities on what kinds of investments 
will lead most surely to economic growth. To begin with, we need better 
general understanding of these relations. More specifically, we need to 
develop the ability to assist communities and regions in designing investment 
programs that have a good chance of achieving the desired results. 
Information is needed on what economic activities are reasonable 
prospects for specific areas I what public investments will enhance these 
prospects .. how these investments are to be financed and how the local 
program to bring about economic growth i.s to be carried out. All of these 
needs rest ultimately upon research findings from several different disciplines. 
While some research progress is being made in the land-grant system and 
elsewhere, it is simply not true that all of the information required is on hand. 
No amount of wishful thinking can alter that hard fact. 
D. Social Overhead Capital. Another factor in the plight of low-income 
areas is the volume and quality of their social overhead capital. Short-
comings run the gamut from such basic essentials as good schools, roads, 
police and fire protection, and water and sanitary systems, through the full 
range of cultural amenities, such as parks and other recreational facilities, 
libraries, museums, drama and music centers 0 
Social overhead capital contributes to economic growth in a number of 
ways. It is often a direct substitute for private producer capital, and lowers 
private capital costs. These forms of capital are also used in human capital 
formation 1 and are often effective as lures for attracting needed categories of 
high-quality human capital o Social overhead capital is required for creating 
and disseminating· technology. 
Again, the basic and prior need is for information. Few disadvantaged 
areas can hope to repair all their shortcomings simultaneously, so that hard 
choices must be made. The alternatives need to be study carefully, so 
that public investments are made that are fully relevant. to specific economic 
growth needs. 
E. Area Planning and Development. Advances in transportation and 
communications have brought communities into close economic interdepend-
ence that had almost no economic effect upon each other half a century ago. 
Study of the commuting or trading zones around urban centers illustrates how 
widely diffuesed the effects of economic growth are. Increased employment 
opportunities in an urban center may provide new jobs for workers living 
within 50 miles (in Iowa) or a 100 miles in more sparsely settled areas o 
Technological change has reduced the locational significance of natural 
resources, availability of blue-collar workers ,and amplified the importance 
of human capital and social overhead capital 0 These requirements that have 
become more important have another distinct characteristic--they are 
usually met through public investments. 
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The employment opportunities that low-income rural households need 
badly can probably be created no closer than a nearby urban center 1 and 
even this will take a great deal of doing. Urban places with less than 
10,000 people have rather small probabilities for economic growth while 
many places over 25,000 have reasonable possibilities for growing into 
metropolitan areas. Rural households are dependent on the nearest potential 
metropolitan center to become the location of additional employment opportuni-
ties. If nearby centers do not transform themselves enough to be able to 
create additional jobs I then the unemployed and underemployed workers 
within that commuting zone will have to migrate to more distant centers 
to find employment opportunities. 
The creation of employment opportunities will require considerable 
investment in human and social overhead capital and responsibility for these 
should be shared as equitably as possible among the communities that will 
benefit from the additional employment. The first need is to identify economic 
areas and their urban centers for the whole country. Fox (16) of Iowa State 
University has done pioneering work 1 but this work needs to be expanded 
rapidly and extended. It is not enough to agree on the obsolescence 0f 
counties as spatial units; more meaningful and useful units must be 
developed. EconomistF of the USDA and the experiment stations did yeoman 
work in developing the old type-of-farming areas on which the now-obsolete 
state economic areas are based. There is little evidence of interest in the 
land-grant system in participating in this badly-needed new exercise in 
developing more useful units for economic planning. 
Even if we now had FEA 's (Functional Economic Areas) , two formidable 
tasks would remain. One is to find means for associating the communities 
in each FEA together effectively for making public investments I and for 
improving the environment for economic growth. This will require reliable 
information to convince the FEA residents (urban, suburban and rural) of their 
economic interdependence with all the other units in the FEA. Once this demon-
stration has been made, institutions must be build or transformed to serve a 
wide range of cooperative activities. 
A second task will be to develop the informati.on on which to base the 
cost sharing for the needed public investments. This too will be difficult I 
because "Beggar-Thy-Neighbor" or formal neutrality are more typical feel-
ings between adjacent communities than a cooperative attitude. Rural 
communities and their leaders tend to cultivate aloofness from or animosity 
toward adjoining urban or suburban communities. 
Action is needed but information is a prerequisite to wise action. The 
information is not now available in the form, quality or volume required. 
The land-grant system has a wide enough range of human talent to participate 
in all aspects of this badly needed research. 
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F. Leadership Development. Some of the rural communities in low-
income situations have leaders who can lead effectively within a given range of 
of activities, while other communities have only "shadow" leaders or 
individuals who represent leadership symbolically on formal occasions. 
Leadership for regional or multi-community groupings is seldom present 
in more than rudimentary form. 
In some low-income areas, the availability of the information described 
above would bring an uncertain response because the structure of leadershiP 
is incomplete, and because the competence of the leadership does not 
encompass the complexities in many of the issues. Better understanding of 
the social structures and the role of local leadership could be obtained by 
means of research, and is urgently needed. 
One critical function of leadership is to generate motivation for self-
improvement and for improvement of the social, economic and political 
environment. These processes are extremely difficult to initiate. The 
experience of American social scientists in underdeveloped countr.~.es is prob-
ably relevant to this process and should be drawn upon. 
The Cooperative Extension Service has over 50 years of experience in 
patiently developing and training leadership in rural communities. The range 
of issues that is relevant today is broader and more complex than those with 
which Extension has dealt most effectively--those connected with productive 
efficiency in farming. There appears to be no reason why Extension could not 
adapt itself to this wider range of issues and problems, although the adjest-
ments required of Extension and of its chief support, the experiment station, 
would not be minor ones. The capacity in the USDA and the experiment stations 
stations for research in sociology and political science seems to have 
increased little since the days before World War II. 
G. Income Transfers. National concern for the welfare of disadvantaged 
groups may be justified on humanitarian or on economic grounds. The human-
itarian case has been made often and convincingly; the social conscience of 
the American people is sensitive enough to human misery that welfare . 
programs for the disadvantaged can probably be justified on these grounds 
alone. This is particularly the case if one can assume that economic prod-
uctivity is not eroded away by damage to the structure of human incentives. 
Listening carefully to the prophets of doom for 35 years has yielded little 
evidence on this erosion that has long-run and analytical rigor as well as 
statistical meaning. 
The economic grounds are of more interest. Even after all the justifi-
able investments are made in the potentially employable rural population 
and in potentially renewable urban centers , there will remain many low-
income households and communities with severe economic problems. To 
raise living standards to an acceptable minimum, income transfers will 
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undoubtedly be necessary. At least two kinds of economic justification 
could be offered. 
(1) As long as society is not using its productive capacity fully 1 the 
opportunity cost of welfare payments to the aged and the handicapped 1 
to the uneducated and the discouraged will be less than their budget 
costs. The social value of erstwhile subsistence farmers and migrant 
farm workers may be greater qS: consumers than as producers 1 as long as 
effective demand must be increased anyway . 
.(2) Income transfers may be justified to help break the vicious circle of 
poverty by which impoverished households produce second and third 
generations of disadvantaged and economically inefficient individuals. 
Research findings are beginning to show how "hereditary" these problems 
are. The costs to society of the resultant social disorganization are so 
large that an ounce of prevention may truly be worth several pounds of 
cure. 
(3) Another possible justification may be offered tentatively. When the 
"Great Society" is reached, it may be necessary to redistribute leisure 
systematically because the work force will be driven by the Protestant 
work ethic (8) to offer more human services than can be employed. If 
this is probable 1 then it may be desirable not to invest in the productivity 
of labor force members who will be of marginal employability even after 
the investment. Their employment tenure may be very uncertain and the 
investment mign.t better be made in an individual whose employment is 
likely to be of greater duration': In any case, we need to know a'great 
deal more than we now do about the welfare effects of redistributing 
leisure. 
Income transfers fly in the face of values held by many of the rural 
population. Schultz (45) points out that by their own choice farm people 
have acquired few of the major social services. To date, their acquisitions 
include only RFD, farm roads 1 electricity and telephones, the land-grant 
system I vocational agriculture training 1 and 1 more recently I extension of 
Old Age and Survivors' insurance benefits to farmers. 
farm people. . . are opposed to extending to hired farm labor the 
unemployment and related benefits available to nonfarm laborers. 
There is virtually no concern .•. about the social deprivation of 
migratory farm workers or about the social costs of cheap im-
ported farm labor.. . Except for agricultural vocational training 
and for land-grant teaching 1 research and extension work, there is 
strong opposition to any and all federal aid to education. There 
is also objection to public measures for medical care and health 
facilities. (45 1 p. 175) 
It appears that the enfranchised members of the rural population and 
their leaders will need more information to become convinced of the 
appropriateness of income transfers as one of the weapons to use against 
rural poverty . 
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3. Summary 
Painting with a broad brush 1 we have examined in a qualitative way 
the effects of national agricultural programs on rural poverty. Only in the 
1950's were programs established to deal directly and specifically with rural 
poverty 1 and these have been supported only at token or experimental levels. 
These efforts suffered seriously from the inadequacy of the basic information 
required for designing and carrying out poverty programs. 
In order to judge the potential of the land-grant system to deal effectively 
with rural poverty we sketched in the outlines of a poverty program. 
These elements were included: 
(1) Achieving full employment in the economy 
(2) Agricultural reorganization 
(3) Human resource development 
(4) Social overhead capital formation 
(5) Area planning and development 
(6) Leadership development 
(7) Income transfers 
In each of these seven elements, information on the structural aspects 
of the problem area was judged to be inadequate and incomplete. Although 
action programs obviously need not mark time until long-run research can be 
completed 1 research attacks need to be launched on a broad front at once. 
Program elements should be designed so that research findings can be fed in 
as quickly as they can be made available. The magnitude of the research 
program and the eventual magnitude of the attack on rural poverty need to be 
brought into much better balance with the size and difficulty of the problem 1 
and with the tremendous benefits to society that would accrue from real 
success. 
With all of its different kinds of expertise in research 1 extension 1 
instruction and in action programs 1 and with a century of experience behind 
it, the land-grant system could play a leading role in the attack on poverty. 
Several substantial adjustments may be needed before all the intellectual 
capacity available can be focused effectively upon the problem. Critism of 
agricultural programs has made the system so self-conscious that it may 
need a clear signal from the public to put it wholeheartedly into the effort. 
On their part 1 public representatives may need from the system a much 
clearer sign of deep interest in the problem that has been forthcoming from 
land-grant leaders. If no commitment comes from these leaders I the needed 
competences can be found elsewhere in the society. They are so scattered 
that considerable effort would be required to focus and coordinate thf?m 1 but 
it could be done. Some agencies in the Department of Health I Education and 
Welfare are eager to attack the problem 1 even though their experience with 
rigerous problem-oriented research is confined largely to the Public Health 
Service. The Dep9rtment of the Interior has also indicated some interest 1 
although the relevant research experience is even more limited., With the 
widespread interest in the poverty problem in the federal government there 
seems to be little liklihood that the USDA and the land-grant universities 
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will be allowed to continue to play "dog-in-the-manger" to rural poverty. 
Credit should be given to some of the agencies now working on the 
poverty problem--the Area Redevelopment Administration of the Department 
of Commerce I the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor 1 and ·· 
the Economic Research Service of the Department of Agriculture. The research 
sponsored by these agencies has been relevant to the poverty problem and 
high in quality 1 even if the total volume has been small. So was the budget 
they received. 
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THE EDUCATION OF LEADERS FOR A VIABJ.,E DEMOCRACY 
by Wallace E. Oggl 
This presentation will attempt to establish the need in our times for 
research and education to supplement the traditional sources of information 
available to interested citizens. But first, to talk about education of 
leaders in democracy, a statement of democratic political faith is required. 
Democracy demands a faith in the inherent importance and dignity of the 
individual. 
The highest morality for democracy is to preserve the opportunity for 
the individual to make decisions, to experience the consequences of those 
decisions and, given the consequences, to reconsider. Our society seeks 
to give him enough freedom to develop and cultivate his own personality, 
but limits his freedom by preventing him from denying this right to others. 
For practical realization of these ideals in group decisions for social 
action, representative government, with one vote per adult, is the essen-
tial tool. 
With such a concept of democracy, a large, indifferent, apathetic 
mass of people, even a majority, may not seriously threaten democracy 
and its tool, representative government, so long as they do not rise up in 
a crisis and destroy the right to reconsider. 
-In practice, I hypothesize, this is just what we have in the United 
States. We have an indifferent majority who take very little interest in 
public decisions and policy so long as the apparent consequences are 
not too threatening. We have an interested minority who talk about public 
policy, who make tentative decisions and who actively support or oppose 
policy positions. Then there is a group of leaders (defined broadly to 
include informal lay leaders, formal organization leaders and administrative 
leaders in government) who formulate the specifics of policy and work 
closely with elected representatives in either developing and advocating 
or opposing a new policy, or in modifying and defending an old :policy. 
Also, in practice, the elected representatives must, regardless of what 
the active leader group ·want and say, be sensitive and responsive to 
this interested public. The leaders may occasionally become insensitive 
lprofessor of economics, Iowa State University 
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to the interested public in their enthusiasm for or opposition to a specific 
policy, but the representatives cannot. 
This concept of working democracy is very dynamic. The size of the 
indifferent apathetic group is variable depending on the intensity of the 
times and the con sequences of former policy. If the times are threatening, 
the size of the indifferent apathetic group shrinks and the interested pub-
lic grows. People who are members of the interested public on most issues 
may be leaders on specific issues. When policy crises pass, leaders on 
specific issues settle back to being part of the interested public. 
Representative government, to be effective then, demands: 
1. An informed interested citizenry who know in broad outline: 
a. What their goals for the general welfare are. 
b. What constitutes problems to attaining these goals. 
c. Some sense of the consequences of alternative policies. 
2. Leaders who understand the above but who in addition are suf-
ficiently well informed in detail on specific issues to develop 
realistic alternatives for policy to deal with identified problems. 
3. A sufficiently firm consensus on the part of the majority to support 
action by leaders and representatives. 
4. Elected representatives who are sensitive to the public consensus. 
5. Leaders among elected representatives well enough informed on 
specific issues to help draft legislation and conduct the debate 
leading to compromise. 
Democracy and representative government in the United States have 
been effective. They have involved considerable trial and error, but the 
errors have not been di sa strou s. The traditional tools on which we have 
relied for the enlightenment of the interested public, lay leaders and 
representatives are political debate, mass media news coverage and 
serious literature. For needed research we have depended on the imagi-
nation and creativity of physical and social scientists to anticipate ;the 
needed additional knowledge, with very little structuring between needs 
and research effort. This freedom for imagination and creativity should 
and will be preserved, but perhaps something more is needed. 
In recent decades the gravity of the world situation and the leader-
ship role of the United States have simultaneously increased. The 
world situation and United States foreign policy are closely related to 
the domestic scene. On the domestic scene, the rapid expansion of 
technology and the economic growth stemming from it have brought a 
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sharply increased rate of change. Adjustment to change creates tensions 
in individuals and communities. Policy responses may conflict with foreign 
policy. In this grave and dynamic environment, key political, editorial 
and educational leaders are questioning whether the traditional system for 
enlightening the interested public, leaders and elected representatives is 
completely adequate. Serious mistakes about the nature of problems or 
the consequences of policy might be disastrouso Perhaps a more deliber-
ate structuring of research and educational efforts towards the critical 
public problem areas is needed. 
Actually a substantial beginning is under way, In the land-grant 
system there is a long tradition of closely structuring research and edu-
ca~ional programs to the felt needs of farmers for technological applica-
tions of science. To a much more limited extent the need for social science 
research and educational programs on public problems of farmers has been 
recognized and carried out. These beginnings lay a foundation for deal-
ing with more general social problems, for a much wider audience and 
with more effective educational programs. 
Administrators of our public educational institutions and especially of 
the land-grant system have been acknowledging this responsibility, which 
the institutions with their vast research and educational resources might 
accept. Policy statements to this effect have been is sued frequently in 
the two decades since World War II. Exciting pilot efforts at team or 
task force research have demonstrated competence" Effective educational 
programs have been carried out on a state-wide basis in several states. 
Some of the programs have been sharply focused to meet the needs of 
particular leaders and some have been designed to reach up to l 00, 000 
interested people through reading and small intense self-administered 
discussion groups,, People who have been involved in these educational 
efforts express a new confidence that the individual can have an intelli-
gent impact on policy formation in big democracy 0 
We have sketched a simplified model of the process of policy forma-
tion and the possible need for more carefully structured research and 
citizen education. 
Perhaps these abstract ideas can be communicated more clearly by a 
recent real life example o The 19 62 Agricultural Act as it applied to feed 
grains provides such an example, The voluntary feed grain program had 
been developed by administration leaders in 19 60 with the idea that it 
could be stop-gap legislation pending a more permanent program for feed 
grain. The administration's more permanent program proposal was pre-
sented to the 1962 Congress. Its objectives included improved aggre-
gate farm income, reduced government feed grain stocks and reduced 
treasury costs for the program. The new tool was to be compulsory crop 
land reduction. Administration leaders conducted an intense effort to get 
the program through Congress. They were strongly supported by the 
Farmers Union. The American Farm Bureau Federation strongly opposed 
the administration's program and pressed very hard for a voluntary crop 
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land retirement program involving whole farms. Under these circum-
stances, what did Congress do? After a long, painful fight, it passed 
a program for which no leadership group had asked. It extended the feed 
grain program with very little change. 
Evidence from two sources indicates that what Congress passed was 
the strong favorite of a sizable majority of feed grain farmers. Sam Lubbell, 
the·well-known political analyst, surveying farmers at the time the bill 
was being considered, found farmers strongly favored a continuation of 
the feed grain program. Early last year sociologists conducted a survery of 
a statistically representative sample of Iowa farmers on the farm problem 
and farm policy. 2 These data are in the process of being processed. In 
two sets of questions involving choices of program, the choice most 
nearly resembling the present feed grain program received the support of 
a strong majority. 
Before there is too much complacency about the effective working of 
this representative government and thus the infallibility of the decision 
making in democracy, a second look at the sociological research is re-
quired. Whereas farmers were quite firm in favoring the present feed 
grain program as their choice of the program alternatives offered them, 
their understanding about the nature of the farm problem, as indicated by 
their responses, is disturbing. 
As already evidenced at this conference, there is a strong concensus 
among agricultural economists that there is a substantial excess capacity 
to produce crops, especially wheat and feed grains on American farms. 
This has resulted because supply has grown faster than demand. An im-
portant factor accounting for the rapid growth of supply has been the rapid 
improvement in technology. Total food supply has grown rapidly. But 
most of the growth has been contributed by commercial farms. Thus, 
since many small farms have inadequate land and equipment relative to 
labor for modem mechanized farming, adjustment to better opportunities 
will mean continued migration of workers from farming. 
But these representative farmers in the sociological study ranked 
"Too many farmers" at the bottom out of 12 choices and "Surplus produc-
tion due to application of too much technology" ninth as causes of the 
farm problem. At the top was "High cost of farm production inputs--", 
"High profits taken by processors and distributors •• " and "Union prac-
tices in industry which are continually raising wages which are in tum 
reflected in rising costs of agricultural outputs" in that order. These 
are familiar scapegoats of long standing among farmers. Obviously 
there is some basis in fact for their top choices. These answers deal 
with immediate "causes" not underlying relationships. They do not 
2Experiment Station Project 1493, George Beal and Joseph Bohlen. 
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indicate an understanding and acceptance of the world as it is. Such a 
level of enlightment is discouraging to the prospect for policy consistent 
with long-run adjustments. 
The strongly supported goal of growth in income per capita in the 
United States provides an excellent example of the need for research and 
an effective educational program. The interested nonfarm as well as farm 
leaders must understand the process of such economic growth if policy 
is to be relevant. Briefly sketched the process includes: 
1 . The applications of science to technology. 
2. The new technology changes the economic environment. Often 
capital in the form of large machinery is substituted for labor. 
People have to learn new skills and change jobs. 
3. If this adjustment takes place, both machines and human ingenuity 
are more effectively used, and output per person and income per 
person, rise. 
This process is not easily understood, is highly rewarding to some 
and painful to others. Witness the closing of the Brooklyn Navy Yard. 
As indicated above a good beginning has been made towards committing 
some of the research and educational resources of our public institutions 
to research sharply focused on social problems and effective educational 
programs for leaders and the interested public. It is important to recog-
nize the awesome responsibility which this involves. Objectivity and 
integrity are imperative. Objectivity and the limited time and effort 
which will be allocated to learning by adults pose hard decisions. 
Which problems and issues should be studied? Which leaders are to be 
educated? Out of research findings what information should be presented? 
What will be the most effective educational technique? 
In spite of these difficulties the Center for Agricultural and Economic 
Development and the Farm Policy Institute have actively encouraged par-
ticipation in.this kind of research and e.ducational activities. 

WHAT'S AHEAD AS A CONSEQUENCE OF LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT--
IN TERMS OF BOTH THE POLITICAL AFTERMATH AND THE 
EFFECT ON AGRICULTURAL POLICY? 
by Charles Press1 
Apportionment of legislators is an issue on which our federal conven-
tion almost floundered in the summer of 1787. Now over 175 years later it 
again becomes controversial as we hear talk of federal plans for the whole 
of the federal system to be accomplished by constitutional edict. My 
assignment is to examine the current struggle and trace as well as I am 
able, its effects for agriculture. 
I want to begin by reviewing the history of the current apportionment 
struggle, then say a word about the moral arguments on each side, next 
examine the probability of success for those attempting to reverse the one 
man-one vote trend, and finally discuss the long run effects for agricultural 
interests and welfare. First, the historical evolution of the apportionment 
fight. 
The Historical Background 
The early English kings based representation in parliament on taxable 
wealth because they invented parliament to raise taxes. The American 
colonies seem to have followed along in this pattern. But the one man-one 
vote ideas of the seventeenth century Levelers did also affect early American 
thinking as is evidenced by the requirements laid down in the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787. Though stated vaguely, these ideas were generally 
interpreted to mean that both houses of western state legislatures should 
be based on population alone. Through the nineteenth century most new 
states came into the union with representation by population embedded in 
their constitutions, and some older states, though not all by any means, 
changed their constitutions this way. Inspired by the populism of the 
frontier, the movement in theory was away from property qualifications 
and representation of units to representation of population. 
1 Associate professor of political science, Michigan State University 
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But when it came to drawing district lines, practical matters 
triumphed over abstract theory: legislators districted for personal and 
political advantage •. 2 The gerrymander has an illustrious parent. It is 
named after a patriot Elbridge Gerry who was one of the few to sign the 
Articles of Confederation and Declaration of Independence, who attended 
the Constitutional Convention as a delegate, was a representative to the 
First Congress, governor of Massachusetts and died in office as vice 
president to James Madison. The rules followed are: protect seated leg-
islators where possible and protect the party interest. 
But representative government can easily survive such minor jockey-
ing for advantage by officeholders. The practice only took on signifi-
cance when large-scale shifts of population occurred in the late nine-
teenth century and after. The national House of Representatives for a 
time dodged the problem by increasing its size so seated legislators 
would be undisturbed. But by 1920 it ran out of floor space and so 
skipped an apportionment, contrary to the explicit instructions of Article 
I, section 2. 
State legislatures also squirmed to avoid constitutional clauses. 
Several things happened. In 1930 the national Congress faced up to 
constitutional requirements but softened their effect somewhat. Dropped 
from the earlier act were the requirements for compactness and contiguity. 
No one raised embarrassing questions of population equality within states 
when seating took place at the beginning of the session. Heartbreak was 
generally avoided by gerrymandering Congressional districts at the state 
legislative level. A recent analysis indicates that in the twentieth cen-
tury, four-fifths of the variation from representation by population for 
national House seats is traceable to gerrymandering in the districting, 
and only a minor bit from the apportionment formula itself. 3 
2See the discussion of all Kansas redistricting acts in Thomas Page, 
"Legislative Apportionment in Kansas," University of Kansas Publi-
cations, Lawrence, 1952. Chapter 3, pp. 29-78. This monograph 
is unusual in its sophisticated ..approach to the subject. For a 
study of a recent legislature in the process of redistricting, see 
Gilbert Steiner and Samuel Gove, "Legislative Politics in Illinois, " 
Ur: University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1960, Chapter 4, pp. 
84-117 
3Ernest C. Reeck, Jr., "Unequal Congressmen" National Civic Re-
view LII (June 1963), pp. 308-311. For attempts to devise measures 
of the degree to which population is the representation standard see 
Paul T. David and Ralph Eisenberg," Devaluation of the Urban" and 
"Suburban Vote," two monographs, Bureau of Public Administration, 
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1961, 1962. For 
a method using standard statistical techniques see Glendon Schubert 
''and Charles Press, "Measuring Malapportionment" American PoUti-
cal Science Review LVIII (June 1964) pp. 302-327. 
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The states generally took a different route. Some changed con-
stitutions away from the population base. Every twentieth century 
change proposed by legislators was of this kind. 4 In other states con-
stitutional provisions were disregarded. State courts sometimes over-
ruled blatant gerrymanders but hesitated to issue orders that constitu-
tional provisions be followed. This tendency was confirmed for most 
in Colegrove v Green (1946). The United States Supreme Court told a 
professor of political science that apportionment of Illinois congres-
sional districts was a political question; in Justice Frankfurter1 s ex-
pressive phrase a "political thicket" the court would do well to avoid. 
But the decision was peculiar in a number of respects. There was no 
sitting chief justice and one of the court was at the Nuremburg trials in 
Europe. Even worse, in the 4-3 decision Justice Rutledge sided with 
the majority in agreeing no relief should then be given, but with the 
three minority members that the case was justiciable. Nevertheless 
most persons assumed that the Court had said the question of apportion-
ment was not a question to be handled by the judiciary. 
But the drift from population standards continued at an even more 
rapid rate as suburbs grew and central cities lost population. 5 And 
cases kept appearing in the courts. At this point, after the 1960 cen-
sus, Baker v Carr was accepted and ruled on by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. The Tennessee Constitution of 1870 required reapportionment 
of both houses every ten years. None had occurred since 1901. In 
March 1962 the Supreme Court held by 6 to 2 that the question was 
justiciable and remanded the case back to the lower federal courts. 
All but Frankfurter and Warren had something to say in separate opin-
ions. 
At this point the dam burst. If Colegrove v Green had been mis-
interpreted as saying more than it did, now the justices were second 
guessed on Baker v Carr. Within six months there were 70 new cases 
in 33 states; within two years apport.ionment action had occurred in 
42 states. In these two years it is fair to say a greater movement was 
made to approaching the population standard of one man-one vote than 
in the previous 60 years. And the Supreme Court followed up with a 
series of decisions that hammered home the trend. The Georgia county 
unit system was declared unconstitutional for statewide elections as 
contrary to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 0 
(Gray v Sanders.) In February 19 64, in Wesberry v Sanders, the court 
ruled that on the basis of Article I, Section 2, Congressional districts 
within states must be relatively equal in population. Then in June 1964, 
4Editorial Comment, "On Amending the Constitution," National 
Civic Review LIII (October 1964) pp. 472-4730 
5navid-Eisenberg, QQ. cit o 
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using the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
court ruled in Reynolds v Sims that both houses of state legislatures 
must be apportioned on a population basis. The division was 6 to 3. 
Moral Arguments 
This is perhaps a good place to pause and ask what the moral 
questions were on each side of this fight. 6 On the one man-one vote 
side, the battle for apportionment was viewed as a continuation of the 
struggle against special privilege that began when King John signed 
the Magna Charta, or even perhaps before that, and is continued into 
modern times in fights over such issues as civil rights or woman suf-
frage. 
The other side of the argument is more complex. Most variants 
go back to notions expressed perhaps best by John Calhoun in his 
theory of concurrent majority. Decisions, he argued, should be made 
only when all important political interests agree. Defining the signifi-
cant political interests leads to variations. In some cases special 
moral qualities are claimed for such groups as Jefferson did for rural 
as opposed to urban citizens. In more sophisticated arguments, a plea 
is made for representation by communities. One student suggests a 
combination of representat;i.on by population, by communities which he 
defines by local legal boundaries of counties, cities and villages and 
of the top 20 functional groupings according to the latest census (far-
mers, lawyers and I was about to say professors, but they don't show 
on any method of rating). 7 
But while moral arguments are worth considering, there is a cer-
tain artificial quality in their use in current debate. Only a relatively 
few on each side are really concerned with them. The rest are con-
cerned w~th advantage. Most of those favoring one man-one vote will 
gain by it, Those who now listen with favor to theories of consensual 
democracy are open to question about past activities. (Why, they 
might be reasonably asked, was one house never set aside for cities 
when they were the minority? How can perpetual freezing of districts, 
even when they are counties, claim to represent communities that grow 
and change over time?) 
6For an excellent discussion of the arguments on moral grounds 
over apportionment see Herbert Garfinkel and Leibel Fein, "Fair 
Apportionment; A Citizens Guide to Legislative Apportionment in 
Michigan, Bureau of Social and Political Research, East Lansing, 
1960. pp. 16-23. 
7 Alfred de Grazia, "Apportionment and Representative Government," 
Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 19 63. ''Apportionment in the 
Next Generation," pp. 169-174. 
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I should like to interject my own position here. More important 
than numerical equality is timeliness. By timeliness I mean a will-
ingness in government to face up to the problems currently agitating 
important segments of the citizenry. Today such problems are pri-
marily urban, or to be specific, metropolitan. State governments 
from World War I on have been viewed by many of their citizens as 
somewhat less than timely. Yet the U.S. Senate, despite its stray-
ing much farther than many states from a one man-one vote norm, is 
not so viewed by most persons" This is because, I suspect, most 
Senators have urban constituents in sizeable numbers even when from 
sparsely populated states. The question of timeliness is one to which 
I should like to return after first exploring the probabilities that the 
one man-one vote trend may be reversed. 
Prospects for Reversing One Man-One Vote_ 
Little direct help can be expected from the courts" Almost imme-
diately after declaring both houses of state legislatures must be based 
on population, the Supreme Court, in Lucas v Co!orado General Assembly, 
overruled an amendment to the Colorado constitution that placed one 
house on other than a population basis. Even a majority of a state elec-
torate, they arguedu can not deprive citizens of thei.r constitutional lib-
erties. 
Both state and federal courts have also dealt with more severity 
with foot-dragging. In some states they have apportioned legislatures 
or ordered elections at large. In others they stated that until apportion-
ment was accomplished they would only honor as legal routine, house-
keeping actions. In Georgia a federal court prevented the proposal of a 
new constitution. On October 28, 1964 Chief Justice Warren in effect 
ordered the lower federal courts to move ahead on Virginai apportioning 
by refusing to grant a stay until 1968 when incumbent terms would be 
finished. 
Attempts also have been made to reverse one man-one vote through 
amendment of the federal constitution. Three amendments proposed by 
the Sixteenth General As sembJ. y of the States affiliated with the Council 
of State Governments struck at what was considered Supreme Court 
interference with state matters including apportionment. Few states 
have adopted these proposals. At the same time a second constitutional 
convention was proposed. Sixteen of the required 34 state legislatures 
have petitioned Congress to call such a body. More may act in early 
1965, but the outlook is not too hopeful. It is not clear that Congress 
must call such a body, particularly on the petition of state legislatures 
that at the time of acting were not always apportioned according to the 
formula then the law of the land. The proposal also smacks of despera-
tion since to call such a convention in the view of many is to open a 
pandora's box. Since most regard our system of government a fairly 
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successful one, given the history of mankind's follies, there is a 
tendency to avoid unpredictable change. 
Thus more attention is being given to a constitutional amendment 
proposal aimed specifically at the problem of apportionment. The 
Seventeenth General Assembly of the States endorsed this, with some 
dissents, and the National Grange and American Farm Bureau, at 
about the same time in late autumn of 19 64, endorsed it. It would per-
mit one house of the state legislature to be apportioned on some basis 
other than population if the voters in an election so decided. Even this 
considerably more modest proposal is in for rough sledding. 
The last Congress debated a proposal to delay apportionment for 
two years, and while this passed the House, it was killed in the Senate. 
An amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill proposed by Senator Dirkson to 
accomplish a similar result was killed by filibuster. Finally a mild 
resolution to urge the Supreme Court not to take undue haste passed the 
Senate. Now Senator Dirk son has reintroduced the amendment in the 
new Congress. It has the support of every Republican Senator but one, 
about 18 southern Democrats and a scattering of Northern Democrats. 
The most optimistic proponents see it as still short ten or more votes 
from the required two-thirds for Constitutional amendments. The 
amendment still leaves some questions unanswered: can a state re-
consider its adoption of an apportionment of one house based on fac-
tors other than population without having to get that house to agree to 
amend the state constitution? Can the basis other than population 
include apportionment on the basis of race? 
In the meantime, state legislators have been experimenting with 
methods of softening and sometimes partially avoiding the effects of 
the one man-one vote principle. Some apportionments have been ruled 
by courts as inadequate as both legislators and courts experiment to 
find out how close apportionment must be to the population standard. 
The method of giving weighted votes to incumbent legislators so that 
they can remain seated as is but cast votes according to the population 
of their districts has been thrown out by courts in Washington state 
and New Mexico. An ingenious method to test the court's acceptance 
of various methods was completed by the lame duck New York legis-
lature in late 19 64. Each of four apportionment acts was an amend-
ment of the previous one. Thus if number 4 were unconstitutional, 
number 3 would be in effect, etc. These included provisions for 
apportionment on the basis of those who actually vote rather than 
population alone. 
Thus the current trend in most states has been to find out what the 
acceptable standard of deviation from population might be, that is II how 
much? II and for the current majority to gerrymander in their own interest. 
Those states most resistant to any change are a half dozen or so in the 
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south. But in a good many of the states I enough shaking up has already 
occurred, combined with the results of the 1964 elections, to suggest that 
things will never be quite the same again. Important leaders of the fight 
against one man-one vote have been defeated while new proponents of the 
theory have been elected. Perhaps as important as any other fact is that 
in many states the balance of power within party organizations has shifted 
to those who would pay consic!erable attention to metropolitan problems. 
Whether an absolute standard of population .is carried out with mathe-
matic precision in every state or not, rural areas should face up to the fact 
that as a practical matter they are not going to wield as much influence with 
legislative bodies as they did in the past. This even includes local govern-
ment bodies such as county boards of supervisors, which are under challenge 
in such states as California, Wisconsin and Michigan. Most rural residents 
probably regard this trend as inevitable, given the current population trends. 
Some, given their Populist past, fight it only reluctantly on moral grounds. 
Even if the Constitutional amendment allowing one house on a non-popula-
tion basis passes, which is unlikely at least before 1968 (if it passes at 
all), state legislatures will have changed markedly from what they were in 
the early 1960's. 
The Effects of One Man-One Vote 
The next point that I plan to examine is that of the likely effects of one 
man-one vote trend. But first it is important to ask who the beneficiaries in 
actual representatives were of the system as it operated before Baker v Carr. 
Of course the agricultural interests gained, but even more so did the resi-
dents of small cities and villages. Agricultural areas frequently are repre-
sented by the small town lawyer, banker or insurance man, and even urban-
ized areas choose such a representative if he has worked his way up through 
county government. It is the small town, already having felt the fierce im-
pact of big city competition in business, that will suffer most. Agriculture 
will lose some influence, but its interests can never become wholly irrele-
vant in any society. 
It is also important to examine, simply on a representation basis, who 
the major beneficiaries will be. These of course will be the metropolitan 
areas, but they are not as cohesive as some rural persons imagine. Few 
differences politically are as sharp as those between low and upper income 
areas within a large city or between large parts of the central city and some 
of its suburbs. 8 
8see the following with citations in footnotes, Howard D. Hamilton, 
Joseph E. Beardsley and Carleton C. Coats, "The Fear of Urban Domi -· 
nation" in Howard D. Hamilton, "Legislative Apportionment, Key to 
Power, Harper and Row 1 New York. 19 64. pp. 9 0-9 6 and Robert S. 
Friedman, "The Urban-Rural Conflict Revisited," The Western Poli-
tical Quarterly, XIV (June 1961) pp. 481-495. 
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It is indeed these suburbs that gain most in the long run since the trend 
of decline in population in central cities, noted dramatically in many areas 
after the 19 60 census, is likely to continue. 9 Even more important, in 
very few states (according to the most careful study I know of) will two or 
three population centers by themselves be able to dominate a house ap-
portioned on population. 1 ° Of states with more than 15 counties, three 
or less counties have a numerical majority in eight states; if all states are 
considered, three or less counties have a numerical majority in 15 states. 
In only five states do central city residents in the three largest cities (ex-
cluding suburbanites) have more than 40 percent of the population. These 
are Hawaii, Nevada, Rhode Island, New York and Arizona. But while dom-
inance of a few areas is not immediately a problem in most states, a gen-
eral increase that will give urbanites a clearcut majority in many states 
is a problem. 
The impact in representational changes would of course vary. The 
Congressional Quarterly estimates that in the national House there would 
be a shift of 2 7 seats from rural areas, with ~even going to central city 
districts and 20 to suburban areas.ll In most states the shift would be 
to a division of representation between central cities, suburbs and rural 
areas, with none in the majority. 
The above analysis implicitly assumes that every representative 
usually votes his constituency on important issues. There is some tend-
ency in this direction, but it is not as great as one would suppose. On 
specific issues party membership is generally more important than con-
stituency as a predictor of voting. In state after state rural members 
have voted for urban programs, perhaps reluctantly or only in part at the 
urging of party leaders and candidates wishing to make a party record for 
a statewide election. There have also been urban representatives who 
voted a good deal like rural representatives, either on the basis of party 
program or because they won in an upset election and are more. concerned 
with voting their true feelings than getting re-elected. Our studies show 
that only on a few issues is their a sharp split on roll call votes: on 
prohibition, civil rights in the south and of course on apportionment. 
9Robert S. Friedman, "Reapportionment Myth" National Civic Review 
XLIX (April 1960) pp. 184-188. 
1 0The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations," Apportion-
ment of State Legislatures," December, 1962, Washington, pp. 44-46. 
11 congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, "Suburban Areas Most Under-
represented in the House," February 2, 1962. pp. 153-169. 
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The record is less clear on labor and welfare measures, though there 
is some tendency for a split presently .12 Occasionally one can also find 
clear indications that state-shared funds have especially benefited rural 
areas, though in some of these cases a good argument can be made that 
proceeds should be distributed according to need and not according to 
source of funds. But where as in Florida, the lucrative race track pro-
ceeds have been distributed equally among counties, urbanites can argue 
that something less than a careful judgment as to need determined the 
formula.l3 
But some students have made studies that examine state policies on 
other than a roll call basis, and they argue th:lt rural influence on policy 
m:s.king is more pervasive than shows up on roll call votes.l4 For one 
thing, issues are often decided in committee of the whole or legislative 
party caucus and without formal roll call votes. The record vote may be 
considerably different than the informal votes. A second point is that 
rural legislators have often been able to gain more than average influence 
through holding leadership positions. From my own observation of the 
Michigan Legislature during the period of crisis in the 1958 and 1959 
sessions, I should say this influence was of greater importance than would 
be indicated by roll call votes, which were as a rule strictly party line 
votes. 
The influence I am talking about is what I have previously referred to 
as timeliness.15 I am referring to the kinds of political ideas that prevail 
in a legislative body. In making policy, policy makers need a kind of 
short hand philosophy which they can use to make judgments. Interest 
alone doesn't explain political coalitions. Rather a general viewpoint 
binds together groups of legislators and politicians in a common cause. 
I think three important facts about these ideas need to be remembered: 
12see the review of the literature in The Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations, op. cit., pp. 23-29. 
13Hugh Douglas Price, "Florida: Politics and the Pork Choppers," 
in Malcolm E. Jewell, (ed.) "The Politics of Reapportionment," 
Atherton Press, New York: 1962 p. 89. 
14 See Thomas Page, op. cit. Chapter 5, 131-151. See also William 
G. Havard and Loren P. Beth, "The Politics of Misrepresentation, 
Rural-Urban Conflict in the Florida Legislature," Louisiana State 
UniversityPress, BatonRouge, i962. 
' 
15The ideas in this section were developed with Charles R. Adrian, 
Michigan State University, and used in "The American Political 
Process," McGraw-Hill Book Go •. , Inc., New York, 1965. See 
especially chapters 6 & 7 and 2 0. 
-112-
l. They spring in part from experience. Political ideas that are 
widespread are not wholly the result of abstract theory but of 
groupings within society struggling to get a viewpoint that will 
help them somehow control their environment. 
2. In America I think these sets of ideas have as well been attempts 
to restate our tradition, that is the ideals of freedom that flow 
through our history from Thomas Jefferson on. In other words, I 
think groupings in our society meet with new experiences, and 
they attempt to restate American ideals in a way that helps them 
control their environmental. 
3. Out of the many groupings that have unique experiences some must 
be chosen that are widespread enough to build a political coalition 
on them. This is the job taken over by political parties. 
The experience of one's trade no doubt leads its members to unique 
ideas, some of which are politically relevant. But these are not widespread 
enough as a rule to serve as a general set of political ideas on which one 
can conduct campaigns but rather are better furthered by specialized inter-
est groups. The same is true of the ideas of such subgroupings derived 
from their unique experiences as Negroes, white southerners, or even 
women. 
The subgrouping which is widespread enough to use in political cam-
paigns but yet narrow enough to be less than an overwhelming majority, is 
that related to place of residence. Place of residence as used here relates 
to the density of population that occurs where one lives and affects what 
sociologists call his life style. 
I believe that as the experience of the majority of Americans has 
changed, new ideas have emerged and political parties have built new 
coalitions on these ideas. And with Samuel Lubell, I would argue that 
once a party becomes associated with the set of ideas shaped by the new 
majority it remains almost exclusively in power until a new set of ideas 
emerge. 16 
Look at the history of presidential elections and note how seldom 
the Whigs won after the Jacksonians and consolidated their power with 
the emergence of the frontier majority, or how often Democrats won after 
Republicans had fashioned a new coalition based on the ideas growing 
out of small town experience, or how often Republicans have won since 
the Roosevelt New Deal coalition built on the ideas of large cities emerged. 
I should like to review briefly the ideas that emerged from these major 
political coalitions and then return to the notion of timeliness. 
1 6see Samuel Lubell, 11 The F~ture of American Politic.s, 11 Harper and 
Row, New York: 1951. 
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I view the Jack sorcic:m i:;f!)alition of 182 8 as an attempt to deal with that 
frontiersman considered a,, ,::mer·::).ing aristocracy. The political ideas were 
those that made sense in D frontier environment, though they do not in the 
opinion of many make as much sense in an urbanized setting. They were 
that ballots should belong with everyone elected since every one in the 
community could make a fair judgment of everyone else. They included the 
patronage system as opposed to long tenure in government jobs since the 
common man on the frontier was a jack of all trades who could handle any 
or most of the simple government jobs then in existence. They included 
short terms of office and laws against succession, particularly by treas-
urers. All of these would smash an incipient aristocracy of eastern office-
holders. 
When after the civil war a new majority existed in America,. that of 
residents of small towns, a new set of ideas was devised in terms of that 
experience. The gift the small towns gave America was to make it a great 
nation. Small town boys from Henry Ford on, through ingenuity, hard work 
-- ~/ 
and thrift made the land blossom. The idealized version of the process is 
of course in the Horatio Alger stories, but the reality-of.their accomplish-
ments is too clear to deny. The political implications of their ideas were 
that the small town boy should not be hindered by government regulations 
or by taxation that would deplete his working capital. Also related was the 
belief that the morally upr~ght wquld in the end win out and therefore there 
was a reluctance to J.\~v:e the. government interfere by handing out doles. 
This is still the viewp0.int derived from experience of many small business-
men. 
However, farmers, at least in the nineteenth century, parted company 
with these ideas as the result of drought and depression in world markets. 
In their experience the moral did not always win out. But more important 
was the parting that occurred when a new majority emerged in the big citieso 
Their experience was heightened by a depression. To them achievement of 
the American dream was to come through government aid. Government must 
regulate traffic or building or sanitation where population was densly con-
centrated. Impersonality made the social controls of the small town inef-
fective in situations involving working conditions, the accuracy of the 
butcher's scales, or the ingredients of products purchased. To the crowded 
residents of cities, such experiences suggested government aid and regula-
tion. 
The majority has shifted once more and I think the new mood is the most 
important one in judging the long term effects of apportionment. The ex-
perience of suburban living has fashioned a low pressure political creed, 
one that prefers to avoid conflict and controversy in politics, and one that 
has an inordinate trust in the technical expert. At an earlier ti.me the War 
on Poverty program, for example, would have been viewed as a handout to 
the victims of society. The new mood looks at it more as the professional 
social worker would. An oder view stressed the moral responsibility for 
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overdrinking, the new set of ideas stresses that this is a disease, renames 
it alcholism, and recommends psychiatric treatment. There are two points 
to note about the suburban experience: the suburbanite expects and wants 
large- scale organization to stay, but at the same time he is afraid individu-
ality will get lost in the process. 
These are what I would argue have been the main sets of politically 
relevant ideas. Note, that all can be present in society at the same time. 
Note secondly, that I am not necessarily arguing that the ideas of any one 
set are right or wrong but only that they seemed to the people involved to 
help them restate democratic ideas under new conditions. Finally, by 
timeliness I mean that the set of political ideas that dominates the govern-
mental unit harmonizes with those fashioned by the then current majority. 
The United States Senate has I believe been generally looked up to by the 
citizens because most view it as timely--it discusses what they consider 
important problems and deals with these problems in ways that to them seem 
proper. This is true even though they are grossly disproportioned on a pop-
ulation basis. It springs from the fact that many Senators from rural states 
have urban areas that must be considered. 
State legislatures, on the contrary, have been viewed as not timely 
and in part as a result have been deliberately bypassed by the New Deal 
majority when this was possible. But even they have not remained unaf-
fected by the urban viewpoint--only less affected. Because even in the 
legislatures most dominated by small town political viewpoints, the newer 
urban viewpoints set the direction of policy. The debate was always in 
terms of "how much." Attempts to turn back to the previous majority view-
point if carried into statewide elections, frequently resulted in political 
disaster. 
The Effect of the Trend on Agriculture 
What then can we say about agriculture, given the emerging political 
ideas and apportionment that is likely to give such ideas wide influence. 
In terms of benefits, less unless the experts think such programs justified. 
But there will be areas where they do consider such benefits justified: In 
research and in eliminating rural poverty. Thus I would anticipate increas-
ing efforts to reduce subsidy payments, especially to prosperous farmers, 
an attempt to rationalize marketing conditions so that efficient production 
will pay off, and finally a reduction in the number of farms with larger 
farming operations encouraged. This means the direction will be one of 
de-emphasizing farming as a way of life and emphasizing agriculture as 
a business. 
On the state level I would suppose the trend which began symbolically 
when the agricultural college was changed into a state university, will 
continue. Research or extension p"rograms will not be abandoned simply 
because rural persons no longer control numerical majorities in both houses 
-115-
of state legislatures. But such programs will no longer get preferential 
treatment over what urbanites consider legitimate needs. One of the 
important issues I would argue will be property taxation programs that 
are devised where rural and suburban areas overlap (particularly where 
new schools are built). Another will be the problems of zoning in the tran-
sitional period before suburban settlement is dense enough to sell out agri-
cultural land but at the same time farming is more difficult and somewhat 
less profitable. These are important battles that agricultural interests 
might well lose to their serious disadvantage. 
If my analysis is correct, the burden of it seems to be that of the fam-
ous prayer of the theologian Reinheld Niebuhr, II Lord give me that courage 
to change what can be changed, the patience to accept what can not be, 
and the wisdom to know the difference. 11 
Living with government more dominated by urban and suburban resi-
dents' viewpoints will not be all that one might desire. But given present 
day conditions, it is likely to come about. The job then is to find a way 
that agriculture can profitably come to terms with it. 

THE IMPACT OF FUTURE WORLD SUPPLY AND DEMAND PROSPECTS 
ON U.S. AGRICULTURAL TRADE 
by Lester R. Brownl 
It used to be, as someone recently remarked, that 2 5 years was not a 
very long time. Nothing much happened in 25 years. But today 25 years is 
a very long time. For those of us who spend much of our efforts trying to 
anticipate what lies ahead, even 10 years seems a long time. 
Although the topic assigned is future-oriented, much of this paper will 
be devoted to reviewing the past. Before making any judgments concerning 
the future we must look to the past, at where we have been and where we 
are now. The early part of this paper identifies some of the principal 
forces bringing about changes in the world market for farm products. The 
latter part focuses on U.S. export prospects for individual commodities. 
U.S. Agricultural Exports in Retrospect 
Throughout most of U.S. history, three commodities--wheat, cotton 
and tobacco--dominated our agricultural exports. During most of the past 
century either wheat or cotton was the leading export item. Recently, 
however, wheat has moved well out in front, reflecting more than anything 
else the growing food shortages in Asia. Since the second world war, soy-
beans and feed grains have grown in importance so that we now have five 
major export commodities. 
In the usual pattern of development the role of agriculture declines 
as an economy becomes more industrialized. Thus agricultural exports--
accounting for about three-fourths of total exports at the time of the Civil 
War--declined until they reached a recent low of 18 percent in 19 53. 
Since then, however, this long term trend has been reversed. In the early 
1960's the agricultural share of total exports reached 2 4 percent; pre-
liminary data for 1964 show a further gain to 25 percent. There is good 
reason to believe that this figure will climb still higher in the years ahead. 
lstaff economist, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture 
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U.S. Agricultural Exports in Perspective 
The United States is today the leading exporter of agricultural pro-
ducts, completely dominating trade in temperate zone commodities. It 
is the principal source of such major commodities as wheat, com, cotton, 
tobacco and soybeans. 
Our exports of farm products exceed those of Canada, Australia and 
Argentina combined. In most years, exports of farm products under the 
Food for Peace program alone exceed the total agricultural exports of any 
of the other major exporting countries. 
U.S. exports of farm products, averaging just over 4 billion dollars 
per year in the late 1950's and 5 billion dollars per year in the early 
1960's, have exceeded 6 billion dollars in each of the last 2 years. The 
output of one acre out of every four now moves into export. In recent 
years two-thirds of the wheat crop, almost two-thirds of the rice crop, 
close to one-half of the soybean crop, one-third of the cotton crop and 
about one-fourth of the tobacco crop has moved abroad. These facts 
indicate a new era in agricultural trade. The broad outlines of this new 
era are evident in the shifting pattern of world grain trade. 
The Shifting Pattern of World Grain Trade 
Grains, providing a major share of man's food energy supply and 
occupying more than 70 percent of the world's harvested cropland, are a 
convenient commodity with which to measure shifts in world food trade. 
Trade Trends by Geographic Regions 
From the beginning of modern trade until about 1940 the regional 
pattern of world grain trade was rather constant. Western Europe was 
the big importing region. Other regions were net exporters. In the late 
1930's North America exported 5 million tons of grain per year, Latin 
America 9 million tons and Eastern Europe (including the Soviet Union) 
5 million tons. The other three regions Asia--Africa, and Oceania 
(Australia and New Zealand)--exported smaller quantities. The situa-
tion, then, was this: one importing region and six exporting regions. 
Since World War II, however, the world grain trade pattern has 
changed dramatically. The only region maintaining essentially its prewar 
position is Western Europe, Its net grain imports, averaging 23 million 
tons in recent years, have changed little from the 24 million ton yearly 
average in the 1934-38 period. 
North America and Oceania are now the only consistent net ex-
porters. Asia and Africa have joined Western Europe as permanent net 
importing regions. Eastern Europe and Latin America appear to be losing 
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their surplus producing capacity, both having been net importers in some 
recent years. 
Trade Trends by Economic Regions 
The world now comprises two major economic groupings: the developed 
and the less developed. Asia, Africa and Latin America may be considered 
the less developed world. The other four regions mentioned above com-
prise the developed world. 
Prior to World War II the less developed world exported to the de-
veloped world 11 million tons of grain per year. After World War II this 
flow was reversed. The flow from the developed to the less developed 
world was 4 million tons annually in the 1948-52 period, 15 million tons in 
the 1957-60 period, 21 million tons in 1961, and according to preliminary 
estimates, 25 million tons in 1964. According to this indicator, the less 
developed world is losing the capacity to feed itself. A growing share of 
each year• s population increment is being sustained by food shipments 
from the developed world, primarily Food for Peace shipments from North 
America. 
The Growing Demand for Food 
What is it that creates additional demand for food? There are two 
important sources. One, of course, is population growth. The other is 
rising per capita incomes. These two forces are distinctly different. 
One is a demographic force, the other an economic force. Both are in-
creasing faster than ever before in history. 
Population Growth and the Demand for Food 
Until the outbreak of World War II, world population had never 
inc rea sed more than 1 percent per year. Since then the rate of increase 
has accelerated sharp! y. Today it is inc rea sing 2 percent per year. 
Even without any further gain in per capita incomes, world food needs will 
rise 2 percent annually. 
Population growth rates vary widely between countries. The popu-
lations of several countries in both Eastern Europe and Western Europe 
are growing at less than 1 percent per year. At this rate, these countries 
will require the better part of a century to double their populations. 
Some less developed countries such as Brazil are expanding at more than 
3 percent per year. The number of people in these countries will double 
within a generation. 
The relative importance of the two principal demand-increasing 
forces varies widely between countries. In the less developed countries 
where population is growing 2-3 percent per year or more, and where 
per capita incomes are rising slowly, if at all, population growth is the 
major demand-increasing force. 
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Rising Incomes and the Demand for Food 
Per capita income levels also vary widely between countries. In 
subsistence-type economies such as India or Pakistan they may average 
only $60 to $70 per year. In the more advanced economies of the in-
dustrial West, they may range up to $3,000. Rates of increase in per 
capita income also vary widely between countries. Rates of gain are 
very high in several West European countries and Japan. The combina-
tion of high rates of overall economic growth and low rates of population 
growth in these countries over the past several years has resulted in 
extraordinary gains in per capita income. In Japan, the country with 
the most rapid rate of economic growth, income per person is doubling 
each decade. 
As incomes rise, consumption patterns follow certain rather pre-
dictable changes. At the lower income levels, diets consist largely 
of starchy foods. Consumption of livestock products and other costly 
foodstuffs is low, often negligible. Thus in Asia, grain products, 
roots and tubers, account for three-fourths of total caloric intake. 
Livestock products supply only 5 percent. In North America, where 
incomes are quite high, starchy foods account for less than one-fourth 
of total caloric intake; livestock products provide more than 30 percent. 
The consumption of fats and oils also rises steadily with income levels. 
One way of relating rising incomes and the resulting additional 
demand with agricultural resource requirements is to measure the quality 
of diet in terms of grain. About 1 ton of grain per person per year is 
required to maintain the high quality, high protein diets of North America. 
Per capita grain consumption in the less developed regions such as Asia 
is only 450 pounds per year. The difference between these two econ-
omies is the difference between one which can afford to convert large 
quantities of grain into meat, milk and eggs, and one which requires 
nearly all available grain for direct human consumption. With develop-
ment we can expect per capita grain requirements in the low income areas 
to gradually rise from the current 450 pounds to much higher levels, grad-
ually moving toward North American levels as incomes permit. 
The Less Developed Regions--Growing Food Shortages? 
We noted earlier that the less developed world, exporting an aver-
age of 11 million metric tons of grain per year to the developed world 
prior to World War !! 1 has become a net importer, importing an estimated 
25 million tons in 1964. This net shift of 36 million tons approximates 
the total grain production of Canada and Australia combined. 
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Why Has this Vast Deficit Developed? 
The rapidly growing import deficit is readily explained. In traditional 
societies food output is expanded along with population by simply ex-
panding the area under cultivation. But now relatively little new land can 
readily be brought under cultivation in many densely populated countries. 
Additional food output must come largely from raising yield per acre. 
Herein lies the problem, for underdeveloped economies, almost by defi-
nition, are not prepared to do this. Raising yields is far more difficult 
than merely moving to new land. 
Historical evidence indicates that there are certain preconditions 
for generating and sustaining a steadi.ly rising trend in yields per acre. 
One of these preconditions appears to be a reasonably high level of 
literacy. It is difficult to imagine a largely illiterate society, as in India 
or Indonesia, generating and sustaining a trend of rapidly rising yields 
such as those currently existing in the United States, Japan or some of the 
countries in Western Europe. In many countries, the level of literacy, 
though rising, is still quite low--especially in rural areas. Only a small 
fraction of the rural population is literate in such countries as India, 
Indonesia, Pakistan and Egypt. 
A minimal level of literacy is but one of many preconditions. There 
may be a minimum level of per capita income, below which there is not 
enough difference between output levels and subsistence levels to fi-
nance the capital inputs needed to raise yields. Commercialization of 
agriculture may have to develop to a certain minimum extent before there 
are enough sales of farm products to permit the purchase of yield-raising 
capital inputs. The nonagricultural sector of the economy must reach a 
certain size and level of development and sophistication before it can 
provide capital inputs, such as chemical fertilizers and pesticides and 
the services needed in agriculture to increase per acre yields. Note that 
these preconditions were not needed so long as food output was ex-
panded in the traditional manner, i.e. , by simply expanding the area 
under cultivation. The nature of these preconditions shows why, his-
torically, yield takeoffs have been confined to the more advanced econ-
omies. 
In summary, rapid population growth in the less-developed regions, 
coming at a time when little new land is left, is forcing the process of 
economic development, which required centuries in the Western World, 
to be telescoped in to a period of a few decades. It does not seem 
likely that the disturbing tendency for food output per person to trend 
downward in several major less developed countries can easily be re-
versed. 
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Illustrating the Problem 
It is too early yet to assess the impact of the current and projected 
population growth rates on the food economies of the less-developed 
regions. One of the most effective ways for us to grasp the magnitude of 
the problem is to interchange the projected population increases of the 
developed and less-developed regions. 
Consider these facts. The agricultural land resources of the two eco-
nomic regions, measured in terms of croplancl, are not too different. The 
19 60 population of the developed world was less than G. 9 billion; that of 
the less-developed world, more than 2 billion. The projected increase 
between 1960 and 2000 for the developed world, according to the United 
Nations medium level projections, is 0. 4 billion and that for the less-
developed world, nearly 3 billion. 
Now let us interchange the projected growth in population of the two 
regions. The developed world would then absorb the 3 billion and the less-
developed world, the 0. 4 billion. The United States, with about one-fourth 
of the agricultural land resources of the developed world, could expect to 
accommodate one-fourth of the 3 billion total (7 50 million). This amounts 
to an addition of about 190 million per decade--roughly the equivalent of 
our current population every 10 years. 
What would happen .to our food consumption levels under these circum-
stances? But we are much better prepared to absorb population increases 
of this magnitude than are the less developed regions. We have the capital, 
the agricultural and industrial technology, and the high levels of literacy 
and education. And we have a much more favorable !and-man ratio to begin 
with. 
Unfortunately, the vast increases in population are projected for the 
regions least prepared to feed them. The imbalances between population 
and food in the less developed regions are certain to grow. 
Western Europe--Uncertain Trends 
The trends in Europe are much less clear. The big question centers 
around the agricultural negotiations with the European Economic Community 
--the main negotiating focus of the Kennedy Round. 
If the rates of economic growth prevailing in Western Europe in recent 
years continue, the demand for agricultural products will :dse rapidly. 
How much of this additional demand will be translated into import needs 
will be heavily influenced by the outcome of the negotiations now under 
way. 
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Japan--Our First Billion Dollar Market? 
Japan is today our leading overseas market, taking nearly $750 million 
worth of farm products in the year just ended. Because of its prominence 
as a market for U.S. farm products it deserves some special attention. 
Japan' s population growth rate, over the past decade, has been less 
than 1 percent per year, among the lowest in the world. But Japan now has 
95 million people--half the population of the United States--compressed 
into an area smaller than California. As this population built up, mostly 
within the last century or so, the Japanese were forced to look to the sea 
for their animal protein, using their scarce land resources to produce 
starchy food staples, mostly rice. Thus the Japanese developed and be-
carne accustomed to a very plain diet, consisting largely of fish and rice. 
In recent years, however, as Japan' s phenomenal econo~ic growth r:ate 
of 7-8 percent per year has permitted per capita incomes to double within 
a decade, the Japanese have begun to develop a taste for meat, milk, eggs 
and other live stock products. But with near! y all the cropland devoted to 
the production of food crops such as rice, the Japanese must either import 
these livestock products or the feed grains needed to produce them domes-
tically. Feed grain imports, averaging 2-3 million metric tons per year in 
recent years, are projected to reach 10 million tons by 1975. 
A continuation of the explosive rate of increase in per capita income 
prevailing over the past several years will require ever growing quantities 
of imported food. It now appears to be only a matter of time until Japan 
becomes our first billion dollar market for farm products. 
The Outlook for U.S. Farm Exports 
Proceeding from this background, what is the outlook for U.S. farm 
exports? 
Wheat Export Prospects 
The United States is today the leading world exporter of wheat, supply-
ing some 40 percent of all the wheat entering the world market. With ex-
ports increasing, we have, within the past five years, made the transition 
from producing primarily for the domestic market to producing primarily for 
the export market. During the past two years, two-thirds of our wheat 
crop has moved abroad, mostly under the Food for Peace program. 
The past quarter century has witnessed some pronounced changes in 
the geographical destination of our wheat exports. Up until World War II, 
Europe took most of our wheat. In recent years the less developed regions, 
especially Asia, have taken the bulk of our exports. Thus far this fiscal 
year, the less developed regions, in addition to taking the usual large 
volume of Public Law 480 shipments, are taking a major share of our com-
mercial exports as well. 
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Japan, importing better than 2 million tons of wheat in recent years, 
is expected to increase its imports to well above 3 million tons by 1970. 
In Western Europe where both per capita and aggregate consumption of 
wheat for food is declining as incomes rise, and where output is trending 
steadily upward, dependence on imported wheat is certain to decline. 
More and more of the indigenously produced wheat will be used for feed-
ing purposes. 
The situation in several of the less developed tropical countries, 
however, is quite different. Per capita consumption of wheat, a pre-
ferred staple in nearly all less developed countries, is rising. Popula-
tion growth rates of 2 to 3 percent per year, coupled with rising per capita 
consumption, is resulting in an impressive rate of gain in the aggregate 
demand for wheat. 
In Brazil, where demand is growing and production is declining, the 
need for imported wheat has grown rapidly2. Brazil now imports close to 3 
million tons, of wheat per year--half as much as China and two-thirds as 
much as India. About half of this wheat is imported commercially and 
about half under the Food for Peace program. Brazil now produces only 
one-tenth of its annual wheat requirements. 
Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, has had a similar lack 
of success in expanding wheat production. Although its imports of wheat 
are rather small compared with Brazil's, they are growing steadily. The 
Philippines, producing less than 1 percent of its wheat requirements and 
now importing half a million tons per year, has doubled its imports in 
the past few years. Further increases in imports are projected. Indonesia, 
another tropical country, also produces little or no wheat. Its rising 
internal demand can be met only through imports. 
The above countries were singled out because they represent a group 
of countries where wheat consumption is rising rapidly but which produce 
little of their wheat requirements. Another group, including such countries 
as India, Pakistan and Egypt, have growing wheat import needs, not be-
cause they do not or cannot produce wheat, but because they cannot ex-
pand production fast enough to keep up with the rapi'dly growing demand. 
U.S. exports of wheat, more than any other commodity, will reflect the 
growing imbalances between food needs and food production in the less 
developed regions. 
Rice Export Prospects 
Rice, along with soybeans and grain sorghums, is a relatively new 
U.S. agricultural export. Prior to World War II, quantities of rice 
2Production in Brazil has declined from 500,000 metric tons in the early 
1950's to less than 300,000 tons in recent years. 
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exported were negligible. Exports of rice in 19 63/64 at l. 5 million metric 
tons nearly doubled the average exports of the 1950's. 
A large part of our total rice exports now go to Asia. India, large! y 
a concessional market, and the Philippines, buying most of its rice com-
mercially, are our big outlets. The dropping of Indonesia from our list of 
concessional markets is partly offset by the return of Japan as a large 
commercial purchaser of U.S. rice. 
Mainland China, which ranked third as a major rice exporter behind 
Burma and Thailand until a few years ago, has now lost most of its export-
able surplus. The United States with its steadily rising volume of rice 
exports has moved into third place" With neither Thailand noLBurma ex-
panding production or exports very rapidly in recent years, the Ur:.ited 
States has come very close to overtaking both of these traditional ex-
porters. The United States has the potential to become the leading 
supplier of rice in the world market if favorable export conditions should 
develop. 
Feed Grain Export Prospects 
In this discussion we will use the North American definition of feed 
grains, including corn, barley, grain sorghums and oats. Grains used 
almost exclusively as feed in this country are important sources of food 
in many parts of the world. Corn, for instance, is the leading food staple 
in Latin America. In Africa, grain sorghums are the principal food. In 
some African countries, grain sorghums supply a major share of the total 
food energy supply. 
Corn is the leading U.S. feed grain export, accounting for some 
three-fourths of the total. Grain sorghums rank next in importance, fol-
lowed by barley. 
Feed grain exports go mostly to Western Europe and Japan, both 
characterized by rapidly rising per capita incomes and rapid gains in the 
per capita consumption of livestock products. With little additional 
land available to support expanding livestock industries .these countries 
must look to the world market for feed grains. 
Exports from Argentina, a longstanding feed grain exporter, have not 
kept pace with growth in world feed grain exports. Newly emerging corn 
exporters such as Thailand and the Republic of South Africa have picked 
up much of the slack. The United States supplies one-half of all the 
corn and four-fifths of the grain sorghums entering the world market. 
In the export of barley, the United States, competing with Canada, 
Australia and more recently France, enjoys a much less favorable posi-
tion. 
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U.S. feed grain exports have increased steadily over the past decade, 
nearly tripling the levels of the early 1950's. This country is an efficient, 
highly competitive producer of feed grains. As long as we keep our prices 
competitive, we should experience little difficulty in at least maintaining 
our present share of a rapidly growing world market. 
Soybean Export Prospects 
Soybeans merit the title of outstanding performer among the major ex-
port commodities. Though a relatively new export crop their rise as an 
export crop has been phenomenal. During the 1930's, U.S. soybean ex-
ports averaged 2 million bushels per year; during the early 1950's they 
averaged almost 30 million bushels. Since then exports have risen 
dramatically, reaching 186 million bushels in the fiscal year just ended. 
These exports this past year earned half a billion dollars in foreign ex-
change. If the value of soybean oil and oilcake exports is added, the 
total approaches three quarters of a billion dollars. 
In the 1920's and 1930's, when soybeans were just catching on here, 
Mainland China completely dominated world soybean trade, supplying some 
four-fifths or more of total soybean exports. Today, however, the United 
States dominates soybean trade, supplying a similar share of total exports. 
China has lost its traditionally large exportable surplus. Lagging agri-
cultural output and the addition of 15 million people per year will likely 
prevent China• s reemergence as a serious competitor in soybean market. 
U.S. soybeans and soybean oil have proved formidable competition 
for other oilseeds and vegetable oils in the world market. Soybeans are 
today the leading oilseed, having eclipsed such traditional oilbearing 
commodities as peanuts, copra and palm kernels. As U.S. soybean ex-
ports continue their expected rapid expansion, the U.S. role in the inter-
national market for vegetable oils and oil seeds will become even more 
dominant. If past trends continue, it is only a matter of time until exports 
of soybeans and soybean products reach the billion dollar mark. 
Cotton Export Prospects 
The longterm trend in our cotton exports contrasts sharply with that 
of other major commodities. During the 1890's, cotton exports ranged 
from 5 to 8 million bales per year. As recently as the 1930's, cotton 
exports averaged close to 7 million bales per year. But since World 
War II, two important developments--the emergence of several new 
exporting countries and growing competition from synthetic fibers--
has made the expansion of cotton exports difficult. The use of syn-
thetic fibers is expanding much more rapidly abroad than the use of 
cotton, thus redpc::ing .cotton• s share of the overseas fiber market. 
Cotton exports, facing continuing keen competition from other suppliers 
and synthetic fibers, are likely to remain at about current levels. 
-127-
Tobacco Export Prospects 
Tobacco exports, though edging upward during the past several years, 
have been rather stable during the postwar period. But, like cotton, to-
bacco faces stiff competition from newer producing countries, especially 
Rhodesia. Most of the growth in world tobacco trade in recent years has 
been accounted for by the expansion in exports of the newer exporting 
countries. With a sustained effort to improve our quality advantage, to-
bacco exports should expand modestly over the next few years. 
Export Prospects for Livestock Products 
Until quite recently prospects of significantly expanding our fXports 
of livestock products did not seem good. However, annual exporfs, rang-
ing from $500 to $700 million between 1955 and 1963, are now beginning 
to expand. Preliminary figures for fiscal year 1964 show the value of 
livestock product exports moving up toward $800 milliono 
Nonfat dry milk, frozen poultry, pork" and variety meats have made 
significant gains over the past few years. Exports of nonfat dry milk this 
past year reached a record level, more thon dQubling the level of the late 
1950's. In addition to sizable shipments of nonfat dry milk for use under 
the Food for Peace program, growing quantities are beginning to move to 
Western Europe, where they are used largely as an ingredient in feed-
stuffs. 
Exporting nonfat dry milk to the less developed regions is a practical 
way of using our agricultural production potential to alleviate diet deficits 
in animal protein. Nonfat dry milk ships and stores well. It is especially 
important in the U.S. sponsored school lunch programs now operating in 
many less developed countries as part of the Foop for Peace program. 
Beginning in the late 1950's, there was a rapid rise in our exports of 
frozen poultry. But this was seriously set back by the imposition of im-
port restrictions in the EEC countries. With rapid growth in exports to 
non-EEC countries, however, the long-term prospects for expansion are 
good. 
Exports of variety meats, approaching 200 million pounds this past 
year, are expected to continue to gain. The rapid growth in variety meat 
exports reflects the rapidly rising income levels in the major importing 
countries of Western Europe. Exports of pork, the other livestock product 
doing very well in recent years, have nearly doubled over the past sev-
eral years. Other developments such as exports of small quantities of 
feeder cattle and young calves to Europe, also hold some promise for the 
futureo It now appears that exports of livestock products are beginning 
to rise, perhaps initiating a long-term trend. • 
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Summary 
A review of the various projections of U.S. farm exports made over the 
past several years is revealing. The one consistent element in all the 
projections is the tendency to underestimate future export levels. This has 
been true for most individual commodities as well as for total agricultural 
exports. 
Both population and per capita incomes are increasing more rapidly 
than ever before. In Europe and Japan, where population growth rates are 
low, demand is expanding largely as a result of rising per capita incomes. 
Given their limited land resources and the high production costs associated 
with attempting to get more and more output from a fixed land area, these 
regions must turn to imports to fill their needs. 
In the less developed regions of Asia, Africa and Latin America most 
of the additional food needs will arise from increases in population. Many 
less developed countries, lacking both new land to bring under cultivation 
and the capacity to raise yields rapidly, will be faced with growing short~ 
ages of food. 
The forces which have resulted in a doubling of U.S. farm exports 
over the past decade still exist. They may have an even greater impact 
on the level of U.S. farm exports in the years ahead, further increasing 
the share of our farm output moving abroad . 
• 
ALTERNATIVE TRADE POLICIES: THEIR IMPACT ON U. S. 
AND WORLD PRODUCTION AND TRADE 
by D. Gale Johnsonl 
I. Introduction 
It is not now possible to discuss alternative trade policies without 
discussing alternative domestic farm policies of the major trading nations. 
In a sense it has never been possible to entirely divorce the domestic and 
international aspects of national measures affecting agriculture. 
For centuries governments have attempted to influence the develop-
ment of agriculture through the control or direction of international trade. 
Import duties, quotas and embargoes and export subsidies have an ancient 
and almost uninterrupted history in the major nations of the world. Free 
trade in agricultural products, as practiced by the British after the abolition 
of the Corn laws, has been the exception rather than the rule. 
But compared, say, to the end of the nineteenth century, the inter-
connection between trade and agricultural policies are now much more 
intimate and all pervasive. Trade restrictions and inducements are now 
only one of the numerous tools in the policymaker' s kit. And perhaps 
most important, trade interference is now largely determined by or ac-
commodated to a whole series of domestic interventions in the markets for 
agricultural products. At one time it was possible to negottate on tariff 
rates on agricultural products without becoming involved in a complex set 
of national legislation and administrative actions. Now a negotiation 
about variable levies is a negotiation about the level of price supports in 
the European Economic community or a negotiation about U. S. trade re-
strictions on peanuts is a negotiation about the U. S. program of acreage 
allotments and price supports for peanuts. 
It is not difficult to determine why these interconnections have become 
more direct and complex. Most governments of industrial countries have 
accepted the responsibility for reaching certain income objectives for their 
farm populations. A nation can have such objectives -- and pursue and 
attain them -- without interference with international trade. However, 
most nations are attempting to achieve their farm income objectives pri-
marily by influencing, that is increasing, farm product prices. It is the 
use of the price system to achieve income objectives that necessitates 
1Professor and dean, Division of the Social Sciences, University of 
Chicago. 
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import restrictions or export subsidization. No nation can long afford to 
increase the world price for an important commodity; sooner or later some 
means for separating domestic and international prices must be resorted 
to. 
If any important trading nation or area relies upon higher farm product 
prices as a means of achieving farm income objectives there are certain 
obvious effects upon international trade. First, domestic output is encour-
aged. If the country is an importer, this means that less will be imported; 
if the country is an exporter, this means that more will be exported. Either 
of these consequences limits the export markets for third countries. Second, 
unless deficiency payments are used, domestic consumption is reduced. 
Again, if the country is an importer, less will be imported; if the country is 
an exporter, more will be exported. 
It is often argued that the response of either output or consumption to 
higher prices is relatively small and thus little weight should be given to 
such effects. It is true that in the richer countries people tend to vary 
quantities purchased of farm products very little as prices change. 2 But 
this, by itself, is ;not an adequate indicator of the effect of high consumer 
prices on the amount of product imported or exported. If before a price in-
crease imports accounted for 20 per cent of a nation's consumption of a 
product, the percentage effect of the price increase on imports would be 
approximately five times the percentage effect on national consumption. 3 
The same "multiplier" effect occurs as a result of output increases due 
to higher prices. A given percentage increase in production in importing 
countries can have a much larger proportional effect on quantity imported; 
the same statement applies to the effects of increased production in ex-
porting countries upon the change in their exports. 
The consumption and output effects of higher farm product prices are 
additive and this is true whether a nation is an importer or an exporter. 
Thus even if demand and supply are both quite inelastic in a given nation, 
the impact upon the volume of foreign trade can be significant. 
This has been a long introduction to make a rather simple point, namely, 
that if governments use manipulation or support of prices received by farmers 
as the means of meeting income objectives, modifying trade policies re-
quire modifying domestic farm programs. While the point is a simple one, 
it is hard to overemphasize its importance. The point explains why the EEC 
has had so much difficulty in arriving at a common agricultural policy; it 
explains why there are so many tensions in the present round of trade 
2rn more precise economic terms, the price elasticity of demand is 
very low. 
3Thus if the price elasticity of demand were -0.2 and the price in-
crease were 20 per cent, national consumption would decline by 4 per 
cent. Imports, assuming no change in local production, would decline 
not by 4 per cent but by 20 per cent. 
-131-
negotiations when the problems of agricultural trade are under discussion. 
And the above discussion also indicates why exporting nations are legiti-
mately concerned with the domestic agricultural policies ·of other countries, 
whether those countries are importers or exporters. 
There is one other point of an introductory nature that merits attention. 
There exists quite different views concerning the effects of U. S. farm pro-
grams upon our farm output. Officially we have taken the position that our 
acreage allotment and other governmental programs have restricted total farm 
production. There is a great deal of skepticism about this conclusion by other 
governments. Until we conduct the sophisticated and detailed studies that can 
determine whether the aggregate effect of all of our governmental programs 
has been to restrict total output, we are not likely to convince others that they 
have any responsibility for avoiding measures that encourage farm production. 4 
I feel that we have here a serious source of misunderstanding between the EEC 
and the U. S. And until this misunderstanding is cleared away we are not 
likely to make much progress in convincing the EEC and other major importing 
areas that they have an obligation not to encourage high cost agricultural 
production. 
In the outline that was sent to me by the program organizers I was asked 
to discuss the following major topics: 
1. Continuation of expanded trade -- effect on commodities 
2. Selective import restrictions 
3. Market-share doctrine based on rights established because of market 
development costs 
4. The gains and losses from alternative policies 
I shall restrict my comments to the above four topics. 
II. Continuation of Expanded Trade -- Effect on Commodities 
How much has agricultural trade expanded in the post World War II per-
iod? This is a seemingly simple question, but the answers are quite com-
plex and differ for different commodities and different countries. Obviously 
in this chapter I can do nothing more than to indicate some of the differences 
that appear if one approaches the question from different viewpoints. 
The volume of world agricultural exports increased by about 43 per cent 
between 1953 and 1963, when valued in 1957-59 average prices of U. S. 
imports or exports. It may be noted that the 19 53 volume of world exports 
of agricultural products was approximately the same as the 1934-38 volume. 
4Price supports, acreage allotments, conservation and acreage reserves, 
agricultural conservation program, soil conservation, small watersheds, 
irrigation and reclamation. 
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The increase in the value of world exports of agricultural products between 
19 53 and 19 63 was less than 43 per cent since world export prices of agri-
cultural products declined by roughly 5 per cent during the period. 
The growth in exports of food and other agricultural products has been 
quite uneven. For example, between 19 53 and 19 60 the value of food exports 
changed as follows: 
Total world food exports, 
excl. exports of Eastern 
Trading bloc* 
EEC to EEC 
Industrial to Industrial 
Non-industrial to industrial 
per cent change 
1953-1960 
25.3 
119.9 
44.8 
6.2 
* But includes imports of the Eastern Trading bloc 
Of the $4, 458 million increase in world exports of food, as defined, 
$2, 522 million represented increases in trade among industrial countries and 
only $4 7 5 million from non-industrial to industrial areas. While the value of 
food imports of the Eastern Trading bloc was still small in 1960, the increase 
in value of exports by non-industrial countries to the bloc was $320 million 
during the period or about two-thirds of the increase in food exports to the 
industrial countries. The other large component of the increase in food ex-
ports was the increase of $807 million in exports from industrial to non-
industrial areas. A large fraction of the latter increase was due to increase 
in food shipments by the U. S. under our various foreign aid activities. 
A study made by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the changes in 
the value of world exports of the main agricultural products among the major 
regions between 1952-53 and 1960-62 is of interest in assessing the growth 
of trade. This study was concerned with broad world regional groupings --
Western Europe, North America, Latin America for example. Thus trade 
among nearby countries, such as trade between Canada and the U. S. or 
among the EEC members, was excluded. The increase in the interregional 
trade in agricultural products (not just food) was $3,283 million during the 
period. This increase may be described as follows: (1) The increase in 
the agricultural exports of the less developed countries was only $815 mil-
lion; (2) the increase in commercial exports of the industrial countries was 
$1, 097 million, and (3) the increase in the value of products made avail-
able as economic aid or surplus disposal by the U. S. was $1,371. It 
would appear that a very large fraction -- perhaps two-thirds -- of the 
increase in commercial exports was due to larger exports by the United 
States. 
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While I do not want to underemphasize the importance of trade among 
nearby countries, the above material indicates that the growth of agricul-
tural exports from the less developed to the industrial countries has been 
very modest during the past decade and that much of the increase in inter-
regional exports by the industrial countries has been captured by the U. S. 
And much of the increase in U. S, interregional exports has been in terms 
of economic aid and surplus disposal. 
It is clear from all the available data that the increase in exports of 
agricultural products during the past decade has been much smaller than 
the increase in exports of industrial products. Excluding exports by the 
Eastern Trading bloc, world exports of agricultural products increased 32 
per cent between 1953 and 1961 while the world exports of manufactured 
products increased 6 7 per cent. 
The slower growth of trade in agricultural than in industrial products 
is what one would expect. In general the demand for agricultural products 
grows much more slowly than per capita income. 5 In fact, for a number of 
farm products per capita consumption declines as per capita incomes in-
crease. 6 In most industrial countries it appears that food grain demand 
has this characteristic. 
The relatively slow growth in international trade in agncultural pro-
ducts, especially in the exports of less developed countries, has been 
partially due to the tendency of industrial countries to provide increasing 
protection for their farmers. This increased protection has been assoc-
iated with a decline in the share of the total food supply imported by 
Western Europe. Before World War II, Western Europe imported 31 per 
cent of its food supply; the region now imports significantly less than 
2 5 per cent. U. S. imports of agricultural products have remained 
approximately stable in value terms for the past decade, while exports 
have increased by 60 per cent -- even more if the very high export level 
of 1964 is considered. Thus the U. S. has added very appreciably to the 
supply of agricultural products moving in international tradec but it has 
not added to the demand. Most of the stability in the value of our agri-
cultural imports has been due to strictly economic factors -- demand 
growing more slowly than per capita income and declining product prices; 
but not alL We have clearly used trade barriers t:o restrict our imports 
of sugar, many dairy products and peanuts. 
5In economic terms, agricultural products have low income elasticities 
of demand. 
6That is, they have a negative inco:rne elasticity. 
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As population increases and real per capita incomes grow in most 
parts of the world, and especially in the industrial countries, interna-
tional trade in agricultural products will continue to grow and perhaps 
at the recent rate of 2. 5 to 3. 0 per cent per year. Some of the important 
agricultural raw materials and beverages -- cotton, oilseeds, copra, tea, 
coffee and rubber -- are subject to relatively limited trade barriers. In-
creasing per capita incomes will probably result in increased international 
trade in feed grains and perhaps for some kinds of meat. 
But a significant expansion in commercial international trade in agri-
cultural products must await a reduction in barriers to that trade and a 
reduction in the degree of subsidization of agriculture in the industrial 
countries. If the industrial countries gradually dropped their protection 
of sugar, international trade would expand and real national incomes would be 
would be increased in both the importing and exporting countries. If the 
agriculture of Western Europe were given less protection and subsidization, 
international trade in wheat, feed grains, fruits, tobacco and poultry would 
expand significantly. If the U. S. provided less protection for certain parts 
of its agriculture, international trade in dairy products, peanuts, wool, 
fruits, vegetables and nuts would expand considerably. 
III. Selective Import Controls 
It is my opinion that the introduction of additional quantitative import 
controls -- whether "voluntary" or unilateral -- would be a serious mistake 
and should be resisted by all who are concerned with the maintenance of an 
efficient and prosperous U. S. agriculture. Certain! y we cannot expect 
other nations to eliminate or reduce quantitative restrictions on the impor-
tation of agricultural products when we resort to the same technique. 
While much remains to be done in the elimination of quantitative restric-
tions, there can be no denying that substantial progress has been made 
in the last decade. In the face of this gradual progress, it is little short 
of tragic that we have resorted to voluntary import restrictions on beef, 
veal and mutton and certain dairy products and now have legislation pro-
viding for beef, veal and mutton import quotas under certain conditions. 
Even if the meat quotas provided in the legislation are never imposed, the 
legislation authorizing the quotas has been and will be a costly venture 
for us. The existence of the legislation, which I interpret to be incon-
sistent with our GATT obligations if applied, provides an excuse for 
others to resist our efforts to induce them to eliminate such barriers. 
Obviously we are not opposed to quantitative restrictions on principle; 
we are only opposed to such restrictions when it is in our interest. Or so 
at least will run the argument of our trading partners who have quantitative 
restrictions that they wish to maintain for domestic political reasons. For 
example, the domestic political rea sons for France maintaining restrictions 
on the imports of fruit are undoubtedly as respectable and forceful as are 
our political reasons for providing import controls on meat. 
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Selective import restrictions -- under the guise of the euphemism, 
market sharing arrangements -- have gained some popularity in certain 
circles. It is sometimes argued that the greatest potential for maintain-
ing or expanding our trade in certain farm products with tl:le EEC is :to 
negotiate a series of market sharing arrangements which would allocate 
a specific quota to imports,. with this quota increasing as utilization grew 
as a consequence of increased population and income. 
Such arrangements have the effect, if effective, of freezing the share 
of national consumption supplied by imports, Future changes in relative 
costs will affect the amount and flow of international trade only slowly 
and uncertainly, if at all. Would we have been wHU.ng to enter into such 
an arrangement with the EEC for feed grains in the mid-,50' s? We were 
then exporting about 2. 1 million metric tons of feed grains annually to the 
EEC; by now a growth sharing formula might have increased our share to 
about 3. 0 million tons. I doubt if anyone would now want to accept this 
figure as our negotiated share of the EEC market for imported feed grains. 
Even the imposition of very substantial variable levies on feed grains has 
not had the effect of reducing our feed grain exports to the level that we 
might have accepted had we negotiated a market sharing arrangement with 
the EEC in 1958. 
When domestic political and economic pressures are strong enough, 
few nations can resist violating international economic agreements if such 
violation permits a solution, even a very short-run solution, of a domestic 
problem. The long inclusion of the escape clause in our reciprocal trade 
legislation was an open recognition of this fact. How much confidence 
could we have that freely and sincerely negotiated market sharing arrange-
ments would, in fact, be observed in the face of farm income and price 
problems in the importing nation? Suppose that in a given year domestic 
output of feed grains equalled expected use in an importing country that 
had signed such an agreement. Thus the entire import quota would have 
to be stored or exported. If exported, the exporting nations signatory to 
the agreement have gained little or nothing, Are importing nations likely 
to incur the heavy storage costs that would be required if the imports were 
stored? Perhaps, but I doubt if we can have any certainty that such would 
be the case, 
Negotiation of market sharing arrangements may turn out to be superior 
to any other alternative with which we may be faced. Nevertheless, I feel 
that we need to approach such agreements with caution and with recognition 
of the fact that enforement of them may be nearly impossible, 
IV. Market-sharing Doctrine Based on Rights Established Because of Market 
Development Costs 
I find it hard, and I should say so at the outset, to take this idea 
seriously. The allocation of markets, either nationally or internationally, 
on the basis of market development costs (or should I say advertising costs?) 
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impresses me as a way to maximize waste and to minimize international 
good will. It is one thing for the United States to impress the Japanese 
with the desirability of U. S. wheat and then try through quality control 
of the product and effective pricing to retain the market developed; it is 
quite another for the Japanese to guarantee that if we spend ten times as 
much as the Canadians to develop or expand the Japanese market for wheat 
that we should from then on export ten times as much wheat to Japan as 
Canada. 
One consequence of such an arrangement would be to enrich the 
Japanese or the German equivalent of Madison Avenue. What export 
nation could stand by while another nation was engaged upon a market 
promotion campaign if they knew what future market shares would depend 
upon costs incurred in developing the market? The only way to prevent 
wasteful expenditures would appear to be a cartel arrangement among the 
potential exporters -- an arrangement that would result in agreed market 
shares. Why not approach the matter of market share directly? 
But assume that the above brief comments are beside~the point and 
one takes the idea seriously. The administration of such a scheme would 
surely present a number of difficult problems. 
One issue that would arise is how to handle the expenditures from 
P. 1. 480 counterpart funds generated by our food aid program. Are the 
expenditures from these funds for market development and trade fairs 
legitimate and real expenditures made by the U. S. ? If we claim these 
to be real expenditures, do we then reduce our claims concerning the 
amount of foreign aid provided under the Food for Peace Program? Could 
the U. S. count some of the value of food or other agricultural products 
provided under Title I as market development costs? Who would decide 
what was a legitimate expenditure? How would the market development 
costs of various nations be compared? Would costs incurred by private 
firms in promoting branded products be included? 
If the contribution of foreigners to the development of a market is to 
be used as the criterion for the allocation of import shares, the most 
appropriate claim for a given share would be the effect of the various 
promotional devices upon the development of the market. The use of 
costs is obviously a very imprecise guide and one chosen, presumably, 
because we have no way of measuring the effectiveness of market de-
velopment programs. 
I have so far interpreted this market-sharing doctrine in terms of 
allocation of shares in a volume of imports determined by any arbitrary 
rule. I suspect that the promulgators of this rule have something more 
in mind, namely that the total market -- including that supplied by do-
mestic producers -- should be allocated in terms of relative market 
development costs. I find it hard to believe that any important nation 
would accept such a rule. Such a rule would guarantee foreigners a 
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definite claim against the growth of a market that was due to increasing pop-
ulation and rising per capita incomes. Does any one really believe that the 
recent growth in per capita meat and wheat consumption in Japan is due pri-
marily to market development expenditures rather than to increasing per 
capita income and~ in the case of wheat, the rationing of rice? 
It is probably true that U. S. private and public efforts to introduce 
broilers into West Germany had some effect upon the growth of poultry con-
sumption in that country. But was the contribution of these market develop-
ment efforts so considerable and so certain that the costs of these efforts 
constitute a legitimate or reasonable claim for a share of German poultry 
market? Per capita poultry consumption in West Germany increased by 160 
per cent between 19 56 and 19 61, but in the Netherlands ~- an important 
poultry exporter where I suspect that we did not engage in market develciJ-
ment activities -- per capita poultry consumption increased three fold. 
And in Belgium and Luxembourg the absolute increase in per capita con-
sumption of poultry was almost half again as large as in Germany, though 
the relative increase was only 70 per cent. 
I do not want to be misunderstood. I believe that poultry producers 
should receive the full support of the U. S. Government in obtaining access 
to the West Germar:.. poultry market under reasonable conditions. They de-
serve that support because on the basis of price and quality they can de-
liver poultry to West Germany on terms that are fully competive and because 
it is our national policy to promote trade to gain the advantages of inter-
national specialization. But I do not think that poultry producers have an 
ethical or economic claim to any part of the German poultry market because 
of expenditures on market development. 
V. The Gains and Losses from Alternative Policies 
Unless there is a significant modification of the trade and agricultural. 
policies of the major industrial nations, we can look forward to only a 
modest absolute growth in the value and volume of commercial agricultural 
trade. With existing policies, Western Europe will continue to expand the 
relative importance of domestic production in total consumption. This 
trend is important, of course, to the major agricultural exporting countries 
such as Canada, Australia and the U. S. But this trend when combined 
with increased efforts on the part of the U. S. to expand agricultural 
exports through surplus disposal and the payment of subsidies on several 
important export products is of critical significance to the less developed 
areas of the world. 
If the less developed areas of the world are to achieve the kind of 
economic growth envisaged in the Alliance for Progress, for example, 
these areas must be able to finance a significantly larger volume of 
imports of capital goods and related items for the investments in agri-
culture, industry, transportation and communication that are essential 
for rising per capita incomes. Except for the small part of the world 
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with petroleum or minerals to export, such areas must rely primarily upon 
export earnings from agricultural products to finance the required capital 
imports. The deliberate subsidization of agriculture by most of the impor-
tant industrial nations clearly limits the export earnings from such areas. 
Thus one of the important losses of the continuation of the trends in 
agricultural policies of the past 15 years, including trade policies, is the 
adverse effect that such policies have upon the growth rates of the poorer 
areas of the world. 
A second loss that is and will be suffered by a failure to remove some 
of the impedients to an efficient allocation of agricultural production in the 
free world is the real loss in income suffered by the area. Western Europe 
is involved in encouraging high cost production of many agricultural pro-
ducts rather than exchanging industrial output for farm products on a much 
larger scale. But the U. S. is guilty of the same type of action. Recently 
we have encouraged the expansion of sugar production even though over 
the long run we could probably import our sugar requirements at about 60 
per cent of what it is now costing us to produce it. Nor can our highly sub-
sidized rice production be justified in terms of efficient use of our re-
sources or the resources of the free world. 
A third loss from the existing agriculiural and trade policies is the bar-
rier that these policies present in the path of achieving effective economic 
integration of the free world. The present round of trade negotiations are 
burdened by the high priority that most participants to those negotiations 
give to maintaining their current farm programs. 
I do not believe that selective import restrictions or market-sharing 
arrangements such as those described earlier can do anything but to ag-
gravate the losses described above. Such arrangements, in my opinion, 
will have the effect of contracting rather than expanding trade. 
There are clearly substantial gains to be achieved by expanding 
economically justified trade in agricultural products. However, we must 
not make the error of assuming that any and every increase in trade is 
beneficial. Some of the increases in agricultural trade within the EEC 
has probably replaced products from relatively low cost sources by rela-
tively high cost products. Some of our P. L. 480 shipments have dis-
placed lower cost products by relatively high cost products from the 
u. s. 
But it is all too clear that it is not going to be easy to achieve the 
modifications that are required before international trade in agricultural 
products will both expand and be redirected to permit demands to be met 
by relatively low cost producers. To achieve these ends require sub-
stantial modifications in the agricultural policies of most industrial 
nations, especially the nations of Western Europe and the United States. 
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Where income support for the farm population is deemed essential, it 
must be achieved in ways that do not encourage production or discourage 
consumption. Many of the industrial countries have followed policies 
that encourage too many resources, especially labor, to be retained in 
agriculture. It is difficult to now extricate themselves from this situa-
tion. But the long run gains, both direct! y to the countries involved 
and to the free world as a whole, are sufficiently important for industrial 
countries to give greater weight to the international implications of their 
domestic agricultural policies than it has been their practice in the past. 

REMARKS OF A CONGRESSMAN 
by Hon. Robert B. Duncan 1 
I feel most inadequate in my present capacity as a commentator on the two 
ITeceding papers (Lester R. Brown and n. Gale Johnson). As a member of Congress 
talking to farm program specialists , I am somewhat in the position of a1 general 
practitioner speaking with a group of heart specialists on problems peculiar to 
the heart. I would far prefer to listen and to learn an, incidentally, perhaps 
preserve the illusion of wisdom. 
I have been a lawyer and as a lawyer, I had to acquire some knowledge 
about many subjects in order to properly represent my clients in particular 
cases involving many different interests, including farmers, dairymen, and 
ranchers. I have served on the Agriculture Committee in the House for two 
years. All of this is far too little to give one more than the most cursory of 
expertise. I felt badly during my initial service on the Agriculture Committee 
that I couldn •t come up with ready solutions to the complex problems of agricul-
ture until I looked around and saw how many far wiser than I were in the same 
boat. 
Yet the realities of our system of government are such that the decisions 
on policy in agriculture, as well as all other fields of governmental interest 1 
are made 1 and I think should be made I by general practitioners rather than by 
specialists. Broad questions of national policy cannot be decided only by 
reference to specific interests of specific specialities. We must not permit 
the trees to obscure our vision of the forest. Specific solutions to specific 
problems can frequently be worked out if we have only minimal concern about 
the problems created by the solution in other areas. For all of its defects, our 
system of bringing to the decision-making process "general practitioners" 
aided and advised by "specialists" has worked rather well in maintaining a 
balance in this country. 
The specialist is something of an advocate as is the lawyer in the trial of 
a lew suit .. Each need look only to the best interests of his speciality or his 
client. The decision-maker I be he judge or a member of the legislature 1 must 
decide the over-all ..merits without the chance of being able to close his eyes 
to one or the other side. He is immeasurably aided I however I by the give and 
take of the controversy and conflicting interests which 1 hopefully, will permit 
him to arrive at the truth and a sound solution. 
I think it is true that some of these problems are of such significant local 
importance that the member of Congress from the affected district becomes some-
thing of an advocate himself. In this instance I he 1 too, tends to be less inter-
1 Mr. Duncan 1 a Democrat 1 is U. S. Representative of the Oregon 4th Congress-
ional District. 
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ested in the over-all merits of a proposed solution to a problem and to look only 
at the result so far as his own district is concerned. Even here I however I the 
broad spectrum of interest represented by 535 members of Congress guarantees 
a broad constructive approach to the problem for any such proposed narrow solution 
must almost inevitably conflict with another interest represented by other mem-
bers of Congress. In this instance and to the extent we can avoid the combin-
ing of multiple pieces of legislation in the same vehicle 1 these conflicts of 
direct interest will cancel each other out and . the decision will basically be 
made by the balance of the Congress I hopefully I considering the over-all 
national interest. 
In the statement presented by Mr. Brown 1 we have heard factual testimony--
a statistical analysis--of what we must conclude is an expanding demand for 
food both in quantity and in quality. The rapid expansion in population and the 
rising per capita income amply bear out this conclusion. He quite properly further 
points out that there are only two surplus food producing areas in the world and 
emphasizes the important stake the American farmer has in the export market 
with the production of one out of every four American acres now moving into 
export channels. 
Dr. Johnson 1 s paper I it seems to me I is a plea for freer trade (as disting-
uished from free trade) and for greater specialization with a significant dis-
cussion of contrary tendencies that appear on our national scene today. 
The lesson to me 1 in both papers 1 is again the importance of realizing 
that we cannot consider any of these problems in a vacuum. We cannot 
consider our commodity price support programs without considering their impact 
on each other and our whole domestic economy. We cannot consider our 
domestic agricultural program without considering its effect on the world mar .... 
ket I on our exports I and our imports. We cannot consider Food For Peace 
without considering its effect on the commercial market place and our political 
relations with other producting countries I as well as the poliUcal implications 
in the cold war. We can 1t consider our agricultural program without realizing 
the impact of population control or its absence 1 the development of the harvest 
of food from the sea 1 future power development--nuclear or otherwise I--
which might lead to saline water conversion and the reclamation of presently 
fertile but arid areas of the world I labor policies I conventional reclamation 
policies I indeed I the reapportionment of state legislatures I and the redis-
tricting of the Congress. 
Indeed 1 my own conclusion is that there is no greater potential for 
ultimately achieving world peace than a profound and sagacious agricultural 
policy. I do not believe we will ever have a world at peace as long as half 
the world 1 s population goes to bed hungry. 
We learn from these papers that no one economic interest in the United 
States has a greater stake in the expansion of our foreign trade than does the 
farmer. Yet it is specific farm commodity groups from whom we hear most 
frequently cries for protection from foreign imports--cries heard simultaneously 
with those from other commodity groups demanding a greater and freer access 
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to overseas markets. It is politically impossible to pursue both courses 
simultaneously, as Dr. Johnson points out. 
I think I too 1 we learn from this conference and these papers that there 
is every prospect that the next decade or two will see a change in the nature of 
our farm problem from one of producing too much to trying to produce more. 
This 1 it seems to me I is the justification for reclamation today and even with 
the tremendous potential for increased productivity in this country 1 we must 
lend our best efforts to increasing the productivity of the underdeveloped 
nations who so far cannot keep up with the increase in their population. We 
must 1 without ignoring research in techniques of production 1 concentrate a 
greater share of our agricultural research dollar t8 improving our marketing 
techniques 1 both transportation I packaging and others, so that we can get what 
we produce to hungry people at a fair return to our producer. 
I would conclude with only one further thought. I wish that the speakers 
who have addressed you today and throughout this conference could speak 
and get their message across to our constituents across this land. I wished 
equally as fervently that each of the farmers in my district could have 
accompanied me to the Food and Agricultural Conference in Rome last year 
to which I was a Congressional delegate. It is important that we raise our 
sights beyond our own farm I our own business I to know and realize intimately 
that we are a part of the whole world, that these questions are not all black and 
all white, that they cannot be reduced to "Are you for us or are you against us?" 
It is important that we I as a nation I realize that our long-run best interests as 
a nation and as individuals sometimes run counter to what we think are our 
short-term best interests. Herein lies the explanations for conflicting view-
points be members of Congress I all of whom have the best interests of this 
country at heart on such q1...lestions as Food for Peace to Egypt and the beef 
import bill. 
lt has been a pleasure to be with you; I assure you it has been most 
helpful and profitable for me to hear and study both of these excellent papers. 

NEW DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING AGRICULTURAL TRADE 
by John A. Schnittker1 
In his inaugural address last week, the President emphasized change, 
which is the chief characteristic of our world today. Change at breath-
taking speed distinguishes our age from all those which have gone before 
us. 
A changing world presents new challenges and new opportunities to 
American farmers and to that part of industry and trade which deals with 
agriculture. 
The great test of our time is not our skill in preserving the past but 
of our ability to direct the future to the fulfillment of our highest aspira-
tions. 
There are before us now many new economic and political develop-
ments whose importance to agriculture have been clearly recognized and 
thoroughly debated. The European Economic Community and its internal 
agricultural policies and external trade policies and the Kennedy Round 
of trade negotiations are two examples in this category. 
There are other actual or potential developments in world economic 
and political affairs whose importance is less clear and on which debate 
has beep. both confusing and vague. The possibility of linking domestic 
farm policies and trade agreements is one example here. 
There are still other economic prospects on the horizon which are 
intimately bound up with political considerations and where those con-
siderations call for a flexible policy which may differentiate between 
countries. Our trade relationships with the Soviet Union and With Soviet 
Bloc countries are one example in this area. 
Finally, there are emerging developments whose shape and scope 
are yet so dim that they remain on the fringe of public discussion, and 
they are debated seriously only within government and in the universities. 
Excellent examples of this latter group are the crucial role df the develop-
ing economies to the future of world trade, the arithmetic of the food gap 
1 Director of Agricultural Economics, U. S. Department of Agriculture 
-145-
-146-
in a decade or two if agriculture in the developing economies does not 
"take off" and the importance of the unity shown by the underdeveloped 
nations in last year's United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment. 
The European Economic Community is, of course, the most visible 
and most important of a number of endeavors to promote regional eco-
nomic integration. The European Free Trade Association and the Latin 
American Free Trade Association are less well known. All of them in-
crease the possibility of expanded trade in the future. If these economic 
groupings do not follow liberal, outward looking trade policies, all of 
them pose the threat and danger that the walls dismantled within may be 
maintained or even raised against outside countries. 
The prospects for continued economic growth and expanded markets in 
Western Europe and Japan appear to be good. Continued pressure on food 
prices and wages may make our farm products even more attractive there 
than they have been, barring setbacks to expanded trade as the negotia-
tions and the Common Agricultural Policy develop, and as their effects 
are felt. 
On the supply side, the United States will continue to be in a favor-
able position to supply Western Europe and Japan with all they need since 
we continue to have an exportable surplus and an excess productive ca-
pacity. 
Rising incomes in Western Europe have rapidly increased the demand 
for meat and meat products in recent years -- more rapidly, in fact, than 
their domestic production could be increased. Clearly this expansion in 
demand for meat and other quality foods will continue. What is less clear 
is whether or not efficient producing countries will have competitive access 
to European markets -- particularly for feed grains and oilseeds. Pending 
decisions on other products give cause for concern that European markets 
may not be allowed to expand as rapidly as their own interest might require. 
A second "new development" much in the public eye is the Kennedy 
Round of trade negotiations under the GATT. In Geneva today is being 
held a meeting of the Committee on Agriculture, the first since April of 
last year. Charged by the Ministers of the GATT countries in May 19 63 
with conducting negotiations leading to expansion of trade in agricultural 
products, the Agriculture Committee is exploring the means of furthering 
the negotiations. 
The United States remains determined that any ultimate Kennedy 
Round agreement must include liberalization of trade in agricultural as 
well as industrial products. 
-147-
The second category of developments which I noted -- the relation of 
domestic farm policies to international trade -- is one of the enigmas of 
present negotiations. More than two years ago, responsible officials of 
the United States and the EEC as well as other countries made known the 
willingness of their countries to "bring domestic policies into the negoti-
ations" on a reciprocal basis. 
Since that time o there has been a striking contrast between the direc-
tion of the domestic farm policies of the two major parties to the negotia-
tions. 
In the EEC, protection of poultry was increased sharply. The EEC 
gr-::,in price decision promises to give sharply higher prices to the only 
producers in the Community capable of significant expansion -- The 
French farmers o 
In the United States, in approximately the same period, feed grain ex-
port subsidies have been terminated, wheat export subsidies sharply re-
duced and cotton export subsidies slowly reduced. And the beef import 
legislation, which has been criticized in some quarters, is inoperative 
because of the world beef shortage 0 But more than that it provides an 
access formula for imports which includes growth --the kind of formula 
we would like to have our friends abroad consider. 
A year ago in citing our hopes for agriculture in the Kennedy Round, 
Secretary Freeman said that our negotiating approach" 0. 0 is a plan for 
trade liberalization and that is what the trade negotiations are all about. 
"It would require tariff cuts." 
"It would as sure markets to efficient producers and would require 
some limit to the measures encouraging inefficient production 0" 
"It would expose the trading practices and the domestic farm pol-
icies of the Free World to the test of the high principles under which 
the trade negotiations were launched." 
These words are at least as relevant today as a year ago. 
A third category of factors affecting trade is represented by our un-
easy East-West trade position. 
There are some farm products whose export to the Soviet Union we 
license routinely. There are others -- like wheat -- which have been 
licensed under certain restrictions and after a long public debate. 
Trade with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe is 
still another question, and there are extremely sensitive political 
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questions which must be resolved in connection with our policy toward 
these countries. As you know, the President said in the State of the 
Union Message that the government is now exploring ways to increase 
peaceful trade with these countries and with the Soviet Union. 
My purpose in citing this problem is to call it to the attention of a 
group of economists well situated to bring this matter to public attention. 
Future trade flows may well be significantly affected by the policy we 
ultimately adopt with respect to this trade. 
Finally, there is the role of the developing economies in the expan-
sion of the world' s commercial trade. 
The highly developed countries have been the best export markets for 
U.S. agricultural products~ With higher incomes, their consumers demand 
not only a larger volume of farm products but also a much greater variety. 
Our agricultural trade with the developed countries has grown about 
in line with increases in their national incomes. It will continue to 
expand this way. In fact, our farmers can look upon the developed world 
in much the same manner they view our own economy -- as a solid ex-
panding market -- and one which we expect to share in. 
It is the developing countries of the world that promise the greatest 
potential for long term growth in our markets for farm products. Popula-
tion in these countries is increasing more than twice as fast as in de-
veloped countries. Most of their people have been poorly fed and 
clothed, and they will demand more and better food and clothing as their 
incomes improve. However, in the absence of sufficient production or 
foreign reserves to finance food imports, the increased demand can fre-
quently result in inflation and reduced economic growth. It is in these 
situations that food aid can make a vital contribution. 
Total world trade appears to expand at a slightly faster rate than 
world incomes under pre sent conditions. 
But world trade in farm commodities rises more rapidly than total 
trade. A 1 0 percent increase in income in most countries is like! y to 
result in a 12 percent increase in imports of farm commodities. Farm 
products commercially imported' from the United States, those bought 
for dollars, have gone up fastest of all in recent years. 
If these large potential markets for our farm products are to be tapped 
in the emerging countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa, the countries 
must have higher incomes. 
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Our stake in their success may not appear to be as great as their own. 
But it is great enough to draw from us an enormous investment in food 
assistance, and a growing investment in technical assistance. 
There are other developments in the developing world which demand 
our at~ention. I referred to the 11 arithmetic of the food gap. 11 The 
ominous decline in per capita food supplies in free Asia the past few 
years must not only trouble the Free World nations; it must move us --
and them -- to action. 
The trade aspirations of the developing countries as expressed in 
last year's U.N. Conference and as noted in new GATT provisions about 
to be signed present a serious challenge to developed countries. These 
nations want to trade. In particular, they want concessions which will 
expand their exports without reciprocity. Expanded trade for the less 
developed countries will raise their standard of living, expanding de-
mands for all kinds of products. 
In laying the groundwork for the Trade Expansion Act, the late Pres-
ident Kennedy pointed out that a rising tide raises all boats. Our ob-
jective is a rising tide of international trade. 
W. Robert Parks, ISU vice president J. Carroll Bottum, Purdue, and Rep. Horace R. Kornegay (D-N.C.) 
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Participants listening to one of papers during session at Brookings Institution. 
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